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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation analyzes the pattern of deployment of wind power across the 
United States, focusing on the influence of wind resources, incentives/supportive 
government and governance policies, supportive/confounding infrastructures, and 
economic factors. The effects of these factors are considered for 35 states from the year 
2001 to 2012. Effects are estimated using fixed effects regression models, forward step-
wise between modeling, and lead-lag models. The results indicate that demand, electrical 
transmission availability, and complementary generation assets, as well as the import-
export of electricity are important factors in determining where wind energy deployment 
occurs. In addition, elevated levels of wind energy deployment are associated with 
policies that provide price support and increase demand for wind energy. This study 
concludes that while policies play a role in the development of wind energy, 
policymakers can also increase wind deployment by incentivizing infrastructures 
including transmission, complementary forms of generation and retirement of 
competitive generation assets. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction	
	
Background of the Problem 
Wind energy generation capacity in the United States has expanded rapidly since 
the beginning of the millennium to present. However, despite this overall brisk pace for 
development, growth rates across the 50 states have been uneven (Carley, 2009). 
Uniform economic incentives provided for wind energy production at the federal level 
extend to all 50 states; however, variation does exist in state-level regulatory and 
incentive structures for renewable energy production, thus providing differentiated 
inducements (DSIRE, 2011). In addition, each state possesses different resources, 
governance for development, and supportive infrastructures that shape the development 
of the wind energy resources. 
The uneven growth of wind energy deployment raises questions about the 
determinants that shape the deployment of wind power. Enhancing the importance of 
these differentiated results is the call by scholars and political institutions to increase 
renewable energy as part of the solution to the problems of global climate change, health 
and other environmental issues (Edenhofer, et al. 2011; Ezzati, et al. 2004; UN 2005). 
Scholars investigating wind energy deployment have primarily investigated the 
correlation between the level of megawatts (MWs) of renewable energy or wind deployed 
in each state with the existence of state and federal policy instruments while controlling 
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for economic, social, and resource factors (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Carley, 2009, Doris, 
Busche, et al., 2009; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Yin & Powers, 2010). These 
investigations have primarily focused on the question of whether particular state policies 
are or are not effective in increasing wind or renewable energy deployment. The results 
of these efforts has been somewhat mixed and researchers are just beginning to explore 
broader questions to understand the factors that determine the deployment of wind energy 
in a particular jurisdiction (Hitaj, 2012; Maguire, 2010;).  
Current research is shifting the focus from the correlation of policies to wind 
energy deployment to the determination of the underlying factors that increase or 
decrease wind power development. This study extends the research by including an 
examination of the effects of the existing and changing stocks of the complementary 
electrical infrastructures in each state. This research compares the strength of electrical 
infrastructures, state level governance, and supportive policies while examining the level 
of the wind energy resources and economic/contextual factors to determine the effects on 
the deployment level of wind power within a state. The results of this research identify a 
constellation of policies and supportive infrastructures that leads to elevated levels of 
wind energy deployment. The determination of this constellation of factors is important 
for policymakers concerned with accelerating deployment within the U.S. and in other 
countries.  
The electrical infrastructure considered by this study is often termed hard 
infrastructure while the policies and processes that govern the sector are referred to as 
soft infrastructure. This study therefore proposes to examine effects of the hard 
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infrastructure compared to the soft infrastructure while controlling for contextual factors 
that include economic and wind energy resources. The hard infrastructures are essential 
elements of the electrical system. Transmission is a hard infrastructure that is necessary 
to bring energy to market from areas where wind resources exist. Additional generation 
assets are also required to balance the grid when wind energy is not produced. Therefore, 
transmission and generation assets are economic complements to wind generation and 
should be investigated in concert with supportive and governance policies, economic 
factors, and wind resources to understand the deployment of wind energy. In addition, 
with all else equal, the retirement of generation assets increases the demand1 for 
additional generation facilities. It is essential to examine the electrical sector 
systematically to understand the determinants of wind energy deployment. 
Research Questions 
Simply stated, the overarching question is how do soft infrastructures, hard 
infrastructures, wind energy resources, and contextual factors interact to increase or 
decrease the deployment of wind energy? To examine this question, this study proposes 
to examine how policies, electricity transmission, asset depreciation, wind resources, 
wind energy prices, and generation characteristics influence the selection for investment 
in generation assets. The logic behind this approach is simple: differing governance 
regimes and infrastructure stocks exist within each state that influence the patterns of 
investment for new electrical generation assets. For example, transmission and generation 
																																																								
1 Demand in this study refers to total demand 
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assets are economic complements and these stocks vary across states. Furthermore, the 
investments in the stock of generation assets are influenced by the economic 
characteristics of the good, path dependencies, the existing policies, the pricing of future 
generation facilities, electricity demand, and the existing resource base that varies across 
each jurisdiction. Therefore, each of these factors should be examined concurrently in 
order to understand how renewable energy policies influence the future mix of electrical 
generation resources and either provide for or diminish wind energy deployment. 
These factors can be classified into three categories of determinants. The 
categories are (1) soft infrastructure or institutional factors and policies; (2) hard 
infrastructure or transmission and generation assets and (3) contextual factors. The soft 
infrastructure category includes policies that increase the capacity of wind deployment 
(requirements for renewable energy production or sales), the support production 
(monetary production incentives), and the governance policies (permitting regimes and 
regimes that govern access to transmission). The hard infrastructures include the stock of 
electrical transmission assets, existing generation assets, and depreciation/retirement of 
generation facilities. The contextual factors consist of wind energy resources and 
economic factors. These economic factors include demand for electricity, wind energy 
price, and electricity price, as well as the import and export of electricity between states. 
A typology of these factors is presented on Table 1, below. 
Table 1: Wind Energy Determinants 
Soft Infrastructure Hard Infrastructure Contextual Variables 
Permitting Procedures Electricity Transmission  Wind Resources 
Grid Governance Existing Generation Flexibility Wind Energy Prices 
Capacity Incentives Depreciation of Generation Stocks Electricity Demand 
Production Incentives  Electricity Import/Export
  Electricity Price 
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This study therefore seeks to determine how soft and hard infrastructures along 
with contextual factors interact to influence the development of the wind resource base 
within a state. This study focuses on comparing the influence of policies with the 
influence of infrastructure—particularly the stocks of transmission and generation within 
a state— since the existing infrastructure should, in conjunction with policies, influence 
the development of wind resources. This study is to determine the constellation of factors 
best predicts a state’s wind energy development. To answer this overarching question, 
specific questions should be explored which include the following: 
1. What are the relative strengths of the policy factors to the contextual factors? 
2. What are the relative strengths of the infrastructure variables in comparison to the 
contextual factors? 
3. What are the comparative strengths of the policy and infrastructure variables 
when including the contextual factors? 
4. What is the constellation infrastructure, policy, and contextual variables that 
foster the growth of wind energy generation? 
These questions are nested within the overall question of what accelerates or 
provides barriers to the development of wind energy. In other words, why is there a 
marked differentiation across states? Many of these questions have been explored 
recently by scholars conducting research into the effectiveness of various policies in 
promoting renewable energy (Doris, McLaren, et al., 2009; IEA, 2011; Mitchell, et al. 
2011). This study adds to previous work by focusing on policies in comparison to 
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supportive infrastructures to determine what constellation of system attributes is 
favorable for the deployment of wind energy. By identifying these factors, policy 
advancements providing incentives to actors outside of the wind energy industry may be 
identified to foster a more favorable environment for the implementation of wind energy.  
This study will add significantly to previous research by exploring: (1) the hard 
infrastructures including transmission, existing generation assets, and depreciation of 
existing generation assets, (2) the effects of siting, infrastructure, and economic policies 
that promote or detract from wind generation, and (3) the influence of actual wind energy 
prices. To accomplish these tasks, this study uses three novel datasets to represent the 
existing electrical generation assets, depreciation of these assets, and transmission stocks. 
Systematically Examining Wind Energy Deployment 
Researchers have taken a similar approach when examining the determinants of 
wind energy development. The research tends to presume that policy is causal or at least 
correlative with wind energy deployment and tests the correlation of policy requirements 
to wind energy deployment outcomes across states. In conjunction with this correlation, 
the researchers also examine other variables hypothesized to influence the outcomes. 
Researchers have not explicitly proposed theories or comprehensively explored 
systematic explanations for wind energy development. However, the causal chain of 
events for wind energy deployment includes the site selection and permitting, 
procurement of transmission and integration of produced electricity into markets. This 
chain of events has not been examined in previous research. As a result, the influence of 
hard infrastructures such as transmission, complementary generation, and depreciation of 
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generation assets on wind energy deployment has been under examined in previous 
studies.  
This study therefore takes a different direction from previous policy oriented 
research and proposes a systematic approach to examining wind energy deployment. This 
approach starts by assuming that wind energy generation is a portion of the total stock of 
generation assets and that all generation assets are subject to investment and depreciation 
(Figure 1). In other words, this study views generation as a stock of depreciating assets 
that requires investment to meet increased demand and generation retirement. The 
deployment of new generation assets is therefore required in order to maintain a flow of 
electricity in response to depreciation and demand requirements.  
 
Figure 1: Proposed Relationships of Infrastructures and Contextual Factors 
However, the existing generation asset mix also influences the technology 
selection for investment in generation. For example, existing generation stocks must be 
able to supply additional energy when the wind does not blow to meet demands in load. 
Therefore, reserve generation must be available to balance supply and demand 
accordingly. Without the appropriate mix of resources and reserves to balance wind 
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energy variability, wind cannot be added to the system. Thus, the stock of generation 
assets must be able to adjust to wind energy’s variable output to maintain flows of 
electricity, since supply and demand must balance on the electrical grid. Generation 
assets also retire and with all else equal these retirements would create market 
opportunities for other forms of generation. Therefore, generation assets that retire open a 
“market space” and represent opportunities that wind energy or other technologies may 
also take advantage of.  
Interconnection to the grid is necessary and transmission infrastructures are 
essential economic complements to generation that permits the flow of electricity to 
markets. Therefore, transmission must have sufficient capacity and be accessible to wind 
energy resources. Thus, the existing stock of generation and transmission assets 
influences the investment selection, since the new assets must be connected and 
integrated in a manner that allows for delivery to markets.  
The stocks of generation and transmission exist within a complex milieu of 
subsidies, set-asides and prescriptive governance processes that influence the selection of 
the various technologies that may be used to generate electricity.  In addition, the 
contextual factors within a state also shape to deployment outcomes. The outcomes in 
turn add to and influence the mix of generation stocks over time. 
Importantly, this study examines the selection of generation assets. In other 
words, this study is not concerned with selection of how existing assets meet 
instantaneous demand for electricity (or load) within markets, but it instead focuses on 
investigating the determinants of the selection of wind generation facilities to meet future 
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demand. Studies that have previously examined the relationship of wind energy 
deployment to various determinants have often not clarified the distinction of selection of 
generation assets for meeting future demand versus supply for instantaneous demand 
(e.g. Maguire, 2010). In other words, researchers have often examined factors related to 
electricity dispatch from existing facilities rather than factors that determine the selection 
of future generation technologies. The intent of this study is to explore the selection of 
future generation facilities and not to explore factors related to the utilization of existing 
assets meets load demand. 
To consider how future generation assets are selected, it is important to 
understand how decisions are made as influenced by the economics of the investment. 
Investments in generation and transmission assets are highly capital intensive and often 
considered “lumpy” investments. In other words, to obtain the service that the 
infrastructure provides, the entire facility must be constructed. For example, a 
transmission line must extend from the generation location to the area with load/demand. 
This facility must be complete with all required ancillary equipment in order to function 
and be of a specific size, which is often prohibitively expensive to upgrade. Therefore, 
the price of these transmission investments is not incremental and the provision usually 
does not match the incremental increases in demand. As a result, the price for the use of 
an uncongested facility should be equal to the short-run marginal costs with any higher 
price that recovers the capital at risk resulting in under-utilization of the facility. As the 
facility becomes congested prices rise; nonetheless, when the facility expands the 
developer incurs capital costs that must be passed on to the consumers at the same time 
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that prices decline to the short-run marginal costs. This “lumpy” characteristic of 
infrastructure leads to a jagged price pattern that is problematic for the return of invested 
or risk capital. The lumpy characteristics of infrastructures have several effects on the 
ability of the investors to obtain returns and imply long siting and construction times and 
“schizophrenic” investment patterns (Schuler, 2012).  
Investments and depreciation in generation facilities are also related to the “lock-
in” effect of existing technological, economic, system-level infrastructure, and 
institutional factors. Infrastructure investments are usually very long lasting. For 
example, generation assets typically are in service for a period of 30 to 50 years. This 
characteristic leads to institutional structures that may not be favorable to new market 
entrants. For instance, utility operators have been trained in an environment that consisted 
of large, conventional central power plants. This training may bias operators to reject 
variable renewable energy resources (Sovacool, 2009). In addition to institutional lock-in, 
geographic lock-in also occurs. The location of transmission assets are based upon the 
generation assets and technologies that existed at the time of transmission construction. 
In other words, conventional fossil plants were located as needed on the transmission 
network with fuels transported to that location, or transmission was located to suit the 
development of the large-scale fossil plants near the available fossil resources. Wind 
energy is site-specific and must be located with the resource, thus providing additional 
challenges to the developer resulting from transmission path dependency. This difference 
between wind and fossil generation has influenced the geography of the grid and 
potentially disadvantaged the development of wind resources. 
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Wind energy does not enter into a virgin market but instead must compete with 
existing technologies that provide similar services. As previously stated, the 
infrastructure that exists has evolved to accommodate existing technologies and therefore 
may be less (or more) favorable to the market entrant. Proximate causes, such as resource 
levels and price differentials (as influenced by policies), may therefore only have limited 
explanatory power. Indeed, case study research on the deployment of wind power has 
argued that the catalysts for breaking technological lock-in for wind development include 
not only high wind resources and wind energy cost reductions but also supportive and 
stable institutional frameworks. Factors characterized as barriers to wind include 
cumbersome and lengthy authorization processes, difficulties accessing the grid, and 
obtaining authorizations to interconnect (del Rio & Unruh, 2007). These factors may lead 
to lock in of the existing technology in preference to the new market entrant. These 
factors are coincidental with the main variables considered in this study (Table 1 and 
Figure 1); however, the previous studies that considered these factors have done so 
qualitatively through case studies while this study will examine these factors 
quantitatively. 
 Hard infrastructures. Investment in generation plants is influenced by the 
existing and ongoing investments in hard infrastructures, including transmission2. 
Transmission is a capital stock in this study, subject to investments and depreciation. The 
study does not consider the drivers of the stock level of transmission, but instead 
																																																								
2 A glossary of terms is provided in Appendix A. 
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develops an indicator for the stock level. Augmenting the complementary nature of 
transmission, the generator is often required to pay upgrades to accompany new 
generation, including upgrading existing transmission and provision of transmission to 
the nearest substation. The upgrades and generation tie lines (or gen tie lines in industry 
parlance) increases the costs for developers and influences the investments in electric 
generation technologies. Consequently, the investments in wind energy generation are 
influenced by the stock of transmission. Therefore, these stock levels should be 
considered. Hypothetically, increased transmission availability across a state and 
corresponding increase in capacity would be positive for the deployment of wind 
generation. 
Another hard infrastructure that influences selection of future generation assets is 
the existing generation assets available to balance the demand and supply of electricity. 
Consumers of electricity are primarily atomistic actors that create demand through 
individual actions, while suppliers are coordinated to balance the variable load. 
Therefore, the ability to adjust supply through the management of generation output is 
critical. Different technologies have differentiated abilities to adjust output. Balanced 
against these operating constraints is the variable nature of wind energy generation. 
Therefore, the stock of generation assets must not only balance against the variability in 
demand, but also variability in wind energy production or supply of electricity. The 
ability to balance loads is therefore essential in the selection of the future assets, 
including wind. This study hypothesizes that states with higher levels of generation assets 
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that can quickly adjust to supply or demand changes are able to integrate higher levels of 
wind energy development. 
The depreciation or retirement of the existing generation assets is another facet of 
the hard infrastructure to consider. Depreciation decreases the supply of electricity to the 
market on a long-run basis, thus affording a “market space” for new entrants. 
Depreciation may also be lumpy, since large generator retirements can open a large 
market space for new entrants. While many plants have a certain life expectancy, 
depreciation must be considered in conjunction with policy. For example, the 
implementation of new air quality standards may accelerate the depreciation of plants 
with higher emissions. This study examines facility retirements by collecting the state-
level data for the period of the study. Increased retirements are hypothesized as favorable 
for additional wind energy deployment. 
Soft infrastructures. Soft infrastructure consists of the policies and governance 
structures that influence the patterns of development. Policies either accelerate or retard 
the development of wind energy by influencing the return on investment. Wind energy 
return on investment is influenced by policy in two ways: (1) through economic support 
and (2) through favorable permitting or governance procedures. Developers should prefer 
environments with higher levels of economic support and governance procedures that 
accelerate the approval of developments and access to transmission, thus increasing the 
returns to investor and decreasing the risk capital associated with the cost of licensure.  
This study also considers the influence of soft infrastructures that govern access to 
the grid. Grid access procedures can either accelerate or retard the development of wind 
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power. In this study, developers are assumed to prefer areas where governance of the grid 
affords non-discriminatory access, thus enhancing the opportunity to connect to markets. 
Areas where non-discriminatory practices are required are within the territories of 
relatively new independent grid governance structures known as Independent System 
Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Authorities (RTOs)3. Wind energy 
deployment is hypothesized to increase in areas subject to these governance structures 
relative to the areas without independent governance. 
Contextual factors. Wind resources are obviously an important factor to control 
for in this study since where wind resources are not present wind energy development 
cannot take place. On the other hand, where wind resources are prolific, the number of 
potential sites may encourage development. The presence of higher levels of wind 
resources is hypothesized as positive for deployment. This study will account for wind 
resources across states and limit the study population based upon the resource 
availability.  
The relative prices of various generation assets should influence the selection of 
wind energy versus other technologies. Relative prices are self-explanatory, since with all 
else equal, profit maximizing firms will select the lowest cost type of generation to 
maintain the level of capital stocks necessary to generate sufficient flows of electricity. 
Yet, significant debate exists regarding the determination of the lowest cost technology 
for generation and there significant complicating factors to directly comparing 
																																																								
3 A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix B 
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technologies. These complicating factors include various subsidies for each type of 
technology, intermittency for renewables, variable and fixed cost differences, and 
differences in capital costs. This study summarizes this debate in Chapter Three and 
proposes to examine the effects of wind energy prices to the deployment of wind. This 
examination will provide evidence of whether markets are sensitive or insensitive to price 
signals. Lack of price sensitivity would indicate that economic supports and/or policies 
distort the market for selection of future generation technologies to the point where 
technological cost comparisons are not valid.  
Electricity demand is also another obvious contextual factor to examine when 
exploring the determinants of wind energy deployment. Since increased demand requires 
increased supply, opportunities for additional capacity additions would be created, that in 
turn provide opportunities for wind generation. These areas would be where demand 
growth is most rapid and therefore, where wind may develop at an accelerated rate, 
because of greater opportunity. On the other hand, should increases in efficiency or a 
reduction in economic activity decrease demand, then opportunities to construct new 
generation facilities should be less. In-state electricity demand will be examined to 
determine the influence of wind energy deployment. 
Import and export of electricity should considered, since states with large wind 
assets may export power through transmission networks. Conversely, states with lower 
levels of wind energy may also import the energy to meet policy or load requirements. 
These imports and exports determine whether wind power deployment is occurring 
resulting from in state or out of state demand. In addition, should states with higher 
	
	
	
	
16
imports and exports show increased deployment, the transmission links between states 
are an important factor. 
 
Dependent Variable – Wind Energy Generation  
This study examines the level of stocks of wind energy generators. Wind energy 
deployment is the dependent variable for this study, since we are concerned with what 
factors influence the stock level. For the dependent variable, variation must exist within 
the selected unit of analysis. This section examines the various indicators to measure the 
stock level and demonstrates variation in stock levels across US states.  
The measurement of the level of wind energy development within a state presents 
a challenge for researchers, since wind is an intermittent resource and output varies 
according to the wind regime, variability of the climate and the turbine model. Each wind 
turbine model has a nameplate capacity, which refers to the full-load output of the turbine 
under ideal conditions. Therefore, the nameplate capacity refers to what the instantaneous 
turbine electrical output would be at an optimal wind speed. This capacity is expressed in 
megawatts (MWs). Wind speeds vary over time; therefore, the maximum capacity of the 
turbine is not produced throughout the year. The actual production is measured in 
megawatt hours (MWh), which is the actual output of the turbine through the various 
wind conditions during a period. Production varies over time from wind speed variability 
and the turbine’s power curve. The power curve is essentially the output of a particular 
model of turbine as a function of wind speed. The ratio between the ideal full load output 
over time and actual generation over time is the gross capacity factor. Specifically when 
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accounting for losses that occur from conditions related to energy production, such as 
icing and soiling of turbine blades or other factors, the net capacity factors is determined. 
Net capacity factors typically range in modern turbines from 20% to 40% but may be 
over 50% for superior wind sites. In comparison, fossil fuel or nuclear plants typically 
have higher capacity factors greater than 70%, with the downtime typically associated 
with scheduled maintenance (Energy Information Agency, 2013).  
The differentiation in the capacity factors for wind versus fossil plants is 
problematic when comparing either the nameplate capacity within a state for all sources 
of electricity, or the percent of total generation by source. Comparing fossil and wind 
resources strictly on nameplate capacity leads to the perception that the nameplate wind 
generation capacity is actually higher than nameplate conventional energy, since wind 
energy has a lower capacity factor. On the other hand, comparison by MWh of output is 
also somewhat problematic since wind production varies from year to year from annual 
variations in weather patterns. This variation obviously affects the total output of other 
producers as well, since electricity supply and demand must balance. Balancing the grid 
by accepting more wind generation requires decreasing production from other sources 
(with all else being equal), thus, reducing the production from other generation types 
during the year.  
Research specific to wind energy deployment has utilized nameplate capacity and 
generation output measures in a number of ways to handle the issue of wind power 
intermittency. Researchers have utilized dependent variables that include: the nameplate 
capacity per state, nameplate capacity additions per county, nameplate capacity divided 
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by state wind energy potential nameplate capacity, growth in capacity and number of 
large projects (>25 MW) (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Hitaj, 2012; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali & 
Kneifel, 2011). Notwithstanding these considerations, consensus has emerged among 
researchers in wind energy that total nameplate MWs capacity is the appropriate measure 
for exploring wind energy determinants and policy influence. 
Following the standard methods for describing wind energy development this 
study will use the total nameplate capacity of deployed wind in power a state as the 
dependent variable. Considering nameplate capacity, this measure does indicate in 
absolute terms the total MWs of wind energy development within a state despite the 
concerns with production. With all else equal, the total MWs should be equivalent to 
where investment capital is being deployed, and therefore, indicate where favorable 
environments exist for investment.  
Wind energy deployment across states. Wind energy deployment across the US 
has varied across space and time. The level of total deployment across states in the year 
2012 shows that several states have achieved relatively high levels of deployment, while 
others have lagged in the levels of wind energy deployed. In 2012, Texas was the leader 
in terms of MWs of nameplate capacity deployed with a level more than double the next 
state, which was California (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Total MWs Deployed per State - 2012 (States>250 MWs) 
Source: (US Department of Energy 2014) 
	
Nonetheless, these two leading states have taken very different development 
paths. At the turn of the century, California was the leader in deployed MWs of wind 
energy and thus started the century with relatively high levels of deployment. Texas, on 
the other hand, started with very little development but rapidly overtook California. 
Deployment in Texas than accelerated making the state the US leader in wind energy 
deployment. Other states have shown varying patterns in the deployment of wind (Figure 
3). These differentiated paths to the outcomes provide variation across time for the 
dependent variable. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative MWs Deployed 1999-2012 States with >1000 MWs in 2012 
Source: (US Department of Energy 2014) 
 
Independent Variables 
The measurement and operationalization of the factors that influence wind energy 
deployment are essential to this study. The following sections provide an overview of the 
factors that influence wind energy deployment. Further details regarding the 
operationalization and data collection for all variables are found in Chapter Three.  
 
Wind resource availability and variation. Obviously, a large factor to consider 
is the wind resource availability. Wind resources are mapped and the distribution of these 
resources is heterogeneous across the United States (Figure 4). As the map clearly shows, 
large swaths of the central United States, including parts of the states of Texas, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, and North 
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Dakota and South Dakota have large areas of high average annual wind speeds at a height 
of 80 meters above ground level. However, in the southeastern states, large areas are 
relatively devoid of resources. In the northeast and western US, resources are spotty, but 
many of these states have wind resources that would support development. Thus, while 
some areas are devoid of resources, large areas of the United States are amenable to wind 
energy development. Consequently, this study will be limited to states that possess 
sufficient wind energy development potential, as discussed in the section for the selection 
of the population for analysis (below). 
 
      Figure 4: Average Wind Speeds at 80 meters Above Ground Surface 
Source: (US Department of Energy, 2014) 
In addition to mapping the resource availability, the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory has calculated the potential for wind energy deployment (in MWs of 
nameplate capacity) across all fifty states (US Department of Energy, 2014). The 
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resource availability calculation considers the land area within each state that has a gross 
capacity factor of at least 30%. The researchers also excluded wilderness areas, parks, 
urban areas, and water features from the potential. The resource estimates reflect the 
resource availability at an 80-meter hub height, the standard for turbine height during the 
period of this study. From this analysis, approximately 10,956,912 MWs of potential 
wind energy capacity exists across the United States (US Department of Energy, 2014).  
Examining these resource endowments more closely, Texas has nearly twice the 
estimated nameplate capacity as the next state, Kansas (Figure 5). Two tiers are apparent 
for the resource endowments below Texas before the number of potential MWs declines 
in a relatively rapid fashion. In the first tier of states, Kansas has relatively the same 
resource base as Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota with wind 
resource capacities ranging from 952,000 MW to 770,000 MW of nameplate capacity. 
The next tier of states consists of Iowa, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Alaska, and New Mexico, 
with potential wind development ranging from 570,714 MWs to 489,270 MWs of 
nameplate capacity. Resource availability then rapidly declines with Wisconsin and 
Arizona demarking the 100,000 MW and 10,000 MW potential, respectively.  
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Figure 5: Potential Nameplate Capacity by State (>10,000 MW potential) 
Source: (US Department of Energy, 2014) 
This study hypothesizes that areas with higher resources are correlative with 
higher levels of deployment. Therefore, to examine the variation in resource endowment 
across states, this study utilizes the NREL wind energy potential as a fixed independent 
variable. 
Electrical transmission development. In the electrical industry, transmission 
refers to the infrastructure necessary to move electricity from generation sources to load 
centers juxtaposed to distribution. Distribution is the movement of electricity into local 
areas for consumption, typically from substations that receive the energy transmitted 
from generation sources. Transmission lines are typically 69 kilovolts (kV) or greater in 
capacity and distribution lines are typically lines that are 33 kV or less. The voltage of the 
transmission line refers to the electric energy charge difference of the electrical potential 
energy transported between two points and relates to the capacity of the line. The linear 
or geographic unit of measurement of transmission is typically in circuit-miles where the 
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distance is equivalent to the distance (in number of miles) that the individual circuits on a 
line cross. The circuits on a line refer to the number of conducting lines that a 
transmission line may have. Specifically, a power pole may have only one circuit or 
multiple circuits (usually when multiple, the configuration is two circuits and referred to 
as a double-circuited line) on a single transmission structure. Should a line be double-
circuited, the circuit miles are doubled as is the lines’ capacity. 
In this study, it is important to note that transmission is defined as the 
transportation of electricity from the generator’s step-up transformer substation to a step 
down transformer where the electricity is distributed. Generating stations typically 
interconnect to a step-up transformer that in turn connects to transmission lines. These 
transmission lines lead to substations where voltages are stepped down for distribution. 
Figure 6 depicts the key elements of the electric power grid, including these transmission 
features. 
 Figure 6: Key Elements of the Electric Power Grid 
Source: US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004 
 
Geographically, the existing transmission is not coincidental with the wind 
resources for the United States as a whole, since most of the wind resources exist in areas 
that are remote from load and have relatively few high voltage transmission assets. Figure 
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7 depicts the wind resource (left panel) versus the transmission assets (right panel) for 
transmission greater than 500 kV. Thus, the areas with the greatest wind resources have 
very few high capacity transmission lines. Coincidentally, this area has 47% of the 
nation’s generation interconnection requests (Silverstein, 2011). Should these 
interconnection requests be primarily wind energy, this specifically points to an 
additional geographic problem for wind generation, the disparity between resource 
locations and load centers on a national basis juxtaposed to in-state demand.  
	
Figure 7: Transmission Assets versus Wind Resources 
Source: (Silverstein, 2011) 
 
Typical transmission voltages are 230 kV, 345kV, 500kV, and 750kV. These 
higher voltages enable higher transmission capacities in terms of MW. Elevated or 
increasing transmission availability is hypothesized as a positive factor in the 
development of additional generation resources. To examine the effects of the geography 
of the transmission system, this study will use the circuit miles of transmission within 
each state. Therefore, the growth in circuit miles of transmission represents the expansion 
of transmission availability within a jurisdiction. Therefore, the number of circuit miles 
per state provides a reasonable approximation of the capacity expansion of transmission. 
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Policy. The policy instruments that incentivize wind energy consist of four broad 
types: production incentives, financial incentives, capacity incentives and favorable 
permitting regimes. Production incentives are based on the amount of energy produced. 
Financial incentives consist of favorable tax treatment that is primarily associated with 
the jurisdiction where the facility is located. Capacity incentives are those measures that 
require or incentivize a particular amount of renewable energy to be installed. A 
favorable siting policy refers to the preferential treatment of wind energy in comparison 
to other forms of generation during the licensing process. 
 
 Wind energy production incentives. Wind energy is subject to production 
subsidies at the federal and state level. These subsidies take the form of tax credits or 
cash payments for energy production, typically in cents per kWh. Variation exists across 
the states in the type of and amount of production subsidy that each state provides to 
wind energy. In 2012, three states considered in this study (see Selection of the 
Population, below) provided a state level production tax credit (PTC). The federal PTC is 
consistent across states; yet, recent research indicates that the federal production tax 
credit interacts with state level incentives to provide elevated wind deployment relative to 
when the PTC is not in force (Shrimali, Lynes and Indvik 2015). The data for total PTC 
incentives are available for all jurisdictions on a cents/kWh (or $/MWh) basis that allows 
for the examination of the effects of these policies that incentivize wind energy across 
states.  
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Wind energy financial incentives. Wind energy financial incentives in this study 
consist of relief from or credits for corporate tax, property taxes, and equipment sales 
taxes. All property taxes and sales tax are exemptions and not credits. In the case of the 
property taxes, the state typically does not levy the current state property tax on the 
benefit of the installation of the facility equipment. In the case of the sales tax exemption, 
a similar approach applies where the state does not levy the tax. Finally, the corporate tax 
consists of investment tax credits (ITC) or a deduction of the cost of the equipment from 
the corporate income.  
Wind energy capacity incentives. A popular state level policy is the RPS that 
provides a market set-aside through a generation or sales requirement for a percentage of 
energy production. This requirement varies across states; nonetheless, the number of 
MWs of nameplate capacity or MWh of required generation can be estimated for each 
state for each year the policy is in force. In addition to the RPS, some states also support 
wind energy demand through mandatory green power purchase options for consumers 
and state government green power purchasing (GPP).  
Wind energy siting policies. Wind energy is subject to a permitting process where 
the government provides a license to construct and operate the facility. Three basic 
models have been proposed at the state level: 1) a locally based (Standard), 2) a 
simplified state-level model and 3) a minimal model (Bohn & Lant, 2009). In addition to 
these state based requirements, where federal lands exist, a federal permit is typically 
required.  Federal permitting is in addition to the local or state requirements ad would 
represent an added burden to developers. Some states, such as Texas and states east of the 
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Rocky Mountains, have very little federal lands. States within the Rocky Mountain west 
and along the west coast have varying amounts of federal lands. This study proposes to 
determine if developers avoid a cumbersome and expensive federal processes through an 
examination of the area of federal lands within a state. 
Transmission access policies. The governance of the access to transmission 
should influence levels of wind development. Two structures exist across the United 
States: the RTO/ISO administered transmission grids and utility operated grids. Utility 
operated grids are argued as preferentially granting utility generators access to 
transmission in lieu of independent power providers who typically develop wind assets 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014). Therefore, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) supported the creation of the RTO/ISO governance, 
where the transmission assets are operated by an independent entity that is designed to 
provide non-discriminatory access to generators. These entities were authorized and 
encouraged through FERC orders 888, 889, and 2000, which were enacted in the late 
1990s (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014). The first independent grid 
operations commenced operations in 1998. These entities have expanded over time and 
these governance structures are hypothesized to afford elevated access to wind 
generators. This study investigates the effects of these transmission governance structures 
through the development of data for the territory within each state that is subject to 
RTO/ISO governance. 
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Selection of generation assets. The cost of deploying various generation assets 
should be examined to determine the influence of price to the selection of future 
generation technologies. Renewable energy researchers have compared various 
technologies for generating electricity through two differing methods. Researchers have 
examined (1) the percentages of the various forms of electrical generation and (2) the fuel 
prices for thermal generation (Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali & 
Kneifel, 2011).  Turning first to fuel prices, this operationalization only captures one 
aspect of the cost of competing forms of generation, the variable costs of fuels, which is 
problematic. Other costs must be incorporated in addition to fuels, such as the capital 
costs of the facilities, operational costs, maintenance costs, and financing. These costs 
comparisons have been explored through calculations of the levelized costs of electricity 
or LCOE. LCOEs have been the subject of fierce debate and several issues are incumbent 
with the use of these measures, as well. Second, percentages of generation are 
problematic with respect to the variation in generation that occurs, particularly where 
variable assets, such as wind are considered. 
This study proposes to avoid the aforementioned debates and to focus on the 
actual power purchase price (PPA) of wind energy to test whether wind deployment 
levels across states are sensitive to the price of wind energy. Should wind deployment 
levels not be sensitive to price, this would indicate that policy instruments may provide 
support such that comparisons across technologies on a percentage or fuel price basis 
may not be feasible from market distortions. Lack of price sensitivity would suggest that 
policies to support wind are effective. 
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Flexibility of the generation mix. Demand for electricity or load usually varies 
throughout the day. Usually load grows in the morning, peaks in afternoon, decreases in 
late evening, and reaches a low point in the early morning (Figure 12). The minimal 
demand that is present throughout the 24-hour period is met with “baseload” assets – 
assets where the variable costs are low. Variable costs are those costs for electrical 
facilities are that change with variations in output. Variable costs consist mainly of fuel 
for the facility (although some operations and maintenance costs may change with 
variations in output). Changing the output from a particular facility or “ramping” is in 
reaction to changes in load, or occur from in changes to supply. Intermediate demand is 
load above baseload requirements and is served by assets with slightly higher variable 
costs. Finally, peak demand is met with the most responsive technologies. Typically, 
these technologies have the highest variable costs. 
 
Figure 8: Typical Load Curve 
Source: (Kaplan, 2008) 
 
 This study proposes to examine the influence of the flexibility of each state’s 
generation fleet to affect wind energy deployment. The assets in each state are grouped 
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according to a topology of baseload, intermediate and peaking assets. The number of 
MWs of nameplate capacity of each type provides an indication of how flexible the 
generation fleet would be in response to changes in supply or demand. This novel 
examination should shed additional light on the competitive versus complimentary nature 
of various assets and on how the existing generation technologies influence wind 
deployment.  
Depreciation and retirement of facilities. No previous research was identified 
that considers the depreciation of the capital stock of generation assets. With all else 
equal, there must be increased demand or substitution of retiring generation assets for the 
deployment of additional generation assets to occur. Considering depreciation increases 
net demand by removing supply from the market, retirements should be considered. The 
EIA tracks the retirement of electrical generation facilities on EIA form 860. The data 
indicates that since 1999, over 66,000 MWs of generation assets have been retired across 
the US. With many plants reaching the end of their economic lives during the next 
decade, retirements should increasingly provide increased market space and hence, 
demand for new generation facilities to replace these retirements. Capital stock 
depreciation will be examined by determining the number of MWs of generation that are 
“retired” within a particular jurisdiction. Retirement of facilities may not be related to the 
economic life of the facility, but instead to factors such as emission policies that increase 
costs or through lower cost competing technologies. These factors are considered in 
detail in Chapter Three. 
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Electricity demand, import/export, and electricity price. Demand for 
electricity must also be examined as a factor that influences deployment. Obviously, with 
all else equal, increased demand would require additional supply that may be provided by 
wind energy generation. This study examines the influence of demand by utilizing a 
measurement of the total demand per state in MWh. However, demand can also be filled 
through imports into a state via transmission. Conversely, exports of power may also fill 
demand outside of a particular jurisdiction. To examine the imports and exports of 
electricity, this study will utilize a measure of the MWh of electricity that a state imports 
or exports. Similarly, electricity prices may also increase or decrease the deployment of 
wind power since higher prices may allow for higher priced generation within a 
jurisdiction or lower prices may require lower cost generation. The electricity price in this 
study refers to the average sales price within a state for residential, commercial, and 
industrial electricity sales. Prices for electricity do differ across jurisdictions and may 
influence the deployment of wind energy in either a positive or a negative manner. This 
study will examine the price in cents/kWh across states to consider the influence of price 
on wind energy deployment. 
 
Summary of Variables Influencing Wind Power Deployment 
This section summarizes the variables this study will examine in exploring the 
determinants of wind energy deployment. Soft infrastructures will be examined through 
variables related to policies for wind energy economic support, wind siting and 
transmission access. Hard infrastructures are examined including transmission, 
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generation fleet flexibility, and depreciation of generation assets. Economic contextual 
variables include the price of wind energy, imports, and exports of electricity, electricity 
demand, and average sales price. Finally, the wind resource potential accounts for the 
availability of wind in each jurisdiction. These factors are examined in a cross-sectional 
panel dataset for the years 2001 through 2012. Two factors, wind energy potential and the 
proxy for wind siting policies, are fixed for the period of 2001-2012. The specific factors 
examined by this study are presented on Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary of Variables 
Variable Type Operationalization/Units 
MWs of Wind Energy 
Deployed 
Dependent Variable Total MWs within a state 
Renewable Energy 
Production Incentives 
Independent Variable Value of federal and state production 
subsidies within a jurisdiction on a 
dollars per MW basis 
Renewable Energy 
Capacity Incentives 
Independent Variable Total GWHrs required per year of 
renewable energy generation.  
Wind Energy Financial 
Incentives 
Independent Variable Financial incentives provided to 
developers for property and sales taxes 
(binary variables). 
Wind Siting Policies Independent Variable Total area of federal lands within a state 
(acres) 
 
Transmission 
Governance Policies 
Independent Variable Area (square miles) of each state with an 
RTO/ISO governance structure 
Transmission Stocks Independent Variable Total Circuit Miles  
Flexibility of Generation 
Assets 
Independent Variable MWs of baseload, intermediate and 
peaking generation. 
Generation Retirement Independent Variable MWs of generation removed from service 
within a state 
Wind Energy Potential Independent Variable Total MWs of potential generation within 
a state 
Price of Wind 
Generation 
Independent Variable Price of wind energy from PPAs as $ per 
MWh on a regionalized basis 
Demand Independent Variable Total TW/h of electricity generated 
 
Imports/Exports Independent Variable MWh of imports or exports of generation 
from or to a state. 
Electricity Price Independent Variable Average cents per kwh of commercial, 
residential, and industrial electricity 
prices within a state. 
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Scope of the Study 
The study will be limited in scope to large-scale facility deployment and examine 
the period from 2001-2012 when significant wind energy deploy has occurred in the 
United States. Large-scale facilities are defined as wind energy generation with projects > 
1 MW. Small-scale wind generation for home or personal use will not be considered.  
The period from 2001 to 2012 was selected since deployed wind energy facilities 
did not extend across a significant number of jurisdictions until after 1999. Actual wind 
capacity expanded from 6,737 MWs to 140,089 MWs during this period. This study 
therefore captures 95% of the total deployment of wind energy in MWs of nameplate 
capacity up to year 2012. This sample is therefore indicative of the vast majority of the 
wind energy deployed in the United States until the year 2012. Finally, 2012 is the last 
year that data are available for a number of the indicators proposed. 
The sample for this study is developed from the United States at the state level. 
Several advantages exist for using this unit of analysis. First, the policies related to wind 
energy siting, and incentives are usually uniform within the state. For example, within 
each state the tax incentives and RPS requirements are uniform within each jurisdiction 
and therefore these variables can be compared across the units. Data exists at the state 
level for wind energy potential, resources and deployment, depreciation, exports/imports, 
electricity pricing and electricity demand. Nevertheless, the generation assets and grid 
operations are problematic, since these typically do not fall within state boundaries. In the 
case of system operations, there are often disparities between the areas served and state 
lines. Generation assets may be dispatched across state lines to serve areas within another 
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jurisdiction through import and exports of electricity. Data on transmission stocks is not 
typically maintained at the state level, but instead at the entity level or at the regional 
level. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Selection of population for analysis. A number of analysts have utilized 
regression techniques to examine either wind energy or renewable energy development. 
The population selection by these analysts has varied but essentially, there are two 
differing approaches. Those analysts examining the effects of an RPS on overall 
renewable generation have been more inclusive, typically examining 48 to 50 states 
(Carley, 2009; Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Yin & 
Power, 2010). The analysts that have examined wind energy determinants have usually 
focused on defining the populations through the wind power potential of a state. The 
number of states defined by wind potential as part of the population has ranged from a 
low of 25 (Maguire, 2010) to a high of 39 (Menz & Vachon, 2006). Table 3 summarizes 
the population selections from previous studies. 
Table 3: Population Selection for Previous Quantitative Renewable Energy Studies 
Analyst(s) Number 
of States 
Criteria for Selection 
 
Adelaja, et al, 2010 50 Not described 
Bohn and Lant, 2011 37 Wind Potential Available, Wind Energy Developed 
>10 MW 
S. Carley, 2009 48 Hawaii and Alaska eliminated from lack of wind 
energy data 
Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011 
48 Hawaii and Alaska eliminated from lack of resource 
data 
Gong, 2011 48 Not described 
Maguire, 2010 25 Limited to states with wind potential 
Menz and Vachon, 
2006 
39 Excluded states without data or low wind quality 
(<500 MW) 
Kneifel, 2008 49 Inclusive policy study of all renewables  
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Shrimali and Kneifel, 
2011 
50 Not Described 
Yin and Powers, 2010 50 Inclusive policy study of all renewables 
 
The previous population selections point to a significant flaw in the analyses that 
have been inclusive of all states. While the states may have policies to promote 
renewables, they may not have the resources to do so. Indeed, wind power has been the 
most economic and cost competitive renewable resource until recent price drops in solar 
photovoltaic. Results of analyses conducted utilizing 48-50 states may be skewed since 
development of renewable energy in these states is cost prohibitive, or simply infeasible 
from a lack of resource availability. 
This study selects the population for analysis based on two criteria: (1) the 
existence of resources and (2) the actual development of resources during the period of 
study. In other words, in the first instance, a state must possess sufficient resources to 
develop wind power, or it cannot be defined as a member of the population of states 
where wind development can take place despite any policy instruments or other 
incentives. In the second instance, some states have developed a high percentage of their 
wind resources, despite having a low resource base. For example, the estimated wind 
energy potential for West Virginia and Pennsylvania is 1883 and 3307 MWs, 
respectively. Regardless, the development of the resources in these states is high as a 
percentage of the potential with Pennsylvania developing over 40% of the resource base 
and West Virginia over 30%. Therefore, it is important to examine states that may have 
low levels of resources as well as those with very high levels to understand how these 
high penetration levels are achieved. The population must include states where 
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development is taking place, despite having a relatively low resource base and those 
states, which have high resources, irrespective of whether relatively high development 
has been achieved. 
Examining the data, Massachusetts has a resource base estimated as 1028 
potential MWs; however, the state has developed approximately 10% of the resource. 
Either no states with resources less than 1000 MWs have developed their resource base to 
this extent, or it is the result of an extremely low resource base. For example, Delaware 
has a wind energy potential of 9 MWs and the development is 5 MWs. Obviously, this 
state represents an outlier since development of the entire resource base could consist of 
the deployment of a very limited number of turbines. In the case of state with over 1000 
MWs of resource potential, particularly a smaller state, development of a significant 
portion of the resource base would require a much larger effort. This study therefore 
proposes that the population consists of all state with >1000 MWs of potential wind 
energy development. Although somewhat arbitrary, this level of potential resources 
considers states that have developed small resource bases and where a relatively 
significant number of turbines would be necessary to do so. 
Finally, considering the remaining 37 states with greater than 1000 MWs of 
potential, the state of Alaska and Hawaii are not considered in this study. These states are 
not connected to the grid in the mainland and therefore do not import or export electricity 
with other states. In addition to being isolated systems, pricing wind energy and 
electricity is also problematic in relation to the other states. Therefore, the economic and 
geographic characteristics of these locations significantly distort the price for electrical 
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power in these areas. In addition, logistical considerations for installing various 
generation technologies may add to these price distortions. Therefore, these states were 
omitted from the analysis. The resulting population therefore consists of 35 US states 
with wind energy resource potentials greater than 1000 MWs. These states are presented 
on Table 4 and wind power development by state for all years to 2012 are shown on 
Figure 9. 
Table 4: States Selected for Analyses 
Arizona Maine New Hampshire Texas 
Arkansas Maryland New Mexico Utah 
California Massachusetts New York Vermont 
Colorado Michigan North Dakota Virginia 
Idaho Minnesota Ohio Washington 
Illinois Missouri Oklahoma West Virginia 
Indiana Montana Oregon Wisconsin 
Iowa Nebraska Pennsylvania Wyoming 
Kansas Nevada South Dakota  
 
Figure 9: Locations of Wind Power Project in the United States 
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012 
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Added Value of this Study 
Scholars have only recently begun to examine the determinants of wind energy 
deployment. The systematic examination of wind energy deployment is also limited in 
previous studies. Instead, the majority of research explores selected factors that 
hypothesized to determine deployment of wind energy within a state. This study 
examines the determinants of wind energy deployment systematically by specifically 
focusing on the economic complements necessary for deployment.  
By examining supportive hard and soft infrastructures systematically, one benefit 
of this study is specification of the physical aspects of the system that have not been 
considered or have been under-examined by previous studies. The literature review for 
this study did not identify any previous studies that have considered either the retirement 
of generation facilities, or the flexibility of the existing assets. Investigating the flexibility 
of generation assets will add value by identifying an asset mix that is supportive of the 
integration of wind energy assets. The investigation of retirement will determine whether 
accelerated depreciation of existing assets may add to wind energy deployment. This 
study will specifically examine the factors that have not been considered in the previous 
studies. 
Transmission is underspecified in the literature with only one researcher 
examining a fixed dataset as compared to panel data that describes the changes in the 
transmission system during the recent period of wind energy expansion. This study 
develops a novel panel dataset for transmission to explore this relationship. The 
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correlation of physical assets to the outcomes of wind energy may shed light on whether 
complementary policies supporting electricity transmission could be more effective than 
policies that only support wind ventures economically or through advantageous licensing 
processes.   
In addition, with many analysts forecasting grid parity of wind-generated energy 
with traditional fossil resources, the importance of characterizing the constellation of 
factors that favors increased renewable energy deployment is of growing salience since 
removal of wind energy subsidies at the federal level has recently occurred in the United 
States. Fostering the wind energy sector through indirect means, such as increasing the 
availability of transmission or accelerating the retirement of other assets, may therefore 
be of increasing importance. 
The findings of this study could be of particular interest in emerging markets, 
which are just beginning to deploy renewable energy. By determining the factors that 
support the wind industry, emerging markets can take advantage of the “lessons learned” 
in the United States. Therefore, markets with limited resources may find that instead of 
direct subsidies for renewable energy, the construction of favorable transmission 
networks combined with the depreciation/retirement and incentivizing of particular 
complementary generation assets is more favorable to wind energy development.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to extend the research that has been conducted in 
wind energy development in two ways: (1) the inclusion of under and unexamined 
factors, and (2) the improvement of data for analyses. The research of wind energy 
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determinants is in its early stages, resultingfrom a lack of data and the relatively short 
time the industry has been active (Hitaj, 2012). Significant opportunities exist to refine 
the data and structure the analysis. Earlier studies have been limited in the 
conceptualization of the system that is lacking in specificity and could be improved 
(Carley, 2009; Maguire 2010).  
Research Hypotheses 
Nine hypotheses are tested. These are: 
1. Wind energy deployment is increased in states with elevated wind energy 
potential. 
2. Policies for siting wind that require an additional level of analysis 
decrease levels of wind energy deployment. 
3. Policies that require increased wind energy generation capacity increase 
wind energy deployment. 
4. Policies that incentivize wind energy production increase wind energy 
deployment. 
5. Policies that provide financial incentives to wind energy increase wind 
energy deployment. 
6. Grid governance that provides non-discriminatory access increases wind 
energy deployment. 
7. Increased generation asset retirements increase wind energy deployment. 
8. Generation that is more flexible is complementary to wind energy 
deployment. 
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9. Elevated levels of transmission stocks increase wind energy deployment. 
Importance of the Study   
This study is significant since it will add to the literature of wind energy 
determinants with implications for policy design and policy effectiveness. With respect to 
wind and renewable energy policy research, the majority of studies have examined policy 
effectiveness and have not concentrated on the economic complements that are necessary 
to support the industry. This study is the first to examine the complements and the 
policies in a comparative fashion. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the 
differentiation of this study from the previous literature.  
 
Policy effectiveness. Several researchers have examined the effectiveness of 
renewable energy policies to increase deployment (Carley, 2009; Delmas & Montes-
Sancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Yin & Powers, 2010). The basic 
question asked by these studies is whether renewable energy economic support policies 
are effective or efficient at increasing the total MWs or percent of energy generated from 
renewable sources. Studies of policy effectiveness have focused on the effects of various 
instruments to increase deployment of renewable energy or of wind energy. Studies that 
examine policy efficiency have also focused on determining whether electricity prices 
increase from deployment of renewables and the loss or gain to consumer surplus (Hitaj, 
2012; Gong, 2011). This study does not focus on policy efficiency or policy effectiveness 
but instead explores the influence hard infrastructures and policies on the selection of 
future generation assets. 	
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This study also differs from studies that have developed a normalized measure of 
policy effectiveness across states (International Energy Agency, 2008). Instead of 
determining policy effectiveness and normalized remuneration levels as in the IEA study, 
this study will instead use independent variables developed from a systems perspective. 
This study therefore does not seek to determine the normalize remuneration from various 
policy instruments, but instead to compare the relative influence of infrastructures and 
policies.	
Determinants of wind energy deployment. This	study	also	differs	from	
existing	studies	of	the	determinants	of	wind	energy.	The	current	literature	focuses	
in	a	more	ad‐hoc	and	less	systematic	fashion	to	examine	the	proposed	determinants	
while	this	study	proposes	a	systematic	framework	for	examining	the	infrastructure	
that	must	exist	to	support	wind	energy	deployment.	Therefore,	while	other	studies	
have	examined	political	and	social	factors	related	to	the	development	of	wind	
energy,	this	study	instead	focuses	on	the	soft	and	hard	infrastructures	that	directly	
govern	and	provide	services	necessary	for	wind	energy	development.	
This study will add to the previous policy literature by examining factors omitted 
in the current wind/renewable energy determinants literature. By examining the 
infrastructure that supports wind energy in the context of supportive policy, this study 
will provide insights into the strength of effects of hard infrastructures to soft 
infrastructures. Improved policy design may result from considering the strength of hard 
infrastructures to policy treatments. Therefore, this study may lead to the identification of 
potential areas where policies may be improved by expanding the focus of policy from 
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targeted economic support to supporting necessary economic complements. Specifically 
for wind energy, this study may show that while targeted economic subsidies contribute 
to development of wind energy, the supporting facilities associated with wind energy 
may be of equal or greater importance. Through an understanding of relationship of wind 
energy deployment to economic complements, improved policy instruments may be 
designed.  
 
Proposed Methods 
The primary method of investigating the questions outlined above is through 
quantitative techniques to establish the relative effects of the independent variables to the 
dependent variable. Therefore, the main argument of this proposal—that existing 
infrastructure has influence relative to subsidy levels and policy interventions—will be 
tested by statistical methods. In addition, discussion of these factors will consider the 
specific circumstances across states to provide a background and interpretation for the 
statistical analysis.  
Recognizing the complexity of this system, the quantitative methods will be 
bolstered through qualitative analysis and discussion. The qualitative analysis will be 
utilized to illustrate where deviation or agreement exists with the results of the 
quantitative investigation. In other words, review of the results from the quantitative 
analysis will determine if various constellations of factors lead to increased or decreased 
deployment of wind energy at the state level.  
Plan for the Dissertation 
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Chapter Two of this study reviews the existing literature on the determinants and 
the factors that affect wind energy development. Chapter Three explains the methodology 
for the collection of the data, specifies the operationalization of the variables, and 
concludes by providing an overview of the methods of analysis for the data. Chapter Four 
will present the research findings. Chapter Five will summarize the findings and provide 
suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER	TWO	
 
Formation of the Electrical Sector and Literature Review 
This chapter starts by giving an overview of the history of generation and 
transmission in the US. The theoretical basis for considering economic complements 
concurrently with policies and other contextual factors is provided. Subsequently, the 
relevant literature for renewable energy and wind power determinants is reviewed.  
The overview of the history of the electricity generation and transmission sector is 
instructive since path dependency and technological lock-in have arguably influenced the 
patterns of investment and development. The examination of the theory of economic 
complements and technology diffusion strongly supports the argument in this paper that 
supportive infrastructures must be concurrently examined alongside policies. Finally, the 
review of relevant literature identifies the gaps in our knowledge that have led to this 
study. 
 
Formation of the Electrical Energy Sector – An Overview  
The history of the electrical energy sector spans three distinct periods that have 
led to the industry of today. These three periods are described as the formative era, the 
regulated monopoly era, and the current deregulatory phase (Hein, 2003). The formative 
era extended from1880 to 1930 and consisted of the early competition and consolidation 
in the industry (Hughes, 1983). In this period, inventors and entrepreneurs led 
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developments in the sector to produced desirable networks. Technological transfers 
swiftly followed. Competition, consolidation, and a growing epistemic community lead 
to the regulated monopoly era. This era was characterized by expansion of a monopolistic 
industry under the rubric of state level regulation. The current deregulatory phase has 
been characterized by the unbundling of the sector through federal and state deregulation 
to push for the formation of competitive markets for generation, provide independent 
operation of transmission assets, and to segment these activities from distribution and 
retail sales. This review is not intended to provide a comprehensive history, but instead to 
provide an introduction for how path dependencies and lock-in evolved for the generation 
and transmission portions of the electrical sector. 
The transition to an unregulated market has been the result of federal and state 
policy interventions. These interventions have provided the means to unbundle and 
segment the sector and to form the nascent markets of today. Of particular interest to this 
study is the deregulatory period since unbundling is not complete across the US and 
differentiated regimes exist for regulation and governance of generation and 
transmission. This study will first examine the deregulatory period to understand how 
selection of generation and transmission are inter-related in a new unbundled structure, 
fully recognizing that this structure has not been implemented across all states. Following 
the exploration of deregulation, this study will then consider how the earlier periods have 
led to the industry we see today. 
The effort to deregulate markets was led at the Federal level by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The FERC was formed in 1977 as part of the 
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response to the energy crisis of that time. At the same time as FERC was formed 
congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). This act allowed 
FERC qualified non-utility generators to supply bulk electricity and placed the 
interconnection of these facilities under FERC jurisdiction. FERC was granted the 
authority to regulate interstate transmission of electricity. Furthermore, the PURPA act 
required that state regulators “take active roles” in developing the means for non-utility 
generators to sell power to regulated utilities (Hirsch, 1999). These changes were the 
initial formative steps that allowed the development of electricity markets and the 
unbundling of the sector.  
States were also encouraged by the PURPA acts to replace conventional regulated 
approaches for electricity prices with markets. Concurrently, support increased for 
eliminating regulation since non-regulated generators were providing power at lower 
costs than regulated utilities. An epistemic community arose that provided novel ideas to 
state regulators and alternative approaches to the regulatory utility model were 
considered (Hirsch, 1999). Among these approaches were bidding schemes, pay-for-
performance, demand-side management, least-cost planning, and integrated resource 
planning. The implementation of these programs was uneven with a number of state 
selecting to deregulate different portions of the sector, resulting in a hybrid system of 
regulated and de-regulated generation and retail activities across the states. 
Orders issued by FERC (Order No. 888 and 889) also pushed the restructuring of 
the transmission sector to allow for open access to generators through the creation of 
ISOs. Again, state regulators and utilities played a key role in these new structures. State 
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regulators often required approval for the utilities to enter into the RTO/ISOs. In 1999, 
FERC pushed the de-regulation further with FERC Order 2000 that called for the 
establishment of RTOs and transmission planning on a regional scale (Hein, 2003). These 
FERC orders essentially allowed for the deregulation of generation, established 
electricity markets, and restructured transmission to encourage open access while placing 
transmission assets under independent control. However, it is important to note that while 
these changes were allowed, not all states have deregulated the sector fully and state 
PUCs still often play a significant role in the approval of generation and transmission. 
These regulatory changes allowed states to transform their electrical sectors. The 
electricity sector that largely consisted of state-regulated vertically integrated monopolies 
could establish competitive markets by separating the generation, transmission, and 
distribution activities. The process of opening the sector to competitive markets 
significantly changes the patterns and mechanisms for investments in generation and 
transmission. Decisions regarding power plant investments, including the timing and 
technology, were previously made under regulation by monopolistic utilities and public 
authorities have now shifted and depend on the decentralized decisions of investors.  
Likewise, transmission may no longer be controlled by the utilities within many 
states. The authority for transmission access and operations in these areas has been 
conveyed to independent system operators. Thus, the electricity sector is undergoing a 
process where the planning by monopolistic and vertically integrated producers is being 
replaced by a decentralized system that is partially based on prices (Leveque, 2006). This 
deregulatory transition is allowing the unbundling of the sector and is segmenting the 
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interests of the various providers of the elements essential to electricity provision. 
Economically, generation, transmission, and distribution are complementary goods. 
Confounding this relationship are the consumers, who do not consume these elements 
separately, but instead are sensitive to the total price of the service. Further complicating 
this relationship is transmission and generation that are partially substitutable. For 
example, a choice is made to locate new generation assets closer to load rather than to 
transmit the energy via new transmission.  
In the monopoly model, joint optimization of the investment pattern was in the 
interest of the firm, but in open competition, management is not present to coordinate 
generation, transmission, and distribution. The current unbundling is allowing the 
separation of transmission from generation to ensure that competitive generators have 
non-discriminatory access to transmission. Yet, deregulation has been argued to lead to 
strategic behavior from transmission and generation providers (Leveque, 2006). For 
example, in order to provide for future transmission the transmission operator must be 
informed regarding the plans for generation and vice versa; however, in a deregulated 
environment this coordination is lacking. This lack of coordination can lead to deadlock 
and under-investment in both segments of the industry. Since both transmission and 
generation are considered lumpy investments, obviously both segments would benefit 
when there is a high degree of coordination and cooperation.  
Historic Development Patterns 
Also relevant to the development of wind power is the historical development 
pattern during the formation of the industry and prior to the monopolistic regime. Hughes 
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(1983) argues that the formative period consisted of four stages. These stages were: 1) 
invention and development, 2) technology transfer, 3) system growth and 4) substantial 
momentum. Each of these stages is considered below. 
In the first stage, the activities of inventors-entrepreneurs were key to the 
development of the sector. These inventor-entrepreneurs developed not only the idea for 
the technology, but also pushed the inventions until the systems were ready for use 
(Hughes, 1983). The nascent power sector development commenced in a decentralized 
fashion where the central power station was limited through transmission constraints 
associated with the use of direct current (DC) and the practicalities of reciprocating steam 
engines that provided the motive power for generation. Reciprocating steam engines were 
limited on the ability to achieve greater economies of scale and low voltage DC power 
constrained transmission to within one mile of the generator. Despite these limitations, 
the systems were seen as useful and during the second stage, technology transfers 
commenced with numerous change agents becoming involved in the growth of the sector 
(Hughes, 1983). These characteristics led to a large number of companies that would 
provide generation within a single city.  
In the third stage, Hughes argues that limitations or bottlenecks to the growth or 
expansion of the system are overcome. For example, engineers developed steam turbines 
that exceeded the limitations of the reciprocating steam engines. Steam turbines exhibit 
much greater economies of scale than steam reciprocating engines and decreased costs 
significantly for electricity production. The transmission limitations of DC current were 
overcome by alternating current (AC) that could be transformed to higher voltages. This 
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transformation avoided the large current losses over distances that were associated with 
the low voltage DC transmission systems.  
To take advantage of the economies of scale associated with these new forms of 
generation and transmission, market expansion was necessary and early market 
participants sought to consolidate and expand markets (National Museum of American 
History, n.d.). During the fourth stage, expansion of markets was accompanied by a rising 
number of industry participants including business concerns, government agencies, 
professional societies, and others who shape the system and are in turn shaped by the 
technical aspects of that system (Hughes, 1983). Therefore, the technology and industry 
participants in the formative years of the industry strongly pushed towards larger, 
centralized generation facilities combined with longer AC transmission networks. The 
economies of scale associated with generators and AC transmission partially drove the 
pattern of development in the monopolistic era. These patterns illustrate the 
complementary nature of transmission and generation. 
Development during monopolistic period accelerated based on the large central 
generation station and AC transmission model. Regional interconnections were 
established and transmission voltages rose as the size of central station power units 
increased to achieve economies of scale. These pursuits resulted in a dramatic decrease in 
the costs of electricity provision with prices falling from 55 cents per kWh to 9 cents per 
kWh ($1,992) from 1927 to 1967 (Hein, 2003).  
These price decreases came to an abrupt halt in the 1970s because of the energy 
crisis and increasingly expensive generation expansion plans (Hirsch, 1999). 
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Technological progress and economies of scale appeared to no longer decrease prices in 
the traditional fashion and monopoly utilities were considered inefficient. Introducing 
competition was hypothesized to decrease prices and to provide benefits for the 
consumer. The deregulatory wave and the energy crisis arguably led policymakers to 
implement the policies that led to the deregulatory era we see today.  
One lasting legacy of the monopolistic era was the large central system model. 
This model arguably institutionalized utilities to invest in large base load plants and large 
transmission lines. The geography of the transmission lines installed during this period 
was based on the large central station model and the resources that were utilized to fuel 
generation at the time (primarily coal). The characteristics of central station power, fuels, 
and transmission led to geographic “lock-in” or geographic path dependency for the 
transmission network. The lock-in and the lumpiness of investments are considered in 
detail in the transmission, depreciation, and generation sections in Chapter Three. 
Theoretical Overview: Economic Complements, Inputs, and Policies 
The provision of electricity requires generation, transmission, load balancing, and 
distribution to customers. Because of the nature of electricity and lack of storage 
capabilities, these goods must be coordinated in a fashion that requires consumption of 
the all the necessary services at the same time. Policymakers seeking to incentivize or 
dissuade certain means of production in this environment have two basic choices of 
instruments to do so. The first is to rule out or dissuade certain activities through 
regulation; the second is to provide incentives to a focal activity such as wind energy 
production.  
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Literature on the diffusion of technology has argued that economic complements 
to the focal treatment may provide barriers to the adoption and diffusion of new 
technologies (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Schilling, 1998; Schilling, 1999). The management 
literature exploring technological diffusion has focused on the underlying conditions 
where technologies diffuse across adopters. In early studies, there was agreement on an 
S-curve pattern of diffusion (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961; Rogers, 1962). This 
familiar pattern is ascribed to learning benefits, heterogeneous benefits across consumers, 
and real-option valuation resulting from the decision to invest in the adoption, as well as 
the effects of network externalities (Attewell, 1992; Church & Gandal, 1993; David, 
1969; Davies, 1979; Farrrell & Saloner, 1994; Kapur, 1995; Stoneman, 1983; Stoneman, 
2002). Fabrizio and Hawn have also suggested and additional distinct case of indirect 
network externalities where the benefits of adoption depend on the availability of 
complementary good or service at the time of the adoption decision, which these authors 
deem as complementary inputs (2013). These authors argue that complementary inputs 
are similar to complementary products; however, complementary inputs must be 
consumed at the same time as the focal good. In other words, these inputs must be 
utilized simultaneously at the time of adoption to generate utility.  
This approach differs from the typical complementary goods where after the 
purchase of the focal good, other complementary products and services are consumed for 
periods after the initial adoption. Fabrizio and Hawn hypothesize that in the case of 
complementary inputs that the magnitude of technological diffusion in the case of a 
stimulating policy shock is substantially larger when there are higher levels of the 
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complementary input. The nature of the electrical system, with the requirement of the 
simultaneous consumption of goods including generation and transmission is an exemplar 
of complementary inputs.  
Wind Energy Determinants: An Overview of the Literature 
The literature specific to determination of the factors that influence wind energy 
deployment is relatively limited. The abbreviated nature of the literature is an artifact of 
the relatively short time that the technology has been deployed in its modern form (Hitaj, 
2012). The vast majority of wind turbines have been installed from about 2000 to present 
and policies, including state level initiatives to support wind energy, were mainly enacted 
after the year 2000 (Wiser, Namovicz, et al., 2007). Therefore, data availability has been 
limited and research on the determinants for wind power deployment is a relatively new 
and narrow field. Note that while a considerable volume of literature exists on various 
aspects of wind energy economics, politics and technology, this review focuses on the 
literature that is specific to deployment outcomes. In addition, this review focuses on the 
determinants that the researchers argue as significant to wind energy deployment or that 
are considered as part of this study. Regardless, no literature identified the relationship of 
complementary inputs to outcomes or compared the relationship of infrastructure and 
policies to outcomes in wind energy deployment.  
 
Previous systematic examinations of the determinants of wind energy. Unlike 
previous research, this study examines the existing policies and infrastructures to 
determine the influence on selection of future generation assets, proposing causal 
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relationships and linkages (Figure 1). Previous research on renewable energy and wind 
energy deployment has not typically specified models of the causal relationships of 
deployment variables with two exceptions: Carley (2009) and Maguire (2010). Carley 
examines the causal effect of state RPS policies on RE deployment (Carley, 2009). She 
proposes that the drivers of renewable deployment include political institutions, state 
electricity trends, natural resource endowments, state socioeconomics, the state RPS and 
other energy policies. These factors she arranges in a directed acyclic graph that she 
states is a “causal diagram that identifies the directional relationship between the 
treatment effect and the outcome of interest” (Carley, 2009 p. 3073). There are several 
factors she proposes for treatment effects and outcomes related to RPS policies and 
renewable energy development (Figure 10). Specifically, the state electricity trends that 
Carley examines are electricity use per capita, gross state product (GSP) per capita, and 
population growth rate. Yet while policy and electricity demand are considered (GSP is 
often a proxy for demand), the analysis lacks three critical factors essential to wind 
energy development.  These factors are generation, depreciation, existing generation, and 
transmission stocks.  
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Figure 10: Directed Acyclic Graph 
Source: (Carley, 2009) 
Maguire specifically examines wind energy deployment (juxtaposed to Carly’s 
examination of renewable energy deployment) and proposes a framework that is based on 
the standard economic supply and demand model. In the supply side of this model, she 
considers the project inputs of capital and labor, wind capacity, the influence of 
regulations and financial incentives. On the demand side of the model, she proposes that 
the quantity of wind generation is a function of the price of wind-generated electricity, 
the total quantity of electricity produced, the price of substitutes and consumers 
preferences for renewable electricity. Her research does not specifically consider 
depreciation or transmission but instead focuses on price and policy interventions. She 
specifically focuses on examining market factors in the analysis. Although a supply and 
demand framework is proposed, this framework is appropriate for the selection of assets 
to balance the grid during operations, rather than a framework to explore the selection of 
future generation assets.  
Therefore, studies that have proposed a systematic framework have therefore 
examined the drivers of demand for additional electrical generation assets in a relatively 
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selective fashion. In many cases the distal drivers, such as the political institutions that 
decide policy have been examined rather than the direct drivers such as the 
infrastructures and policies themselves. Previous researchers have not proposed a model 
where stocks of generation coupled with complimentary infrastructure is the focus but 
have instead focused on policies, political bodies, or relative prices as related to 
outcomes. Therefore, augmentation of these studies is required, since deeper driving 
factors, such as the stocks of transmission and generation, may instead contribute to the 
growth or lack thereof in wind energy development, complimenting, or retarding the 
effects of policy interventions.  
Qualitative studies of renewable and wind energy determinants. The early 
literature exploring the drivers of wind development consists of case studies and other 
qualitative explorations. Many of these studies focus on the effects of a RPS on the 
development of wind power and other renewable energy technologies. For example, one 
of the early studies investigated RPS effects on wind energy deployment in Texas 
(Langniss & Wiser, 2003). Langniss and Wiser argued that the Texas RPS design was 
largely responsible for the state becoming one of the leading wind power markets in the 
United States. A subsequent early qualitative study was the evaluation by Wiser, Porter, 
and Grace (2004) of design and impacts of RPS policies in 13 states. The evaluation of 
the 13 states consisted of a comparative examination to determine the effectiveness of 
instrument design. These early qualitative studies were focused on investigating the 
policy “effectiveness” and suggested that wind deployment outcomes were determined by 
policy designs. 
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Taking a different tact, Gouchoe, Everette, and Haynes (2002) studied the effects 
of financial incentives on renewable energy deployment. This very early study was 
conducted on small-scale, renewable energy technologies that are intended for onsite use 
in residential or small commercial applications. Obviously, the findings of this study may 
not be applicable to large-scale wind energy development; nonetheless, the study is 
significant since policy measures outside of the effects of the RPS were specifically 
examined. These authors argued that informational, financial, and institutional barriers 
exist for the deployment of these systems. By making these arguments, the authors 
introduced greater complexity, suggesting additional factors beyond policies were 
contributing or detracting from wind power deployment. 
Another notable qualitative study of the determinants of wind energy deployment 
provided an overview of the policies and market factors that drove development in 12 
states (Bird et al., 2005). Bird et al. diverged from the analysis of RPS and supportive 
policies to include other economic and technological factors. These authors cited multiple 
reasons for development including the volatility and increasing price of natural gas, high 
prices for electricity that resulted from supply-demand imbalances and improved wind 
generation technologies that lowered the price of wind-generated electricity. In addition 
to these non-policy considerations, these authors also cited policies as driving 
development. These policies included the federal PTC and state-level supportive policies 
plus the RPS, tax, and financial incentives. 
In addition to these state level analyses, Wiser et al. also provided a review of a 
proposed federal RPS and how a federal RPS policy might relate to the state level RPS 
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(Wiser, et al., 2007). Continuing the trend of examining RPS policies, Chen et al. 
synthesized the results and methods RPS cost impact studies across 28 states to determine 
the costs and benefits of these policies (Chen et al., 2009). While Chen et al. did utilize 
quantitative methods in their examination the focus of the study was not on determinants 
of wind energy but instead on the economic impacts of RPS policies. Multiple studies 
have been conducted to examine the economic effects of various wind related policies but 
few have examined directly the determinants for the deployment of wind energy. As 
such, the remainder of this review will focus on relevant studies where quantitative 
methods have been utilized to explore determinants of renewable energy and wind energy 
deployment. 
Quantitative studies of renewable and wind energy determinants. A number 
of empirical investigations of renewable energy determinants have focused on the amount 
of non-hydro renewable energy deployment (not exclusively wind-generated energy) 
attributable to policy interventions. As such, these studies warrant examination since the 
majority of non-hydro renewable energy deployed has consisted of wind energy (Table 
5).   
Table 5: Comparison of Nameplate Renewable Energy Deployment 
Wind Energy versus Non-Wind 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total Wind 
MWs 4687 6350 6723 9147 11575 16907 25410 34863 40267 46918
Wind 
Growth    Yr 
on Yr % 26% 6% 26% 21% 32% 33% 27% 13% 14% 22%
Total MWs 
RE 12023 11803 11994 12058 12538 13162 13056 13689 13544 14303
Non Wind 
Growth Yr 
on Yr % -2% 2% 1% 4% 5% -1% 5% -1% 5% 17%
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% of total 
RE MWs 
from Wind 28% 35% 36% 43% 48% 56% 66% 72% 75% 77%
Adapted from Energy Information Agency, 2014  
Considering non-hydro renewable energy as a dependent variable versus wind, it 
is important to note that wind energy deployed MWs year on year average growth has 
been 22% while average non-hydro renewable nameplate MWs growth has been 3% for 
the period from 2002 to 2011. In fact, during this period wind has increased it’s share of 
non-hydro renewable energy from 28% to 77% of all non-renewable electricity 
nameplate MWs. The development of nameplate MWs of hydro remained for the most 
part flat; therefore, the logical conclusion is that the effect of most renewable incentives 
has been to deploy additional MWs of wind, at least at the national level (see also Figure 
13, below). In this study, we therefore assume that the effect of most renewable energy 
supportive policies have mainly been supportive of wind energy nameplate deployment.  
The first quantitative examination specific to wind power determinants utilized a 
sample of 35 states to examine the effects of various policies to wind energy deployment 
(Menz & Vachon, 2006). In this study, four differing dependent variables were examined 
that included the installed capacity at the end of 2003, absolute growth in capacity since 
2000, absolute growth since 1998, and the number of large wind energy projects (>25 
MWs). The policies these researchers examined included the effects of public benefit 
funds, fuel generation disclosures, mandatory green power options (MGPO), and retail 
choice. This study found a positive relationship between wind development and the 
presence of an RPS, MGPO, but interestingly a negative relationship between wind 
energy development and retail choice policies. The difference between green power 
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options and retail choice is that green power options are where utilities are required 
provide a green power option to customers, while retail choice allows customers to 
choose their form of electricity supply in a restructured electricity market. Thus, while 
the findings for the effectiveness of an RPS are concordant with other research, the 
findings regarding retail choice and green power options appear somewhat contradictory. 
Regardless, this was the first study to utilize multivariate techniques to examine the 
effectiveness of state level policies to promote wind power. The study focused on five 
policies and no complementary inputs were examined. 
Similarly, Kneifel (2008) examined all fifty states to compare policies to 
outcomes for non-hydro renewable deployment. His study showed a positive correlation 
with deployment and the existence of an RPS policy when operationalizing the RPS as a 
capacity requirement based on a linear extrapolation of the required MWs from 
enactment to the final requirement year. In addition, he argued that clean energy funds 
(funds that directly subsidize utility scale renewable capacity construction) also showed a 
positive effect. Finally, he claimed that MGPO is a driver for development.  
Kneifel also examined comparative costs for other generation, the effects of other 
forms of electricity generation and political factors. His study found that a weighted 
average of the cost of wind, solar biomass, and geothermal was negatively correlated 
with deployment and that the weighted costs of the retail prices for electricity in 
bordering states was negatively correlated with deployment. The percentage of other 
generation forms was not significant, with the exception of the percentage of nuclear 
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generation. No correlation was found with the fuel costs but states with a higher league of 
conservation voters score was positively correlated with deployment.   
In another early quantitative study, Carley (2009) utilizes a dummy variable (1-3) 
that counts the number of state policies within a jurisdiction to examine the effects of 
loans, rebates, and grants and similarly constructs a tax incentive dummy variable that 
consists of property, corporate, personal and sales tax credits. Her study examines the 
effects of these policies to the total state’s percentage of renewable energy generation as a 
portion of total generation from 1998 to 2006. Her index method is admittedly crude and 
does not account for the characteristics of the tax or subsidy (Shrimali, Lynes, & Indvik, 
2015). She found that grants, loans, and rebates positively influences development, while 
the tax incentives are a negative influence for development. She also operationalized an 
RPS as a binary variable and found that RPS policies do not significantly predict the 
percentage generation from non-hydro renewable energy sources (Carley, 2009). 
However, she finds that the RPS does increase the total amount of renewable energy 
generation. Note that Carley’s study examined the percentage of renewable energy and 
not the deployment in nameplate capacity.  
Carley also examined competitive industries, political environment, wind energy 
potential, electricity use, and price. Considering the political environment, she did find 
that the League of Conservation Voter’s score and number of natural resource employees 
in each state was positively correlated with the percent of renewable generation. 
Surprisingly, she found increased wind potential decreased wind energy generation and 
that higher electricity prices and electricity use resulted in lower wind generation.   
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Doris et al., examined the effects of various state level policies on renewable 
energy development placing the policies into two categories – market preparation (barrier 
reduction) and technology accessibility (Doris, et al. 2009). The former included 
licensing, certification, land access and the RPS, while the latter consisted of tax 
incentives, grants, loans, etc. The analysis also looked at portfolios of policies or 
combinations of policies that were based on identified best management practice and 
policy interactions from previous research. The findings indicate that a correlation exists 
between barrier reduction policies and development. Specifically, these researchers claim 
that higher total renewable energy generation is significantly related to the 
implementation of an RPS, production incentives, generation disclosures, interconnection 
policies, and land access. The research also showed that the higher the number of 
supportive policies, the greater the level of renewable energy deployment. Importantly, 
these findings were presented as correlative and should be interpreted with caution since 
several other factors were cited by these researchers as being potentially important and 
intervening. The important and intervening factors these researchers cited included: 
resource availability, technology cost, economic context, and social 
acceptance/opposition in addition to ownership structures of projects and availability of 
financing (Doris, et al. 2009). This study opened up several additional determinants for 
consideration and called for the investigation of these additional factors. Regardless, the 
investigation still fell short of systematically examining the complementary inputs that 
influence selection of generation assets and the diffusion of wind energy generation. 
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In a relatively unique and focused examination, Bohn and Lant (2009) examined 
the role of state-level permitting processes on wind energy deployment in nameplate 
MWs. This research argued that a simplified permitting process significantly enhances 
the deployment of wind energy. These researchers proposed a three level model for 
permitting and argued that these state level processes have strong effects. Yet, the data 
lacks variation across states, with only one state having a minimal model and two states 
having a simplified state-level permitting regimes. Thus, as they admit, their model is 
suspect as a result. Regardless, their results do suggest that the permitting process to 
obtain a license maybe an important part of the determinants at the state level.  
As part of this same study, the researchers examined the effects of an RPS, wind 
energy potential, accessibility of transmission, electricity market restructuring, and wind 
energy prices. Bohn and Lant found that an RPS was a positive influence when coded as 
the number of years since implementation and that higher wind energy potential was a 
positive factor for deployment. They investigated the accessibility of transmission by 
using population as a surrogate and found a positive effect as well. However, their work 
indicated that market restructuring and higher wind energy prices were negatively 
associated with increased deployment levels.   
Adelaja et al. (2010) examined wind deployment in MWs as the dependent 
variable and argued that RPS adoption and the stringency of its characteristics are key 
drivers in wind development. In addition, these authors argue that elevated levels of wind 
resources do influence the deployment of wind energy but the influence of wind 
resources are relatively low in comparison to the policy, political, and economic factors 
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they examined. One political factor they examined was the democratic control of the state 
Senate, which was argued as positive for deployment. Considering the economic factors 
they cite, the Gross State Product (GSP) and state tax per capita were argued as positive 
factors related to wind energy development. On the other hand, public debt, and higher 
population densities were argued as negative for wind development. Interestingly, these 
authors found no effect from competing energy prices (Adelaja et al., 2010).  
Maguire (2010) specifically examined prices and policies in comparison to wind 
energy deployment expressed as annual state wind capacity divided by state wind 
potential using a supply and demand framework. Maguire argued that RPS policies and 
green power purchase programs positively influence a state’s wind capacity. However, 
the operationalization of the RPS standard in Maguire’s work is unclear. She also found a 
negative association with the League of Conservation Voters score and that the role of 
energy prices is not significant with the exception of the price of natural gas (Maguire, 
2010). While the lack of influence by market factors is supported by Adelaja et al., 
Maguire’s analysis is suspect for the influence of prices. By using a supply and demand 
framework she deploys a method more suitable to the determination of the dispatch order 
for generation assets to fulfill instantaneous demand instead of a method to determine the 
selection of future generation assets. Importantly, the factors for instantaneous market 
demands are not the same as factors for long-range selection of assets to fulfill 
anticipated future demand. Hence, this study is not suitable for determining the factors 
that are specific to the selection of power plants (see further discussion in Chapter Three).  
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Yin and Powers examination of the RPS was arguably the most comprehensive to 
date on that specifically focuses on that policy instrument (Yin & Powers, 2010). The 
investigation examined the effectiveness of an RPS to the deployment of non-hydro 
renewable energy capacity. The researchers expanded upon previous investigations by 
factoring in the heterogeneity of policies across state jurisdictions. The heterogeneity 
within the RPS policies that these researchers addressed was the ramping up of the RPS 
requirement and the final percentage requirement. For example, a state may require a 
30% standard for renewable energy production but the state allows a ramping period of 
so many years for utilities to achieve this requirement. Because of the variability of 
ramping rates, the net effectiveness of the policies varies across time and by each state. In 
addition, the RPS coverage may vary, where certain types of utilities are exempt from 
RPS requirements. For example, in some states municipalities and power cooperatives 
may not be subject to the same RPS requirements as investor owned utilities. Finally, Yin 
and Powers also accounted for the incremental share of the generation that resulted after 
the RPS implementation. This means that all renewable energy production prior to the 
RPS implementation was subtracted from the total to determine the amount that resulted 
after the implementation of the RPS. This sophisticated and more comprehensive 
approach resulted in the authors arguing that an RPS was effective at increasing the non-
hydro renewable energy generation within states.  
In addition to examining the RPS, Yin and Powers also argued that MGPO 
policies are a positive and significant factor for the deployment of renewable energy. 
They also found that the import of electricity was a positive factor for a state to deploy 
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renewable energy. Finally, these authors found that the trading of renewable energy 
credits (RECs) might serve to weaken the effect of an RPS policy. 
Another study that examined the effects of RPS standards to generation was 
conducted by Gong (2011). Gong’s study utilized the RPS indicator as derived by Yin 
and Powers to consider a sample of 48 states. Gong found that RPS policies are on 
average effective in increasing the share of renewable energy production, but do not 
actually increase the electricity price. In addition, Gong argued that MGPO policies and 
RECs were effective for increasing the deployment of renewable energy. Finally, he 
argued that the net metering, an RPS with a penalty, the natural gas prices, and the use of 
public benefit funds was negatively associated with the deployment of renewable energy. 
Political variables considered included the political parties in government at the executive 
and legislative levels within the state. Gong found these variables to be positive and 
significant. The analysis also indicated that state imports of electricity were a positive 
factor in the deployment of renewable energy. 
Shrimali and Kneifel (2011) focused on the potential for renewable energy policy 
to promote the penetration of renewable energy and found that RPS policies were 
positive for the penetration of all types of renewables, however, the impacts varied 
according to the type of renewable technology. Specifically for wind energy, these 
authors did not find the RPS an effective instrument; yet, they found required green 
power options and clean energy funds positively correlated with increasing penetration of 
all types of renewables. Their examination also included economic variables, including 
natural gas prices, per capita GDP and found no significance for these factors. Finally, 
	
	
	
	
69
these researchers also found that no significance in the LCV score or in the share of coal-
generated electricity within states.   
Hitaj (2012) conducted the perhaps most comprehensive and comparable study to 
this research to date. Hitaj examined the effects of wind energy capacity additions 
considering the effects of electricity transmission line coverage, grid regulation, state, and 
federal subsidies. The analysis, conducted at the county level, showed that counties that 
installed wind power have significantly higher wind classes, higher levels of policy 
incentives, higher per capita incomes, land values, and electricity prices. She finds that 
production, corporate, and sales tax incentives are significant determinants of wind power 
investment while the property tax incentives appear to have no influence or even a 
negative effect on wind power development.  In addition, she also finds that the RPS 
standard is not a significant factor in wind energy deployment. She does argue that 
deployment is elevated in areas with RTO/ISO governance of grid access. While several 
of the outcomes from this study are the similar to the hypothesized relationships in this 
study, the operationalization of some of these measures needs improvement. For 
example, the transmission density relies on a 1993 dataset input as a fixed value 
throughout the time of the study. A review of the transmission investment and data 
indicates that this formulation is inaccurate (See transmission capacity in Chapter Three).  
Shrimali et al. (2015) conducted a recent examination of the interaction of state 
level policies and the federal PTC. This study examined panel data for the years 1990-
2011 for installed wind capacity in MWs to determine the effects from interactions of the 
federal PTC with state level incentives and policies while considering economic, 
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political, and competitive technologies. The study found that the federal level PTC acts as 
a catalyst for state level incentives. Therefore, in years where the PTC is available to 
developers, the effectiveness of a state clean energy fund, RPS, state green power 
purchase program or MGPO is enhanced. In addition, these researchers find that the GDP 
per capita in a state and the LCV score are also positive factors for deployment. 
 
Summary of the Previous Findings and Variable Interaction 
The main finding of the studies that examine policy interventions renewable and 
wind energy is that policies are effective in increasing deployment, although the 
particular instruments that this effect are attributable to are debated.  The RPS 
effectiveness is debated but is arguably a result of the operationalization of the policy. 
MGPO policies have been found by previous research as effective, as has the federal 
PTC. Retail choice and clean energy funds have also been considered and argued as 
effective; however, the study of these instruments is limited. Tax policies including 
corporate, property and sales tax also have been studied in a limited fashion and the 
operationalization of the state level policies has been rather crude. The results of studies 
of these instruments has been mixed. Regardless, Doris et al. (2009) and Shrimali et al. 
(2015) contend that the combinations of policies are important. Hence, this study will 
consider the effects of RPS, state and federal PTCs, MGPO, and various tax policies in 
comparison with the infrastructure variables.  
Economic factors considered by the research include the price of electricity, the 
wind energy price, the use or demand for electricity, and the cost of competing resources. 
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Renewable or wind energy prices have been found to be negatively correlated with or 
show no effect to deployment; therefore, the findings for the effects of electricity prices 
has been mixed. Comparison of competing resources has consistently shown a negative 
association with natural gas. Percentage generation findings have been mixed.   
Politically, the findings regarding the LCV score has been consistent across 
studies, as have the other variables that indicate the presence of pro-environmental 
groups, employees, etc. within a state. With these findings, it is important to consider if 
these are not an artifact of the correlation with the groups and political players with the 
existence of pro-renewable policy. Overall, many factors examined in previous research 
appear as tangential factors or represent more distal drivers for wind energy deployment. 
For example, the presence of a state democratic senate, while potentially helpful in 
passing policies is likely not to have much influence on the actual licensing of facilities, 
financing, or the deployment of complementary inputs. As a second example, the GSP of 
the state is relevant, but only when viewed through a lens where states with higher GSP 
provide increased infrastructure support or policy support for large projects. Therefore, it 
is important to utilize measures for the direct drivers that promote the industry, instead of 
the indirect drivers that may or may not result in the direct support to the industry. Thus, 
while many of the proceeding studies provide some insight regarding the potential 
determinants, operationalizing the variables directly combined with a systematic 
approach would represent an improvement. The approaches of the previous research and 
those proposed for this study are presented in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Research Design, Data Collection, and Methods of Analysis 
This chapter presents the overall research design including the sources and 
collection of the data, operationalization of the variables, and the methods used to 
analyze the data. As part of the examination of the data, this chapter will discuss the 
rationale behind the proposed direction of the influence of the independent and dependent 
variable and reference the specific results of previous studies that consider similar 
independent variables. The methods for the analysis are presented and the chapter 
concludes with a summary each independent variable and the hypothesized effects. 
 
Research Design 
This study exploits a natural experiment that exists across the 50 US states. In this 
case, variance exists in the conditions of interest across these jurisdictions; nevertheless, 
similarities limit some of the confounding variables. For example, in each jurisdiction, 
differentiation exists in the contextual, soft, and hard infrastructure variables. On the 
other hand, the US states exist within a common governance framework and with 
relatively similar governance systems at the state level. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
population for this study is selected from the US States resulting from the limitations of 
the wind energy resource and logistical constraints. 
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The data collected for this study is quantitative in nature and based on the the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable is a numerical variable consisting of the 
number of MWs deployed within a particular state.This study attempts to utilize variables 
of with similar units (MWs). Data that consists of similar types and units is collected 
where possible (see Table 6, below). Data that is in similar units scales directly with the 
dependent variable, unlike dummy variables or percentages. The data examined consists 
of 14 numerical variables and 2 categorical variables. The independent variables vary 
across time, with the exception of the acres of federal lands and the wind energy 
potentials that are fixed throughout the period of the study. The collection and 
operationalization of the data are presented below. 
Data Sources 
The majority of the data for this research was available from the United States 
Energy Information Agency (EIA) and United States Department of Energy (DOE). The 
DOE provided the data for dependent variable: total deployed nameplate MWs per state. 
DOE also was the source for potential wind generation MWs per state. EIA maintains 
data on the retirement of facilities and energy demand on an annual basis by state. The 
import and export by state is derived using EIA data for the net generation and retail sales 
of electricity. To aggregate the types of generators to baseload, intermediate and peaking, 
the EIA data was used for nameplate generation capacity for individual plants. 
Data from the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and EIA was examined for transmission but 
data is not available from these sources at the state level. To obtain state level data, 
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historic transmission maps were obtained from Platts (a commercial data provider. Platts 
created all the maps obtained for this study to provide a consistent method for data 
collection. Policy data was obtained from the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 2015). Wind energy generation requirements for 
RPS policies were obtained by information provided by Berkeley Labs (Barbose, 2011). 
Data to determine the measures associated with siting avoidance of federal lands by 
developers were obtained from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
Transmission governance data were derived from maps obtained from FERC. Wind 
energy PPA prices were obtained from a database maintained by Berkeley Labs (Wiser & 
Bolinger, 2012). A summary of the data sources for these variables is presented in Table 
6, and each of these is explored in more detail below. 
Table 6: Data Sources 
Data Data Source Data Units Spatial Coverage 
Temporal 
Coverage 
Dependent Variable 
Nameplate MWs US Department of Energy MWs (nameplate) US 50 States 1999-2013 
Independent Variables 
Wind Production 
Incentives DSIRE; IRS Dollars per MWh US 50 States 2001-2012 
Wind Energy 
Capacity 
Incentives 
Barbose- 
Berkeley Labs GWhrs required US 50 States 2001-2012 
Wind Energy 
Financial 
Incentives 
DSIRE Binary US 50 States 2001-2012 
Wind Energy 
Siting Policy 
(Federal lands 
area) 
Gorte, Vincent, 
Hanson, & 
Rosenblum 
Acres US 50 States Static Data Set 
Transmission 
Governance 
Policies 
FERC Square Miles per state US 35 States 
2004, 2006, 
2009, 2011 
Transmission 
Capacity Platts 
Circuit Miles per 
State US 35 States 2001-2012 
Flexibility of 
Generation Assets EIA MWs US 50 States 2001-2012 
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Generation 
Retirement EIA 2014 MWs US 50 States 2001-2012 
Wind Energy 
Potential 
US Department 
of Energy MWs 
Wind Energy 
Potential 
Static Data 
Set 
Price of Wind 
Generation 
Wiser and 
Bolinger, 2012 Dollars per MWh 
Regional – 
Assigned to 
Sample States 
1999-2012 
Electricity 
Demand EIA 2014 GWhrs US 50 States 2001-2012 
Electricity Import 
and Export EIA 2014 MWs of net import US 50 States 2001-2012 
Electricity Price EIA 2014 Dollars per MWh US 50 States 2001-2012 
 
The data for several indicators are readily available; regardless, a number of these 
indicators have not been utilized in prior studies or as operationalized in this study.  
These indicators include the generation retirement, the generation flexibility, the wind 
energy siting proxy variable, and the pricing of wind energy. Also unique to this study is 
the development of dynamic datasets for transmission governance policies and 
transmission stocks. Several indicators have been utilized in prior analysis of wind 
energy determinants including the dependent variable (MWs of wind energy deployed), 
wind energy potential, wind energy financial support policies, electricity demand, 
electricity prices, import, and exports.  
The dynamic datasets for transmission governance and capacity are novel and 
were developed for this study. The data for wind energy production incentives, price of 
wind energy, flexibility of generation assets, electricity demand, and wind energy 
capacity incentives are modified for incorporation into this study. For all variables, a 
description of the operationalization, modification, and comparison to previous studies is 
provided below. 
Dependent Variable – Wind Energy Deployment  
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In this study, the dependent variable is operationalized as the nameplate 
deployment in for wind energy in MWs per state. This measure is intended to indicate 
where capital is being invested in states for wind power on a national basis, since with all 
else equal, the total MWs of nameplate deployment is indicative of the magnitude of the 
investment. Thus, the nameplate capacity should indicate where favorable conditions 
exist for investment considering the demand, prices, policies, and physical infrastructure 
that exists.  
In comparison to the measure proposed for this study, previous quantitative 
studies have examined total renewable energy deployment, and measures of the 
deployment levels (MWs and percent of generation) of specific renewable technologies. 
In most studies that examine wind specifically, researchers have mainly focused on wind 
energy deployment levels in nameplate MWs as the dependent variable. Of the studies 
that were identified that are specific to the determinants of wind energy, three of these 
wind specific studies have utilized total cumulative MWs of generation as the dependent 
variable (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Hitaj, 2012; Menz & Vachon, 2006). Maguire utilized the 
annual state wind capacity divided by the state wind potential (Maguire, 2010). Aldelaja 
et al. utilized two different operationalizations for the dependent variable: total nameplate 
capacity and total generation. The reasoning for not utilizing percentage generation is 
discussed in Chapter One (See Measuring the Development of Resources).  The data for 
nameplate deployment capacity for wind energy were obtained from the US Department 
of Energy (US Department of Energy, 2014). The data for total cumulative nameplate 
MWs of wind deployment are depicted on Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
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Independent Variables 
In this section, this study considers the independent variables. These variables are 
hypothesized as the direct drivers that influence the selection and deployment of wind 
energy generation across states. For each of these variables, consideration is given to how 
the variable may influence the deployment within a jurisdiction. The findings from other 
studies are presented that considered variable in this study. In addition, the 
operationalization of each variable in this study is detailed. Finally, the data developed 
for this study will be presented. 
 
Soft infrastructures. Multiple policy instruments exist across states and support 
is afforded to the sector from the federal level. The policy instruments that states utilize 
are categorized into four broad types, production incentives, financial incentives, capacity 
incentives, and favorable siting policies. Production incentives are tied to the energy 
production from a facility and include federal and state production tax incentives and 
feed-in tariffs. Financial incentives are provided to decrease costs to wind developers that 
are not tied to production. These financial incentives include corporate tax incentives, 
property tax incentives, and sales tax incentives. Capacity incentives are those 
instruments that encourage the deployment of additional MWs of wind energy. Examples 
of these instruments include generation disclosures, GPP, MGPO, and RPS. Finally, 
minimal permitting regimes and favorable transmission governance are rules that may 
expedite wind development. A summary of the typology of the instruments is presented 
on Table 7, below. 
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Table 7: Typology of Policy Instruments 
Production 
Incentives Capacity Incentives Financial Incentives Governance 
Production Tax 
Incentive 
Renewable 
Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) 
Corporate Tax 
Incentives 
Minimal 
Permitting 
Requirements 
Feed-in Tariffs 
Mandatory Green 
Power Option 
(MGPO) 
Property Tax Incentives
Favorable 
Transmission 
Governance 
 Green Power Purchasing (GPP) Sales Tax Incentives  
 
Production incentives are intended to incentivize the level of production and 
therefore encourage developers to select sites with higher levels of productivity within 
the jurisdiction where the incentive applies. Policies that support capacity deployment 
either require a set-aside of a portion of the market to consist of renewable generation 
(RPS), to require purchases of renewable power by the state (GPP), and/or allowing 
consumers to choose their form of generation (MGPO). These policies are intended to 
provide a “push” to consumers or suppliers of electricity by increasing demand for 
renewable energy with an overall effect of increasing wind energy capacity.  Wind 
energy financial incentives provide relief from taxation within a specific jurisdiction. 
These policies therefore provide a “pull” and are intended to attract investors to a certain 
jurisdiction. Permitting standards may allow for decreased licensing burdens for 
developers, thus, decreasing costs and the time to obtain licenses and represent a policy 
that attracts or pulls investors towards particular jurisdictions. Governance of 
transmission networks may provide for non-discriminatory access for wind. 
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Wind energy production incentives. The state and federal PTC policies provide 
incentives for wind energy production in cents per kWh of generation. No states within 
the selected sample provide a feed-in tariff for large-scale wind energy and therefore, this 
instrument is not considered further. During the period of this study, the federal PTC has 
been provided periodically. Recent research indicates that the federal PTC is interactive 
with the state level policies and provides a “catalyst’ that boosts the influence of the state 
level incentives (Shrimali, Lynes, & Indvik, 2015). Therefore, it is important to consider 
the federal PTC in conjunction with other state policies.  
The federal PTC is a credit against taxes that is tradable and is awarded on a per 
kWh basis for electricity generated from qualifying renewable energy resources. The tax 
credit was set at 1.5 cents per kWh in 1993 dollars, indexed for inflation and is generated 
during the first 10 years of energy production from a particular project that qualifies for 
the credit (DSIRE, 2015). The value of the credit has increased over time (Table 8) (IRS,  
2005; IRS, 2006; IRS, 2007; IRS, 2008, IRS, 2009; IRS, 2010; IRS, 2011; IRS, 2012; 
Selig, 2001; Selig, 2003).  
Table 8: Value of Federal PTC
Year Cents per kwh 
2001 1.7 
2002 0.0 
2003 1.8 
2004 0.0 
2005 1.9 
2006 1.9 
2007 2.0 
2008 2.1 
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2009 2.1 
2010 2.2 
2011 2.2 
2012 2.2 
 
The 2013 value of the credit is 2.3 cents (or $23/MWh). Therefore, the credit 
value for a wind project owner with a 35% tax burden would therefore equate to $35.38 
per MWh of pre-tax revenue. ($23MWh/(1-35%)=$35.38 (Bolinger & Wiser, 2009). 
Considering a 100 MW wind farm with a 30% capacity factor (8765 hours/yr) the PTC 
would represent nearly $10 million dollars per year in subsidies, a significant economic 
incentive. As a result of the magnitude of these subsidies, the PTC policy has been 
argued to provide significant influence on the deployment of wind energy facilities in the 
United States. 
To show the influence of the federal PTC, it is informative to compare the 
deployment of wind energy facilities to the periods where the PTC has been in force vs 
when the policy lapsed. Originally enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the PTC 
was set to expire in July 1999 but the incentive was extended through 2001. It expired in 
2001 but was then extended again in March of 2002 only to expire again at the end of 
2003. The policy was not reauthorized until October of 2004. The pattern of deployment 
of wind energy facilities is consistent with the expiration of the PTC (Figure 11). 
Scholars have often cited this pattern of deployment to argue that policy uncertainty 
decreases the deployment of renewable energy, particularly wind (Bolinger & Wiser, 
2009). Considering the pattern of deployment and the time that the PTC is in force, the 
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evidence certainly argues that the wind industry is responsive to this federal tax incentive. 
Thus, tax incentives are an important factor in increasing deployment and in providing 
returns to investors.  
 
Figure 11: United States Wind Energy Deployment and the PTC 
Source: Marsh, Inc. 2012 
 
Turning to the state level, PTC incentives range from a low of 0.35 cents per 
kWhr to a high of 1.25 cents per kWhr that are applicable to commercial large-scale wind 
energy systems. These incentives are in addition to the federal tax incentive. Seven states 
within the sample provided an incentive as of 2012. Five of the states, Arizona, Iowa, 
Maryland, Nebraska, and New Mexico have a cap or limit to the total amount of 
incentive provided. For example, in Iowa, this limit is 2.5 MW of nameplate capacity per 
owner of a system. In Maryland, Arizona, and Nebraska there is a total monetary limit of 
$2.5, $2.0 million, and $50 thousand dollars, respectively, for these programs. New 
Mexico limits this incentive to 400 MWh of generation (equivalent of 120 MW of 
nameplate per year at 30% capacity). Two states are unlimited in provision of the 
incentive: Oklahoma and Utah. Oklahoma provided 0.75 cents per kWh during 2003 that 
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was reduced to 0.5 cents from 2004 to 2007 and further reduced to 0.25 cents through the 
rest of the study period. Utah provides 0.35 cents per kWh produced to all facilities 
(DSIRE, 2015). 
The number of states within the population that provided production tax 
incentives by 2012 is therefore relatively low. Four of the incentives, Iowa, Maryland, 
Arizona, and Nebraska are so limited that the effectiveness of these instruments would 
not support industrial wind development and are not considered further in the quantitative 
analysis. The other three states (Oklahoma, Utah, and New Mexico) do provide an 
incentive that is sufficient for industrial wind development. In comparison to state 
policies, the federal PTC is unlimited in its applicability to the level of production. 
Therefore, the amount provided by these three state incentives will be added to the 
federal PTC during the times when this instrument was in force. Therefore, in this study, 
the total of the production tax credits in $/MWh is used as the independent variable to 
represent the production incentive. This approach is logical since the two instruments 
target the wind energy production. This approach of adding the State and Federal PTC 
accounts for the interaction of the federal PTC with the state PTC. The data for wind 
energy production incentives are presented in Appendix C on Table C-2. 
Wind energy financial incentives. Financial incentives for wind energy exist in 
the form of sales tax, property taxes and corporate tax credits. The levels of, 
combinations and durations of the existence of these instruments have varied across the 
sample states. Sales tax incentives typically refund or provide tax exemptions for 
purchase of equipment and installation. State property tax incentives typically take the 
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form of tax exemptions instead of credits and typically do not increase property taxes 
based on the presence of an energy facility on the property. Corporate tax credits are a 
broad category of instruments that include deductions, exemptions and credits that often 
overlap the sales and property taxes. Sales tax credits are typically one time, while 
property tax relief is usually provided on an annual basis through the life of the project 
(Hitaj, 2012).  
With all else equal, property tax relief and sales tax incentives should encourage 
developers to locate within areas where these incentives are provided. Regardless, in the 
case of property tax incentives, research indicates that the effect of these incentives may 
not be significant (Hitaj, 2012). In addition, sales taxes may or may not provide 
incentives within a state, since equipment may be purchased a state with incentives, the 
transported out of state. Hence, each of these instruments must be considered separately 
across the sample states to understand the applicability and variance for each instrument 
and jurisdiction. 
The application of sales tax relief policies has increased during the period of this 
study. Initially, these policies were deployed in five states, but by 2012, 12 states had 
such policies. The relief provided by these policies is tied directly to the sales tax rates 
within the individual jurisdictions and ranges from 2.9% in Colorado to 6.875% within 
Minnesota. The costs that would be subject to sales tax relief is usually the costs of 
turbines and towers for the facility but the exact extent of the sales tax relief does vary 
across states. Regardless, turbines and towers comprise approximately 2/3rds of the cost 
of a project (Tegen et al., 2011).  
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Berkeley Labs has gathered price data on wind turbine transactions totaling 
27,000 MWs from 1997 through 2012. Sources have varied and there are challenges in 
the collection and granularity of the data (are ancillary services provided, etc.) but this 
data is as the most accurate and comprehensive source for wind turbine costs that is 
accessible for this study. The costs and the trends over time for US turbines and global 
averages from a particular manufacturer are shown on Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: Turbine Prices and Trends 1997-2012 
Source: (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012) 
 
Examining the data there is wide variation in the costs of turbines, even within a 
particular year. For example, in 2010, costs for turbines for projects in the 5-100 MW 
range varied from $1,222/kW to $2,045/kW. Variations in turbine costs for projects >100 
MW are less extreme; however, in 2008 costs ranged from $1,343 to $1,884/kW. These 
costs variations are even more extreme with projects <5 MW. These variations 
demonstrate that attempting to operationalize this variable in $/MW is unlikely to provide 
consistent results for the effects of sales tax, since turbine costs can vary not only over 
time, but across jurisdictions and project developers. Therefore, this study will utilize a 
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dummy variable to account for the presence or absence of sales tax relief. Data for sales 
tax are found on Table C-3 in Appendix C. 
In addition to the sales tax, property tax relief is also a popular state level 
instrument. This instrument also varies between states, since the states typically afford 
some percentage relief from state taxes based on the cost of the project. Relief afforded 
by the states ranges from zero up to 100%. Thus, these incentives can be substantial, 
since average capacity weighted project capital costs have ranged from $1,279 to $2,236 
per kW over the period of this study (Table 9). For example, a state that affords a 100% 
property tax exemption to a developer of a 100 MW project would not collect taxes on 
property improvements that range from $127 million to $223 million, depending on the 
year of the project installation. 
Table 9: Capacity Weighted Average Project Costs
Year Costs per kW 
2001 $1,312 
2002 $1,532 
2003 $1,390 
2004 $1,279 
2005 $1,500 
2006 $1,672 
2007 $1,836 
2008 $2,047 
2009 $2,236 
2010 $2,229 
2011 $2,135 
2012 $1,943 
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Operationalization of property tax relief is also problematic, since variance not 
only exists for the costs of projects (as shown through turbine prices Figure 12, above) 
but also in the application of the tax. Since in many cases the taxes are imposed at the 
county level, the variance can be significant, even within a particular state jurisdictional 
area. Regardless, the tax relief afforded may be significant and therefore, the effects of 
these incentives should be investigated. As a result of the difference in operationalization, 
a dummy variable is assigned to examine the variance in the property tax relief across 
jurisdictions. Property tax data are found on Table C-4 in Appendix C. 
Finally, corporate tax credits were examined to consider the potential effects of 
this variable across the population. Variance across the population was low, with only 
three states having a corporate tax credit (DSIRE, 2015). One state, Arizona also imposed 
a cap of 50k limit per system with a total cap of $1.0 million in the entire state per year. 
This incentive is therefore not significant. The other two states that provide corporate tax 
credits were North Dakota and Texas. North Dakota provides a 15% tax credit (3% for 
five years) for the cost of inquiring and installing systems on the property owned or 
leased by the taxpayer. In Texas, companies engaged solely in the business of renewable 
energy installations, sale, or manufacturing are exempt from or allowed to deduct system 
costs from the Texas franchise (corporate) tax. The deductions in Texas may be 
substantial. Regardless, the variance in these taxes across the sample is not significant 
and therefore, the corporate tax is not examined in the quantitative analysis.  
Wind energy capacity incentives. Turning to generation requirements, a number 
of states have implemented renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), (GPP) 
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requirements, and MGPO. The RPS policies typically require load-serving entities to 
procure or distribute a certain amount of power from renewable energy resources 
(DSIRE, 2015). The GPP requirements usually take the form of state governments 
requiring the purchase of certain amounts of renewable energy each year to supply state 
governments with electricity. Finally, MGPO policies are policies that require the load 
serving entities to provide an option to consumers where renewable energy may be 
selected for supplying that consumer. Each of these instruments is discussed further 
below. 
The typical RPS requires a set number of MWh, nameplate MWs, or a percentage 
of electrical generation to be provided by designated renewable energy resources. RPS 
generation requirement levels vary across states as does the ability of states to fulfill these 
mandates with power imported from other jurisdictions. These mandates also vary in the 
enforcement vehicles for the requirement. States range from having voluntary 
requirements to standards that provide penalties and fines to industries that fail to meet 
the RPS goals (DSIRE, 2011). Not only does variance exist in the enforcement, but also 
in the accepted forms of renewable generation and the set-asides for particular renewable 
energy technologies (solar, wind, etc.). States may also impose differing levels based on 
the form of entity that serves the load, such as investor owned utilities, co-operatives and 
municiple electricity suppliers. Finally, these RPS standards have also been implemented 
at various times in various states. 
Researchers at Berkeley Labs have maintained a database of RPS compliance data 
and RPS generated demand (Berkeley Labs, 2015).  The RPS generated demands are also 
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projected according to the future requirements of the policy.  The demand projections are 
estimated by applying the percentage targets of the RPS to the projected retail electricity 
sales for those entities that must maintain RPS compliance. These projections also 
account for credit multipliers and exclude any resource requirements likely to be met 
with large hydro power or demand side measures. Furthermore, these same projections 
obtained from Berkeley Labs in 2012 included the carve outs and set-asides for solar 
resources in the RPS standards (Barbose, 2011). The GWh data supplied was utilized in 
lieu of nameplate MWs since the solar set-asides are quantified in GWh and can be 
subtracted from the total RPs requirements.  Therefore, the data in this study represents 
RPS requirements that have been mainly filled by wind energy.The data obtained from 
Berkeley Labs accounts for the majority of variation in RPS policies across various 
states.  
The number of GPP policies that are exist on a state level are limited. Within the 
study sample, the states of Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, and Wisconsin have 
programs to purchase renewable power (DSIRE, 2015). The states with GPP 
requirements and the levels are outlined in Table 10. 
Table 10: State Green Power Purchasing 
State Enactment Year Compliance Year Level 
Maine 2003 2007 100% (70% hydro) (35,000 MWhrs)
Maryland 2001 2014 20% 
Massachusetts 2007 2012 15% 
Wisconsin 2006 2011 20% (184,800 MWhrs) 
Source: (DSIRE, 2015) 
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Examining the states with GPP  programs in conjunction with the RPS 
requirements, it is important to note that each of these states has an RPS requirement. In 
addition, these RPS requirements typically dwarf the GPP requirements. For example, in 
the case of Maine, the RPS level required for non-hydro energy as estimated by Berkeley 
Labs was 3,511 GWh, while the non-hydro component of the puchasing program was 
35,000 MWh, or less than 1% of the requirement of the RPS standard for the same 
period. The state governments listed above only consume a relatively small portion of the 
entire state’s electrical demand and  require  a subset of the state demand to be filled from 
renewable resources. H, the incremental increase in demand in these states is relatively 
insignificant. The finding that green power programs are effective may therefore be an 
artifact of the limited variance across the dataset and correlation with RPS policies in 
place. From the limited variance and similarly limited incremental demand created by 
these policies, they will not be considered quantitatively in this analysis.  
MGPO requirements by states has been argued in research for determinants of 
wind energy as a contributing factor to deployment (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; 
Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Shrimali, Lynes & 
Indvik, 2015; Yin & Powers, 2010).  All researchers, with the exception of Maguire, have 
coded the MGPO as a dummy variable to indicate the prescence or absence of this 
program at the state level. Maguire takes a slightly different approach and constructs 
independent variables based on the year, the sum and the years from indices. Therefore, 
Maguire accounts for the number of programs within a state (presumably at the utility or 
other level) and the time these programs were in place. Regardless, through these 
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methods of examination, where MGPO is examined as an independent variable regressed 
to examine renewable or wind deployment, these researchers have claimed that this 
policy instrument is effective. 
Researchers have not quantified the capacity requirements of these programs to 
determine the effect of these policies on aggregate demand. In addition, MGPO is also 
complemented by other forms of voluntary renewable energy purchases that may occur 
outside of the mandated jurisdiction, providing additional demand. To satisfy MGPO 
requirements and any additional voluntary purchases, renewable energy credits (RECs) 
are often purchased. RECs are certificates that are generated along with the renewable 
energy to document that electricity was generated from a renewable resource. These 
credits are can be sold and traded in the open market. These credits are a means to satisfy 
either the voluntary demand for renewable energy (voluntary market) or even more 
importantly, the mandatory requirements of RPS policies (compliance market). Thus, 
MGPO, voluntary markets, and compliance markets are intertwined. 
Logically, to investigate MGPO and voluntary markets, the demand generated by 
these markets must be added to the demand created by RPS mandatory requirements to 
account for the magnitude of the effect these policies have. However, the accounting is 
not that straightforward, since in many cases RECs can be purchased on a non-locational 
basis. In fact, RECs are often sold with electricity or allowed to be unbundled with these 
sales and either may or may not be sold outside of the jurisdiction in which they are 
generated.  
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A single specific examination of MGPO policies and voluntary markets by 
researchers was identified in the literature. This study claimed the US voluntary green 
power market (which includes MGPO purchases) did not increase additional MWs of 
deployment of wind (Gillenwater, Lu, & Fischlein, 2014). Sincethe MGPO policies are 
correlative but do not necessarily provide for additional demand, this study will account 
solely for the mandatory demand requirements (RPS compliance) when examining the 
policy demand data quantitatively.   
Turning to RPS policy requirements, the RPS may either be enforced with 
mandatory requirements or be voluntary.  Comparing RPS mandatory and voluntary 
requirements is instructive. Voluntary RPS requirements are relatively insignificant in 
comparison to the total demand from mandatory RPS policies. Comparing these 
requirements to the demand generated from sales in the voluntary market, the RPS 
demand is significantly greater; however, the voluntary MGPO market provides a 
significant amount of additional demand (Figure 13). In fact, the voluntary market is 
approximately 1/3 the size of the RPS requirements. It is important to note that the effects 
of this additional demand is not disaggregated across states and the effect is heavily 
debated.  Figure 13 illustrates the RPS aggregate US requirements and voluntary sales. 
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Figure 13: Total RPS, Voluntary Sales 2001-2015 (estimated) 
Source: (Barbose, 2011; EIA, 2015; Heeter, et al., 2014) 
 
Since disaggregated data is unavailable, the capacity demand from policies will be 
represented by the RPS requirements as developed by Berkeley Labs (Barbose, 2011). 
This data as modified for this study excludes carve-outs for solar energy and does not 
include hydro generation; therefore, the data should largely represent requirements for 
wind-generated energy. The data is the requirements for total generation in GWh that is 
compared to the dependent variable of total deployment.  Total GWh reflects the 
nameplate capacity at an estimated capacity factor and therefore, the use of estimated 
MWs or GWh is equivalent in the analysis. As previously stated, GWh was selected for 
this analysis since the data for solar set-asides is in GWh and  not namplate MWs. 
Regarding the additional demand from voluntary markets, it may be large.  If the demand 
from RPS requirements shows a significant effect, then presumably any additional 
demand that results from policy would logically affect deployment in a similar fashion. 
The data for renewable energy generation requirements from the RPS standards is 
presented in Appendix C on Table C-5. 
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Wind energy siting policies. Wind energy siting policies influence the 
deployment of wind energy generation by either allowing a developer a clear path to 
permit within an expedited timeframe, or to provide a potential barrier to development. 
Although limited studies have been undertaken on the effects of permitting, it is clear 
through previous qualitative and quantitative analysis that the permitting regime for a 
state is important. Hence, this study proposes a measure to examine to what extent 
developers avoid additional permitting processes. 
Kahn provides an early assessment of the impact of permitting to wind energy 
development through an examination in three Pacific Coast states (Kahn, 2000). In this 
qualitative assessment, he argues that permitting for renewable resources is harder than 
permitting competing fossil energy resources. Specifically, he cites several challenges, 
including a lack of essential infrastructure in areas where the resource exists (including 
transmission), a challenging regulatory environment, a politicization and a lack of 
regulatory certainty in the regulatory realm, and a number of opposing factions to 
development. He attributes the bankruptcy of Kenetech—the leading wind developer of 
the 1990s—at least partially to the challenges from permitting wind power plants that 
lead to cost overruns. In an examination of the early years of the wind industry in 
California. Asmus (2001) reaches the same conclusion. Considering that permitting costs 
can reach levels where developers face financial challenges; permitting regimes matter. 
Thus, when considering the permitting of power plants, developers should prefer 
those states that afford the lowest cost. The lowest costs for permitting should exist where 
the permitting regime is simplified and the time necessary for the process is shorter.  A 
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simplified permitting process should decrease the opportunities for opposition groups to 
delay the decision (Kahn, 2000). The only study identified in this review that considered 
the complexities of wind siting policies in the United States was a quantitative 
examination by Bohn and Lant (2010). Bohn and Lant propose that three models exist, a 
standard seven-step model, a simplified state-level model, and a minimal permitting 
requirement (Figure 14). The standard model of state-level permitting requirements exists 
in 94% of the states (47 of 50) the simplified model in 4% (2 of 50) and the minimal 
model exists in only 1 state – Texas. The number of steps in the process is an important 
variable, since with each additional step; there is the potential for opposition and for 
project failure or delay.  
 
Figure 14: Models of Wind Energy Permitting at the State Level 
Source: Bohn and Lant, 2010 
 
The regression analysis performed by Bohn and Lant show that the simplified 
permitting and siting procedures are correlative with increased deployment of wind 
energy. Caution should be used when considering these results, since the number of states 
with either simplified or minimal processes is low. Regardless, the logic behind this 
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conclusion is persuasive, since the simplified procedures for permitting decrease the 
opportunities for opposition to projects. Therefore, this study develops a different 
operationalization of a measure for inclusion in this analysis. This measure is based on 
the existence of federal lands within a state.  
The reason for this divergence with the work of Bohn and Lant is simple. 
Essentially, the amount of variation in Bohn and Lant across sample states is not 
sufficient to provide robust regression results. In addition to a lack of cross-sectional 
variation, the state regimes also do not vary over time, thus not affording a measure that 
can provide a reliable result, as cautioned by Bohn and Lant. I therefore deviate from 
their approach to examine whether developers will avoid lands that have complex 
permitting processes. 
To explore this potential correlation, I examine federal lands since these areas 
require a complex permitting process on top of the state processes. Importantly, the 
amount of lands varies across the sample states, thus providing a reasonable proxy 
measure. In other words, instead of measuring the level of development versus the 
process at the state level, the percentage of federal lands will be examined versus the 
deployment to determine if an inverse relationship exists. Although variance in this 
measure over time is minimal, cross-sectional variance is high. 
For many states in the western United States, the federal government is a 
significant landholder and manages lands through the Department of the Interior. When 
federal lands are utilized by private entities, the federal government must decide whether 
to authorize these actions. The decision by the federal government requires a permit 
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process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Thus, developers who 
work within states that contain federal lands or any other federal facilities that require a 
federal decision also trigger a separate permitting process in addition to any state or local 
process. 
Although a project sited on private lands may avoid triggering federal review, the 
odds of avoiding federal reviews decrease with the increasing percentage of federal lands 
within a state. Should a developer select a site in a state where a large percentage of 
federal lands exists, then a NEPA review is much more likely, and the federal 
government would then be adding another layer to the permitting process as described 
above. Thus, although the federal process is the same across all states, the odds of 
triggering a federal review does vary across states and therefore does provide a more 
reasonable proxy to determine if developers avoid the more complex permitting 
processes. 
The federal government owns approximately 635-640 million acres, or 
approximately 28% of all land in the United States. This land ownership is concentrated 
in the Western US (Table 11, Figure 15). The percent of federal ownership within the 
sample ranges from 81.10% in Nevada to 0.30% in Iowa. Within these states, Department 
of Interior (DOI) Agencies, including the Forest Service (USFS), National Park Service 
(NPS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and Fish and Wildlife Service administer 
much of these lands. Together, these four agencies manage approximately 95% of all 
federal lands. In addition to the DOI agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) also 
administers over 19 million acres.  
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Table 11: Federal Land by State, 2010 
State Total Federal Lands Acreage 
Total Acreage in 
the State % of State 
Arizona 30,741,287 72,688,000 42.30% 
Arkansas 3,161,978 33,599,360 9.40% 
California 47,797,533 100,206,720 47.70% 
Colorado 24,086,075 66,485,760 36.20% 
Idaho 32,635,835 52,933,120 61.70% 
Illinois 406,734 35,795,200 1.10% 
Indiana 340,696 23,158,400 1.50% 
Iowa 122,602 35,860,480 0.30% 
Kansas 301,157 52,510,720 0.60% 
Maine 209,735 19,847,680 1.10% 
Maryland 195,986 6,319,360 3.10% 
Massachusetts 81,692 5,034,880 1.60% 
Michigan 3,637,965 36,492,160 10.00% 
Minnesota 3,469,211 51,205,760 6.80% 
Missouri 1,675,400 44,248,320 3.80% 
Montana 26,921,861 93,271,040 28.90% 
Nebraska 549,346 49,031,680 1.10% 
Nevada 56,961,778 70,264,320 81.10% 
New 
Hampshire 777,807 5,768,960 13.50% 
New Mexico 27,001,583 77,766,400 34.70% 
New York 211,422 30,680,960 0.70% 
North Dakota 1,735,755 44,452,480 3.90% 
Ohio 298,500 26,222,080 1.10% 
Oklahoma 703,336 44,087,680 1.60% 
Oregon 32,665,430 61,598,720 53.00% 
Pennsylvania 616,895 28,804,480 2.10% 
South Dakota 2,646,241 48,881,920 5.40% 
Tennessee 1,273,974 26,727,680 4.80% 
Texas 2,977,950 168,217,600 1.80% 
Utah 35,033,603 52,696,960 66.50% 
Vermont 453,871 5,936,640 7.60% 
Virginia 2,358,071 25,496,320 9.20% 
Washington 12,173,813 42,693,760 28.50% 
West Virginia 1,130,951 15,410,560 7.30% 
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Wisconsin 1,865,374 35,011,200 5.30% 
Wyoming 30,043,513 62,343,040 48.20% 
 Adopted from Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012 
 
	
Figure 15: Federal Land in the US Lower 48 States  
Adopted from Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012	
    
Each of these agencies has a different mission and administers land access 
differently. The BLM manages approximately 39% of federal land (248 million acres) 
and has a mission to provide access for multiple uses, including energy development. The 
USFS administers approximately 30% of federal lands (193 million acres) and has a 
multiple use mandate for various uses, including timber harvests, recreation, and wildlife 
habitat. For both of these agencies, wildlife habitat preservation has become an increasing 
priority in recent years (Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012).	
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The USFWS manages approximately 14% (89 million acres) of federal land; 
however, the mission of this agency is very different from the USFS and BLM. The 
mission of this agency is primarily to conserve animals and plants. This mission conflicts 
with the development of resources, including energy; thus, development on these lands is 
highly unlikely. Like the USFWS, the NPS also has a very differing mandate from the 
USFS and BLM. The agency manages approximately 12.5% of all federal lands (80 
million acres) for the conservation of land and for public use. NPS lands are managed 
strictly to prohibit activities that remove resources or that harvest resources (Gorte, 
Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012). 
To reflect the odds of a federal review, the siting indicator for this study reflects 
the area of federal lands within a state. Obviously, this simplistic model does have some 
drawbacks. For example, the areas that are federal lands either may or may not contain 
wind resources. Another consideration is that some federal lands have greater degrees of 
resource protection than others. For example, a National Park would not allow a wind 
project within its borders, but the Bureau of Land Management lands are designated for 
multiple use development. Regardless, with geographic and multiple differentiated 
federal jurisdictional areas within a state, the most straightforward and simplistic 
measurement of the odds of triggering a process is based on the percent of federal lands 
within a state. The federal lands data are presented in Appendix C, on Table C-6. 
Governance of the transmission system. Historically, utilities primarily existed as 
vertically integrated companies with monopoly rights administered under the public 
utilities commissions (PUC). The PUCs existed to protect the ratepayer’s interests and to 
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manage utility monopoly profits until the 1980s. During the 1980s, competition was 
introduced into the electric generation market, effectively allowing for the development 
of independent power producers who developed electrical power plants and sold the 
electricity produced to utilities. Historically, the ability to manage transmission was 
argued to benefit the utilities that owned generation assets by discriminating against 
independent power producers.	The	utilization of transmission assets on a discriminatory 
basis	may	also	provide	higher transmission tariffs. Therefore, FERC directed the 
formation of RTO/ISOs to fulfill their requirement for provision of non-discriminatory 
access for transmission (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014).  
The ISO/RTO governance structure avoid these practices by providing 
transmission rate transparency and non-discriminatory access through an independent 
operator. In many cases, the larger geographic area of RTO/ISO entities allows 
developers to avoid multiple rate charges that would result by routing through multiple 
transmission systems with differing ownership. 
Examining the RTO/ISO governance structures more closely, an ISO is an 
independent entity that operates wholesale electricity markets and provides reliability 
planning for a geographic areas bulk electrical system. An RTO is a regional transmission 
authority that has responsibility for the transmission and generation market in a region. 
These two types of entities are similar enough that in essence, they can be considered the 
same for the purpose of this study. ISO/RTO governance provides for an entity that is 
independent of any market participant, is geographically defined, and has operational 
authority for all transmission under its control and the authority to provide for short-term 
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electrical reliability. Salient to this study, the governance functions ISO/RTOs serve 
include the administration of tariffs for the use of the system, the management of 
congestion and in particular, the administration of access to available transmission.  
RTO/ISO operated grids are typically larger than the grids owned by individual 
utilities. The larger grids allow for greater efficiency and reduced costs from coordination 
of generation, transmission, grid reliability, reduction in reserve requirements, and 
increased market liquidity (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1999; Kirby & 
Milligan, 2008). These aspects are all inherent in larger versus smaller grids. The 
transition from utility to RTO-ISO structures is still ongoing and several areas of the 
country exist under the RTO/ISO structure for transmission management, while others 
are still governed by utilities. The creation and expansion of these entities has mainly 
occurred since 2000.  
The historic data on the territories served by RTO/ISO governance is spotty. RTO 
and ISO participation has expanded over the years in compliance with FERC Orders. 
Contact with several of the ISOs and the ISO-RTO Council did not identify historic 
records of the territories served. In lieu of territory records, maps were obtained from 
FERC annual State of the Market reports that indicated the RTO-ISO coverage for 
particular years (FERC 2004; 2006; 2009; 2011). Unfortunately, the FERC State of the 
Market Reports do not consistently report the area of the RTO/ISOs. Therefore, the maps 
with the service territories as depicted on Figures 16 through 19 provide the best historic 
record of RTO/ISO territories that was identified through this literature review.    
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Figure 16: RTO/ISO Territories 2004 
Source: FERC, 2004 
 
 
Figure 17: RTO/ISO Territories 2006 
Source: FERC, 2006 
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Figure 18: RTO/ISO Territories 2009 
Source: FERC, 2009 
 
 
 Figure 19: RTO/ISO Territories 2011 
Source: FERC, 2011 
 
 
The effect of the RTO/ISO governance has been under-examined in the literature. 
Only one study has been identified that examined the effects of these structures to the 
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deployment of wind energy. This study examined the effect of RTO/ISO governance to 
wind deployment at the county level, however, it did not account for the physical aspects 
of the system, including depreciation and generation flexibility (Hitaj, 2012). Hitaj’s 
study is also unclear as to whether the data for RTO/ISOs were static or varied over time. 
Regardless, the effect of these entities is a factor in wind energy deployment. The 
existence of RTO/ISO governance was found by Hitaj to have increased capacity 
additions at the county level by 20%.  
In this study, the RTO/ISO governance was examined across time and within the 
state sample by estimating the area of each state, that was part of an RTO/ISO in the 
particular year. The magnitude of the area within a state should be analogous to the 
counties that were considered in the previous study. The maps in Figures above were 
imported into the ARC GIS program, adjusted to obtain an accurate projections and 
digitized to estimate the RTO/ISO territories for each state for the particular map year for 
each state in the population (Environmental Systems Research Institute, 2014).  
Examining the data, few states within the population showed a significant 
differentiation (greater than 10% increase or decrease) in the area of RTO/ISO territory 
within the state over the time periods examined.  Virginia and Missouri showed an 
expansion of RTO/ISO territory between 2004 and 2006.  Nebraska was included into 
and an RTO between 2006 and 2009.  Arkansas showed a slight expansion of the 
RTO/ISO territory from 2009 to 2011, while territory in South Dakota approximately 
doubled. In the data, drops in territories did occur in some reporting periods; however, 
when the territory was reinstated in the subsequent map, this was considered a mapping 
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artifact and not a withdrawal of territory and subsequent reinstatement of area.  
Considering the substantial contractual obligations that would be necessary between the 
transmission owners and the ISO/RTO, quick withdrawal and reinstatement is highly 
unlikely. Similarly, where decreases were less than 10% of area the state, the decreases 
were also ignored.  
Finally, the ISO/RTO data from the years 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 was 
extrapolated to cover all periods within this study.  The 2004 territory within each 
jurisdiction was assumed for 2001 and was maintained as such until 2004.  Expansion 
between periods following 2004 was interpreted as linearly between years where data 
was not available to the next period with data available.  Finally, areas for 2011 were 
assumed to be consistent for 2012. The ISO/RTO data are found in Appendix C, on Table 
C-7. 
 
Hard infrastructures. In this section, we examine the influence of the physical 
supportive infrastructure that are economic inputs necessary to wind energy development. 
First, we consider the availability or stock levels for transmission within states. Second, 
we examine the flexibility of the generation mix to support the integration of additional 
wind energy. Finally, we turn to the depreciation and retirement of the physical assets 
that are within the system. 
 
 Transmission. Wind energy deployment is affected by access to electricity 
transmission. Access affects deployment in two ways. The first is whether capacity is 
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available within a particular jurisdiction. The second is whether the governance of the 
transmission system affects the ability of a particular proposed generator to interconnect 
to the grid and subsequently deliver power as previously discussed.  
Transmission System Characteristics. Electricity transmission grids have 
economic and technological characteristics that present significant challenges to 
infrastructure improvements. Transmission lines are similar to other infrastructure and 
may become congested. Congestion occurs when multiple agents attempt to use the 
service concurrently, thus leading to the degradation of service for all users. In the case of 
transmission, excessive current loads may actually result in line failures. In addition, as 
with most infrastructures, the expansion of transmission capacity is not incremental but 
instead occurs in discrete units. As previously discussed, the nature of adding discrete 
units requires large or lumpy investments for improvements. The congestion and 
lumpiness of infrastructure investments leads to several effects that should be considered 
further. 
First, there is a distinction made between the efficient use and the efficient size of 
the transmission network. For the use to be efficient, the capacity should be allocated to 
the agents who value it most highly. When electrical transmission line losses occur, these 
losses require the injection of more power than is extracted. Losses can therefore thwart 
replacement of higher cost local power with lower cost power that is transmitted over a 
distance. Therefore, efficient use is influenced by the geography of market participants. 
Local electrical power and more distance sources can be priced in cents/kWh, 
allowing an equivalence to be established between the marginal costs of both generation 
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and transmission. Equilibrium transmission costs are therefore equal to the differences in 
marginal production costs between two local markets. Pricing that is derived through 
these differences in marginal costs are deemed as nodal prices. Nodal pricing therefore 
varies from where you are in the network and over time. Nodal pricing is an important 
concept when considering the acquisition of capital that is necessary to achieve an 
efficient size of the network. 
To be an efficient size, the network must achieve an optimal level of investment. 
The goal is to achieve the equilibrium size where the capacity must be great enough to 
raise the marginal costs above the benefits of additional expansion. Typically, this level 
of investment displaces local generation with less expensive and more remote generation. 
The efficient use and efficient investment distinction is necessary since short-term 
marginal costs are lower than long-term marginal costs because of lumpiness and 
economies of scale. Essentially, this results in a price for transmission that is equal to the 
short-term marginal costs. Therefore, the price does not cover the investment 
expenditures necessary to construct the optimal size grid. Nodal pricing structures 
therefore do not foster new transmission and may not even cover the fixed costs of the 
transmission. Hence, the argument is that markets do not and will not facilitate the 
expansion of the transmission network (Joskow, 2006). In fact, most analysts have argued 
that the investment in transmission will not occur through the markets, but instead 
through regulated entities (Joskow, 2006; Pérez-Arriaga & Olmos, 2006).  
However, transmission is a network an increase in transmission availability 
provides additional means for developers to convey electricity to markets and to afford 
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opportunities to wind energy developers. Increases in availability can result from 
construction of new lines or upgrades to existing lines or upgrades to facilities ancillary 
to transmission. Notably, any of these improvements can affect other interconnected lines 
within the network to provide improvements to other areas in the system.  
For example, if a high capacity line is connected to a lower capacity line, a 
bottleneck may be removed and expanded service may result. If a lower capacity line is 
upgraded allowing electrical flow from higher capacity lines, this improvement may 
provide additional capacity in areas outside of the upgrade. Hence, new transmission 
lines may affect areas outside of the immediate footprint of the new line. This is an 
important aspect of the system since the transmission system acts as an integrated 
network, thus requiring complicated engineering studies to determine the effects of new 
assets. These complicated effects are outside the scope of study for this report and 
therefore this study develops a measure of the expansion of the transmission network 
within each state to measure the effects on the dependent variable.  
Regardless, since wind resources are specific to a particular location, it is 
important to examine the effects of the location of transmission facilities with the 
location of wind resources. As such, this study proposes to examine the density of the 
transmission networks within the sample states. The size of the network provides a proxy 
measure of the amount of transmission within a state that reflects the distance from a 
particular wind resource to transmission access. Importantly, this measure needs to be 
part of a panel dataset and not a fixed variable, since transmission networks have 
expanded during the period of this study. 
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Investment patterns show that the expansion of transmission facilities. 
Transmission investments by investor owned utilities were relatively flat from 1993 to 
2000 (Edison Electric Institute, 2005). However, since 2001 the pace of transmission 
investment has accelerated rapidly (Edison Electric Institute, 2014; Kaplan 2009). 
Analysis by the Brattle Group depicts the trend from 1995 to 2011 (Pfeifenberger, 2012) 
(Figure 20). Coincidentally, in 2006 investments increased substantially at the same time 
that wind deployment increased rapidly across several states. Certainly, this suggests that 
grid expansion has not only occurred but that the network has expanded during a period 
of rapid wind energy growth.  
 
Figure 20: Patterns of Transmission Investment - US Investor Owned Utilities 
Source: Pfeifenberger, 2012 
 
 
Transmission data. Data for transmission capacity and circuit miles is not 
collected in a consistent fashion at the state level. Several sources do exist for obtaining 
aggregated regional data but this research only identified state level transmission data 
from commercial sources. Commercial data providers market their data to developers and 
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utilities to provide up to date information for the grid. Therefore, historical digital data is 
typically not maintained or available for research purposes (Frank, 2014). Regardless, 
commercial data providers periodically produce maps of the transmission system. These 
historic maps contain distances and capacities of transmission lines with the data 
recorded in a reasonably consistent fashion across states. For this research, transmission 
circuit miles were obtained from these historic maps.  
As previously stated, transmission has been under-examined in the current 
quantitative literature. The only other study quantifying transmission utilized a 1993 
transmission dataset to correlate with policy variables and wind energy outcomes (Hitaj, 
2012). Hitaj acknowledges that the 1993 dataset is out of date, but also states that there 
has been little expansion of the grid since the 1990s. The lack of expansion is not 
evidenced in investment patterns shown above (Figure 20) or in the regional capacity 
data from the NERC and EIA (Table 12). The data shows that transmission expansion has 
occurred during the period of this study across the US with approximately 16,145 total 
circuit miles of AC transmission added. In other words, in the 11 years from 2001 to 
2012, enough circuit miles have been added to the US transmission network to cross the 
nation at least 5 times and total circuit miles of the network have expanded by least 10%.  
Table 12: US Circuit Miles of Electricity Transmission  
AC Circuit Miles of Transmission 
Year (Source) 200-299 kV 300-399 kV 400-599 kV 600+ kV AC Total 
2001 (NERC) 76200 50245 24977 2426 153848 
2002 (NERC) 76437 51025 25000 2426 154888 
2003 (NERC) 77352 51096 25263 2468 156179 
2004 (NERC) 77681 51923 25435 2469 157508 
2005 (NERC) 77862 52133 25611 2469 158075 
2006 (NERC) 78744 52505 25479 2271 158999 
2007 (NERC) 80308 52673 25922 2361 161264 
	
	
	
	
111
2008 (NERC) 80128 53256 25718 2361 161463 
2009 (NERC) 80491 55245 26180 2361 164277 
2010 (NERC) 83938 54324 25797 2361 166420 
2010 (EIA) 82319 58415 25648 2416 168798 
2011 (EIA)* 84023 59025 26204 2418 171670 
2012 (EIA)* 85416 56036 26125 2416 169993 
DC Circuit Miles of Transmission 
 200-299 kV 300-399 kV 400-599 kV 600+ kV DC Total 
2001 (NERC) 465 436 192 1333 2426 
2002 (NERC) 465 436 192 1333 2426 
2003 (NERC) 465 436 192 1333 2426 
2004 (NERC) 232 436 192 1333 2193 
2005 (NERC) 232 436 192 1333 2193 
2006 (NERC) 232 436 192 1333 2193 
2007 (NERC) 232 436 192 1333 2193 
2008 (NERC) 465 436 192 1399 2492 
2009 (NERC) 681 0 1596 0 2277 
2010 (NERC) 681 0 1835 0 2516 
2010 (EIA) 920 0 3075 0 3995 
2011 (EIA) 983 0 3009 0 3992 
2012 (EIA) 983 0 3075 0 4058 
   Source: NERC, 2013; EIA, 2010; EIA, 2011; EIA, 2012 
Note: Multi-circuit miles removed from EIA data – the miles appear to be double-counted. 
 
Regardless of the shortcomings of previous studies in operationalizing the data, 
the results from previous studies are indicative of the complementary nature of 
transmission with wind energy development. In a study by Bohn and Lant (2009), 
population was utilized as a surrogate for transmission access. Although admittedly a 
weak proxy variable, the study did conclude that transmission was correlated positively 
with wind energy capacity. In the study by Hitaj, the use of a static 1993 dataset indicated 
that doubling the average transmission capacity would lead to increases in wind power 
deployment of 10.8 % within a county. Thus, the previous research indicates that 
transmission is an important factor and the improvements proposed in this study to 
operationalize transmission should provide a more accurate assessment of impact of this 
factor. 
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The method used to obtain circuit miles of transmission measured the length by 
voltage on the historic maps for transmission lines for each year for the states within the 
study population. Maps were not located for all years during the study period. Maps were 
obtained for the years 2002, 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2013 (Platts 2002; 2007; 2010; 2012; 
2013). These maps document the transmission system for the previous year; therefore, the 
data was recorded for the year prior to the date of the map. Hence, data was obtained for 
the years 2001, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012. 
Despite the existence of data gaps, the map data is superior to data obtained from 
the NERC and EIA. Specifically, the data are at the state level and second, the maps 
show lines with voltages less than 200 kV. All transmission datasets and the maps 
examined suffered from inconsistencies with industry practices. For example, NERC data 
occasionally shows decreases in transmission circuit miles within a region with almost 
20% of the year-to-year changes being declines. The current practices in the industry 
would suggest that this is highly unlikely to occur, since the utility would more than 
likely re-conductor or upgrade the facility than abandon it (Hirst, 2004). The Platt’s’ data 
derived from maps does suffer from these same inconsistencies, but importantly these 
inconsistencies only existed for the 2012 and 2013 maps. In addition, by hand digitizing 
each of the maps, the actual inconsistencies can be identified across states, thus allowing 
quality control for the data that provides a measure of confidence in the data collected.  
Each map image was imported into ARC-GIS and a geo database constructed for 
each year. A shapefile with the state boundaries was projected to match map image. The 
circuit miles for each state were obtained through the digital measurement of each line at 
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its respective voltage. The 2002 map was initially digitized as a reference map and each 
subsequent map was compared to the result of the previous map to determine where lines 
continued to exist or may have been dropped and to avoid double counting. As the data 
was digitized, the voltage and number of circuits with a state recorded at the respective 
voltage within each state.  
The circuit miles measured are consistent across states for the data derived from 
the 2002, 2007, and 2010 maps. As previously stated, 2012 and 2013 showed anomalous 
values that included the lack of lines of certain voltage from previous years and reduction 
in lines in certain states during these periods. The data from these periods was therefore 
not utilized in this study. 
The resulting circuit mileage data for 2001, 2006, and 2009 was used to estimate 
the circuit miles of transmission each year during the period of this study. Similar to the 
transmission governance variable, transmission mileage was not assumed to drop within a 
jurisdiction from an earlier to a later period. Mileage measurement between periods 
where data was collected was also estimated through linear extrapolation. Data for years 
past 2009 was extrapolated for each state at the previously determined linear growth rate 
for each state this extrapolation was assumed based on the investment pattern (Figure 20). 
Despite the crude approximations, the data derived for this study is superior to previous 
efforts and points to significant problems with the collection of US transmission system 
data.   
Importantly, the measure of circuit miles was developed only for AC circuits and 
not DC circuits. DC circuits were not included, since DC lines require a very large 
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investment in substation equipment to provide voltage conversion for interconnection. 
Therefore, although a line may add to the density of the infrastructure in a state, the cost 
of the infrastructure to connect to these existing DC lines would be prohibitive and 
therefore, DC lines do not provide the same interconnection opportunities as AC lines. 
Hence, DC transmission lines were not included in the density measure. Data are 
presented for the circuit miles per state in Appendix C, Table C-8. 
 Generation flexibility. The mix of generation assets influences the ability of the 
grid to incorporate variable output generation. The technologies and MWs of 
conventional generation within a system allows grid operators the flexibility to adjust the 
generation output to accommodate the variable output associated with wind. The 
flexibility of the generation technology is for the most part concordant with increasing 
variable costs. Variable costs across fossil fuel types are determined by the cost of the 
fuels and the particular facility’s efficiency for conversion of fuel into electricity. With all 
else equal, the typical order of dispatch for generating facilities is from lower to higher 
variable costs. Regardless, there are exceptions to this order of dispatch. One exception is 
nuclear plants, which for technical and economic reasons are operated as baseload. A 
second exception is hydroelectric plants, which also have low variable costs, but must 
also balance the reservoir levels and other environmental and economic factors (Energy 
Information Agency, 2012). The dispatch sequence is referred to as the dispatch curve 
(Figure 21).  
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Figure 21: Hypothetical Dispatch Curve 
Source: (Energy Information Agency, 2012) 
 
Historically, the facility efficiency and fuel costs have led to coal-fired plants 
being operated as baseload facilities, while natural gas and petroleum facilities have 
functioned to fill the intermediate and peak demand (Energy Information Agency, 2012). 
Although coal-fired generators are typically less efficient than natural gas, this efficiency 
disadvantage is offset by a much lower fuel cost. With natural gas generation, it is 
important to disaggregate two gas generation technologies, combined cycle plants and 
“peaking” plants. Examining the dispatch curve above, combined cycle gas is dispatched 
prior to other natural gas and petroleum plants.  
The “peaking” natural gas generation technology consists of combustion turbines 
and reciprocating engines.  The combustion turbines are similar to a jet airplane engine 
and provide motive power to spin a shaft and generate electricity. Reciprocating 
technology is similar to an internal combustion engine. Combined cycle plants utilize this 
combustion turbine technology but also capture the exhaust heat to create steam that 
powers a steam turbine. Combined cycle plants are therefore more fuel-efficient than 
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combustion turbines and reciprocating engines because of the additional heat capture. 
Combined cycle technologies are therefore dispatched prior to combustion turbines 
because of lower variable costs. Traditionally, these plants serve the intermediate load 
(See Figure 21). Combustion turbines reciprocating natural gas engines, and petroleum-
fired plants have typically address peak loads and therefore are known in industry 
parlance as “peakers.”  
Systems that incorporate elevated levels of intermediate and peaking power 
provide a greater amount of flexibility because of the ability to increase and decrease 
output more rapidly than baseload plants. Generation mixes with higher flexibility are 
therefore more accommodating to wind generation and generation mixes with lower 
flexibility less accommodating.  
In this study, the assets within a state were segregated into baseload, intermediate, 
and peaking according to the technology that generates electricity (prime mover). Data 
are available for all 19,023 power plants in the US as of 2012 (Energy Information 
Agency, 2014). The data for nameplate MWs of capacity by technology is from the EIA’s 
Form 860(Energy Information Agency, 2014). Form 860 is required for  
“all existing plants and proposed (10 - year plans) plants that:  (1) have a total 
generator nameplate capacity (sum for generators at a single site) of 1 Megawatt 
(MW) or greater and (2) where the generator(s) or the facility in which the 
generator(s) resides is connected to the local or regional electric power grid and 
has the ability to draw power from the grid or deliver power to the grid.”  
 
Hence the data for MWs by technology type represents the vast majority of 
generation within the jurisdictions considered for this study.  
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Data for each year were sorted to determine the technology associated with each 
power plant (209,253 data points). State totals were derived for the nameplate capacity in 
MWs for each technology. The capacity by MW for baseload assets consists of nuclear, 
pulverized coal, steam turbine, and hydropower. Intermediate assets consists of combined 
cycle natural gas. Peaking assets consists of internal combustion (including natural gas 
and petroleum), pump storage, and combustion turbine technologies. For each sample 
state, the nameplate capacity of each of these categories in MW was summed for each 
year. Each of these categories is tested within the model to determine the relative 
influence of the presence of baseload, intermediate, and peaking assets to the deployment 
of wind power.  
The aggregation of technologies was agnostic as to the fuel type in this study. 
This distinction is important, since all studies to date have examined the competition by 
fuel type and not by technology. While fuel type is important since it is related to the 
costs of generation, it is not the primary factor that determines flexibility.  
Examining the evolution of the mix of technologies in the US from the period 
from 2001 to 2012, several changes are apparent (Figure 22). The most obvious change is 
that the portion of deployed nameplate MWs of generation from combined cycle plants 
has risen dramatically. Deployment from combustion turbines also rose rapidly in the 
years 2001-2003 before the pace decreased. A slight rise is apparent in the MWs of 
internal combustion technology while the number of MWs of nuclear and hydropower 
(including pump storage and traditional hydro) has remained flat. Steam turbine 
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deployment decreased over the period, albeit slightly. Pulverized coal technology has 
varied slightly over the period, but has essentially remained the same. 
 
Figure 22: US Nameplate Generation (MWs) for Fossil Fuel Technologies 
Source: EIA, 2014 
 
Limitations exist when considering the operationalization of this particular 
variable. For example, loads are often not balanced within states, but instead may be 
balanced across regions or within ISO/RTO jurisdictions. In states where ISO/RTOs do 
not exist, vertically integrated companies still operate the generation, transmission and 
distribution networks and within these states and electricity trading occurs less 
frequently. In addition, these vertically integrated companies may also prefer to pull 
resources from their own assets that exist out of state. Indeed, trading may occur across 
state lines in either case; therefore, the import and export of power must be examined (see 
import-export). Regardless of these limitations, the MWs of for each class of technology 
provides a rough means for examining the influence of various power generation classes. 
The data are presented in Appendix C, Tables C-9 through C-11. 
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Depreciation and retirement of facilities. Retirement or depreciation of facilities 
affects the opportunities for new technologies entering the market. The retirement of 
facilities affords “market space”, thus increasing the demand for additional power 
generation plants. Retirement of facilities would obviously augment any increase in 
demand that occurs. This increase can obviously be filled by multiple technologies; 
however, no research was found that related the strength of this factor to the deployment 
of wind. Since this is obviously an important element in the lifecycle of all facilities, this 
study examines the strength of this variable. Recent policies may have forced the 
retirement of coal generation or through implementation of pending air emissions 
standards. The effects of emissions and forced retirement policies obviously can therefore 
have an effect on the market for various generation technologies. In addition to 
depreciation, policies that increase retirement may have large effects in the future for 
wind across not only the US, but in many countries around the world where aging 
generation infrastructure is approaching retirement.  
Two types of policies are directly and indirectly driving retirements in the 
electricity sector. The first of these policies is forced retirements. These policies are 
typically aimed at coal-fired emissions and either forces the retirement or conversion of 
these plants to other technologies. One example of this type of policy is Colorado’s 
House Bill 10-1365 that was commonly known as the “Clean Air, Clean Jobs Act.” 
Although the act was emissions based, requiring the utilities to reduce nitrous oxide 
emissions by at least 70% below a 2009 baseline, compliance also required the minimum 
retirement of over 900 MW of coal fired generation. This generation is approximately 
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50% of Colorado’s total coal-fired generation (Keske, 2011). Various philanthropies and 
NGOs have now mobilized to support policies that retire coal, thus it is essential to test 
the effectiveness of these policies to understand the impacts to wind deployment 
(Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2014; Sierra Club, n.d.). 
Emission standards are forecast to require retirement of up to 60 gigawatts (GW) 
of coal fired generation by 2020 (US Chamber of Commerce, 2014). These retirements 
will result from the increased costs of compliance with the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards (MATS) that requires additional emissions controls whose costs are argued to 
indirectly cause this retirement. These retirements from the upcoming regulations are 
anticipated to commence in 2016, when enforcement commences. The enforcement of 
these regulations will require significant capital expenditures on many coal-fired facilities 
(if they are not retired), thus degrading the economic performance of these plants relative 
to other sources of electricity.  
Regardless of the timing of the new standards, it is necessary to examine whether 
policies are motivating operators to accelerate depreciation and to retire plants in advance 
of life of the capital stock, particularly during the period of this study. To examine this 
question, the retirements of all US generation facilities was examined since 1980. 
Average age of all retired facilities for each year was determined to see if a pattern 
existed that would indicate a decreasing average age for plants being retired. This pattern 
would be indicative of policies or other factors accelerating the retirement of facilities.  
The number of retirements has increased since 2001; however, the age of the 
facilities retired has on average increased and not decreased. Hence, the effect of policies 
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to accelerate depreciation through either direct enforcement of retirement or through 
emissions standards appears to have little effect during the period proposed for this study. 
The average age of retirement of electrical facilities has remained relatively constant 
during the period from 1988 to 2012 with retirements occurring with plants aged between 
30 and 50 years. Importantly, over half of the generating capital stock was deployed 
between 1950 and 1980 when many of the fossil plants were much less efficient. In 
particular, 72% of operable coal generation and 78% of operable petroleum generation 
was built during this period. Thus, over half of all operable generation in existence today 
is between 30 and 50 years old – within the average age of a plant being retired. Figure 
23 shows the MWs retired by year and the average age of the facilities and Figure 24 
shows the nameplate MWs built for each technology by year from 1924-2011.  
 
Figure 23: MWs Retired versus Average Age of Plant Retired in that Year 
Source: EIA, 2014 
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Figure 24: Total Operable Nameplate MWs by Technology Built by Year 
Source: EIA, 2014 
Age of the assets is one factor to assess when considering depreciation but 
economics appears to play a key role in the decision for recent retirements. For example, 
the profitability of generation plants is related in part to the differentiation in the prices 
between the commodities that fuel these generation sources. For example, the price 
differential between coal and natural gas is instructive. Forecast prices for coal are 
anticipated to increase, while natural gas prices are forecast to decrease. This holds true 
in the spot market prices for these two commodities, which is more important considering 
the dispatch order for existing plants. Therefore, the lower natural gas spot prices 
decrease the variable cost for electricity generated from natural gas generation, while the 
increasing costs of coal increase the variable cost for coal generation.  
Recalling the order of dispatch is based on the variable costs associated with each 
from of production, should an older, inefficient coal plant have higher variable costs than 
a newer natural gas plant, the gas plant will be dispatched more frequently than the coal 
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plant. Hence, revenue to the coal plant decreases and profitability declines. These 
dynamics have been argued as the main driver in the retirements that have occurred in the 
period from 2001 to 2012 (Tierney, 2012). If these dynamics were driving the retirement 
of facilities, then one would expect an inverse relationship between the retirements and 
the price of natural gas. Summing up the driving forces for retirement, the age/efficiency 
of the plant combined with the price of natural gas appears to be motivating the 
acceleration of MWs of retirement for the period from 2001 to 2012. Figure 25 shows 
this relationship. 
 Figure 25: Natural Gas Price versus MWs Retired  
Source: EIA, 2014  
 
In addition to the influence of policy, the lumpiness of the investments may affect 
the patterns of retirements. In other words, as the electricity system grew, and the 
generator size increased, the potential exists for large retirements to occur in a particular 
state as a result. This pattern could influence the available market space for wind energy 
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(and other forms of generation) since the retirement of large generators would need to be 
replaced, should demand remain constant.  
To examine the lumpiness of the retirements during the period of this study, the 
vintage of plant retirements was examined to determine the size of plants retired in a 
particular year. This examination was done for all states, similar to the above analysis by 
plotting the number of plants retired in a vintage versus the nameplate MWs of the 
individual plants. The result shows that while a large number of small generators retired, 
that indeed, a small number of larger generators were retired in each year. The presence 
of these large retirements could influence the markets, as well as the additive effect of the 
small retirements. The result of this analysis is depicted in Figure 26, below. 
 
Figure 26: Nameplate MWs and Number of Plant Retirements  
Source EIA, 2014 
 
This analysis shows that retirements are not being undertaken during the period 
for this study because of policy impacts; but instead, result from market forces in 
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combination with the age of the particular asset. The majority of these retirements are 
small and consist of generators that are located onsite at facilities, such as processing 
plants, universities, etc. These facilities are legacy plants where small-scale local 
generation was economically preferable at the time. Regardless, a significant number of 
retirements are being undertaken every year above the 100 MW mark, each representing 
a market space that can be filled with other forms of power.  
The number of MWs of electrical generation retired was determined from existing 
EIA data. Form EIA-860 collects generator-level specific information at electric power 
plants with 1 MW or greater of combined nameplate capacity. Form EIA-860A and EIA-
860B also requires the reporting of annual retirements of electric generators. These data 
are required of utility and non-utility entities (EIA, 2014). This data are utilized to 
develop total retirements in MWs across all states.  
Examining the total retirements across all US 50 states, significant variation exists 
over time. As depicted in Figure 26 (above), the pace of the retirement of facilities has 
increased over the period of this study. In fact, the pace has increased dramatically, by 
over 17 times from 2001 to 2012. Although the total retirement is only a small fraction of 
total US generation, the absolute value in nameplate MWs of retirement is slightly higher 
than the total deployment of all wind for the same period. Thus, while retirements may 
not represent a significant portion of the US fleet, they may be a significant factor that 
allows market space for wind. In addition, the market space may also increase as 
retirements increase due to age and enactment of pending regulatory rules across the US 
in the future. 
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Significantly, variation is also found across states as well as through time. 
Examining the data for the year 2012, there are several states within the sample where 
retirements have occurred, including Ohio, Nevada, Indiana and Illinois. Figure 27 shows 
the retirements for the US in the year 2012. Thus, the dataset has significant cross-
sectional and temporally variation to support the analysis. The generation retirement data 
is presented in Appendix C on Table C-12. 
 
 
Figure 27: US Electrical Facility Retirements 2012 (MWs) 
Source EIA, 2014 
 
Contextual factors. Contextual factors for this study include the resources and 
economic factors hypothesized to influence the deployment of wind energy. Specifically, 
these factors include the wind resources present, the price of generation, electricity 
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demand, imports and exports, and the retail price of electricity. Each of these factors is 
examined below. 
  
Wind energy resources. Wind speed is an important factor in the profitability of 
the plant, since wind power is proportional to the cube of the wind speed, thus a doubling 
of speed increases the power in the wind by a factor of eight (International Energy 
Agency, 2008). As stated by developers, 1 mph of differential in wind speed can make or 
break the project (Taylor & Parson, 2008). Nonetheless, this increase has limitations 
since wind plants operate within a band of wind speeds. Energy production commence at 
lower wind speeds above the “cut-in” speed of the turbine and ramps up to the turbines 
rated output power at the rated output speed. At very high wind speeds, the machine 
reaches the “cut-out” speed (typically 25 m/s), ceases operation and the turbine assumes a 
configuration that allows the machine to survive high wind events. Thus, although the 
turbine may generate electricity at less than full capacity 65-90 percent of the time, the 
actual capacity factor (percent of actual production versus turbine potential production at 
ideal conditions) is typically 25-40 percent (American Wind Energy Association, 2009) 
from the effects of variable wind speeds during the year.  
Wind resources are classified by the EIA based on wind power densities into 
seven different regimes, with class 1 being the lowest power and class 7 the highest. 
These regimes are the average power density during the year at a particular height above 
ground. For example, a class 4 wind regime has an average wind power density at 50 m 
height above the ground of 400-500 W/m2. Class 4 power densities would translate to a 
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wind speed ranging from of 7.0 m/s to 7.5 m/s at an air density equivalent to standard sea 
level conditions. Developers have preferred sites that are typically greater than Class IV; 
however, this is related to the state of the technology and the variability of the resource 
(International Energy Agency, 2008; Renewable Energy Focus, 2012). 
 Wind energy resources within a particular state may affect the investment 
patterns for wind deployment in several ways. First, with all else equal, a higher quality 
resource is more attractive by virtue of the anticipated additional revenue that would be 
provided, should the additional energy not exceed the turbine’s cut out speed. Therefore, 
wind developers are incentivized to seek elevated wind speeds. As this study indicates, 
deployment of wind energy generation is complex. Development requires land access, 
economic incentives distort markets, and developers must have the ability to deliver the 
power to market. Therefore, while elevated wind regimes are preferred, developers are 
often not able to take advantage of the best resources. Therefore, the influence of higher 
resources within a particular jurisdiction may be substantially subdued, since access to 
higher levels of resources may not be possible. For example, Nebraska possesses 
outstanding wind resources, with large areas of average wind speeds >8 m/s; however, 
the number of MWs developed in the state is relatively low in comparison to states with 
similar resources, such as Iowa.  
Examining the minimum criteria necessary for deployment, wind developers need 
a resource that produces electricity in sufficient amounts to achieve the targeted return on 
investment, when including subsidies and incentives. Importantly, the net capacity factors 
for a site determine production from a turbine and not wind speed. Wind speed can vary 
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considerably over time and while average wind speeds may be high, wind energy below 
the cut in speed or above the cut out speed of a turbine is not harvested. Therefore, 
average speeds may not be precisely indicative of production, but capacity factors are. 
Energy production must be balanced against the costs of developing and 
constructing the facility. In other words, attractive wind speeds may not attract 
investment, since other development costs may be higher at a particular site than at a site 
with an adequate capacity factor. Thus, when assessing the development potential of each 
state, the focus should not be on the wind resource levels, but instead on the level of 
resource that may provide sufficient returns. Incidental data supports this finding and 
Figure 28 demonstrates the logic by showing the locations of wind farms near the 
intersections of the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming.  
 
Figure 28: Transmission and Wind Farms at the Colorado-Nebraska-Wyoming Border 
Source: Hitaj, 2012 
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As the figure shows, wind plants are located closer to transmission despite having 
elevated wind regimes nearby (Hitaj, 2012). Thus, while the wind speed is important, the 
balance between the capacity factor and the access to transmission or other plant costs 
may actually be a more important factor in determining the location of wind energy 
generation facilities. Therefore, consideration of the resource levels is not as critical a 
factor in examining wind power siting, instead the question is whether the level of 
resource provides sufficient return to the developer when considering the other costs, 
such as transmission. Therefore, there is a balance between the location of transmission 
and the location of the resources.  
The determinants literature has examined wind resources as an influence on wind 
energy deployment. These studies have utilized slightly different datasets for the resource 
availability and the results of these studies have been mixed. In these studies, the wind 
resource has been examined through the average wind speed, not the capacity factor. For 
example, Bohn and Lant (2011) examine wind speed versus the MWs of wind 
deployment across states considering various permitting regimes. The research excludes 
15 non-windy states (see Table 3) and the data utilized for assessing the impact of the 
resource availability is based on wind speed maps, not capacity factors. This research 
concludes that the size of the resource system provides a positive influence to the level of 
wind energy deployment. Similarly, Hitaj examined the wind resource by using the 
NREL wind classes to derive the area available for developers (excluding six states with 
low potential from her analysis) but her analysis was at the county and not state level. 
She found that the resource - based on wind speed - is a positive factor in the deployment 
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of wind energy (2012). Lyon and Yin (2010) also examined the annual state capacity 
addition and used the wind resource dataset based on a 1993 assessment of wind 
resources. The dataset Lyon and Yin used was based on wind speed to determine the 
resource level (Elliot & Schwartz, 1993). Lyon and Yin categorized the wind resource as 
high, medium, or low, finding that a high resource was a positive factor in wind energy 
development.  
On the other hand, Carley found that the size of the resource was a negative 
influence on the share of renewable energy produced within a state. In her study, she 
utilized preliminary wind resource estimates based on speed developed by the Pacific 
Northwest laboratory (Eliot, Wendell, & Gower, 1991). The wind assessment that Carley 
used in her study excluded lands with a wind class resource less than 3 on NREL’s scale 
of 1-7 and excluded lands that were subject to zoning restrictions. 
Considering these previous findings, one would certainly expect to find that 
where datasets include all wind classes, including those consider the areas not capable of 
sufficient generation that wind speed would be a significant factor. For example, the 
findings of Hitaj, Lyon, Yin, along with Bohn and Lant all indicate that higher wind 
speed is a factor. However, Carley’s results do not agree with the other research. 
Potentially, this is since Carley did not include lands below class 3 – where speeds are 
typically below the level where development takes place. Thus, looking across all of the 
studies and considering Figure 28 (above), the indication is that a certain level of 
resource is necessary. In other words, an elevated speed is preferred to increase returns 
but in actuality, finding a sufficient resource that can balance the other costs to provide 
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adequate returns is the key element in determining where wind energy development 
occurs. Hence, this study will utilize a dataset that estimates the wind energy potential for 
a state in MWs of nameplate generation based upon the geographic area with capacity 
factors greater than 30% at a hub height of 80 meters (Lopez et al., 2012).    
The dataset used for this study determines the wind potential based on the lands 
with elevated capacities within a state. The data for each state also excludes certain lands 
that are not amenable or available for development, such as national parks, cities, water, 
etc. The 30% capacity factor roughly corresponds to the average capacity factors in actual 
projects across the US. Average capacity factors were 30.3% from 2001-2005 and 32.1% 
from 2006-2012 (Wiser & Bolinger, 2012). Thus, the dataset utilizes a cut off for the 
capacity factor for wind development that is realistic and eliminates the areas where 
development is not feasible. Furthermore, this dataset represents capacity factors and 
directly relates to the production potential. Thus, this dataset is appropriate to utilize 
when considering the total wind resource within a state. The data are presented in 
Appendix C, on Table C-13. 
 Generation asset prices. According to economic theory, wind energy generation 
deployment should be responsive to price signals in the market. Wind energy facilities 
compete in the market of electricity facility providers, where the lowest cost technology 
should be selected. As previously discussed, this is true with respect to the variable cost 
of installed generation when dispatched to meet immediate load requirements. However, 
for selection of future power plants, the choice of a particular technology is not as 
straightforward as it is for selecting existing operational assets to meet current demand. 
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Future power plants and the types of plants are selected through a complex process that 
requires assessment of current and future policies, costs, and ability to integrate the assets 
within the existing generation mix and anticipated market conditions. Thus, the selection 
of future generation capacity requires additional scrutiny to understand how technologies 
are selected.  
Within the literature, the costs of electrical generation have been examined 
through two methods and have not considered the economic effects associated with an 
RPS. The first method has been to correlate the various fuel costs for non-renewable 
energy sources to the deployment of wind and the second is to calculate the levelized 
costs of electricity (LCOE) to compare across technologies. The first method is deficient, 
since fuel costs are only a small part of what is considered when entities add generation 
to their portfolios. The second method is also limited, since LCOE values are subject to 
intense debate, may only include the costs of the generation and are not inclusive of how 
market prices and intermittency may affect these prices in a comprehensive way. Finally, 
RPS policies segment the market for generation assets. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine these specific methods considering why examining actual wind energy prices for 
this study presents a superior operationalization. 
 Fuel cost correlations. Researchers have investigated the relationship between 
various forms of generation via the use of fuel costs. The hypothesis is that higher fuel 
costs for fossil generation leads to greater deployment in wind energy. At first blush, this 
hypothesis seems logical but there is a distinct difference between the market to fill 
instantaneous demand for electricity, where this hypothesis may hold true and the market 
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for future generation assets where this assumption may not hold true. Researchers have 
proposed that increases in natural gas price positively affects deployment of 
renewables/wind energy (Bird et al., 2005; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Shrimali & 
Kneifel. 2011). The mechanism is straightforward: higher gas prices equal higher 
generation costs for gas technologies leading to a price advantage for wind. Nevertheless, 
this hypothesis confuses the market for electricity with the market for new generation 
facilities. Although fuel costs are a factor to consider for new facilities, there are a 
number of other factors, including capital costs, construction costs and overall generation 
portfolio influences that must be and are considered in the selection of future generation 
assets. The distinction between markets for electricity and markets for future generation 
has been particularly problematic in previous research that simply correlates fuel costs to 
determine pricing competitiveness. 
In this study, the market for power plants with differing technologies is the focus, 
instead of the dispatching of generation assets to fulfill demand for electricity. Typically, 
when utilities plan for the addition of generation assets, these entities typically undergo a 
complex planning process. This process is known as Integrated Resource Planning (IRP). 
IRPs typically take into account a full range of alternatives that include not only new 
generation, but also power purchases, energy conservation, efficiency measures, and 
others (Western Area Power Administration, 2014). This process takes a longer view 
when assessing future generation assets, since the typical contracts for electrical 
production are 20 to 30 year contracts that correspond to the estimated life of the capital 
stock of the particular technology.  
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IRP processes typically involve a forecasting exercise to determine the suitability 
of particular resources with respect to future load balancing, policies and a 
comprehensive examination of costs (See Levelized Costs, below). Therefore, the fuel 
costs that are input into this process are typically forecasted and do not reflect current 
market prices. Hence, comparing market prices for fuels to deployment is not the correct 
comparison – instead researchers should examine the expected prices and the other 
factors considered in the IRP process. Comparison of the difference between forecast and 
market prices is instructive in illustrating this point. 
The US EIA in the annual energy outlook (AEO) publishes forecasts for fuel 
prices every year. These forecasts have changed over time for coal and natural gas 
(Figures 29 and 30). Hence, expectations for prices that are input to models utilized for 
integrated resource planning have shifted over time as well. EIA’s natural gas price 
forecast has predicted modest price increases for the years 2015-2025, except during the 
natural gas price spike of 2009-2010 (AEO, years 2001 to 2012). For coal, expectations 
have shifted to higher expected future prices relative to the years prior to 2009.  
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 Figure 29: EIA AEO Reference Case Price Forecast Wellhead Natural Gas by Forecast Year 	 Source: EIA, 2001-2012  
 
 
Figure 30: EIA AEO Reference Case Price Forecast Coal Mine Mouth Price by Forecast 
Year 
Source EIA AEO 2001-2012 
 
These forecast prices would indicate that a favorable environment for selecting 
natural gas facilities would have been in place from 2001 to 2008 since the forecast price 
increases in natural gas was modest during this period. However, commencing in 2009, 
the forecasts indicated significant price inflation in the future markets for natural gas. 
This forecast price increase should reduce the demand for future natural gas power plants.  
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Considering the coal forecast prices, these show a similar pattern to gas, except 
that unlike gas, where in 2010 price inflation for future periods decrease, instead, 
anticipated coal prices show significant inflation. The anticipated price increases in the 
future should have the impact of placing a significant damper on the coal generation 
development.  
For both technologies, it is important to note that a significant lag exists since 
permitting and planning cycles for power plants are typically at least 3 to 5 years. In 
addition, the construction period for each technology varies as well and is worthy of 
consideration (Figure 31). Hence, substantial lag would exist between the issuance of a 
pricing forecast and the effects flowing through the IRP process, permitting process and 
finally into construction. 
 
Figure 31: Average Construction Period Electricity Generation Technologies by Average 
Plant Size 
Source: Cooper, 2011 
 
Focusing back on gas markets, the spot market (not forecast) prices increased 
from 2001 to 2008 (Figure 32). Speculatively, the price spikes in 2005 and 2008 lead the 
EIA to revise the 2009 forecasts to higher prices and higher inflation rates, prior to a 
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decline in forecast prices with the entry of natural gas fracking technology. Thus, when 
considering the findings of previous research, the increase in natural gas prices from 2002 
to 2008 (a period of study included in much of the previous wind energy research) 
correlates to a period with an increase in wind energy deployment. This correlation could 
lead one to believe that increases in gas price provide increases in wind energy 
deployment. Regardless, when considering the forecast prices from 2002-2008, this 
correlation is not as strong. Actual prices rose from $5.00/mcf during this period, but 
forecast prices only showed an anticipated increase of $2.00/mcf by 2025. Natural gas 
generation rose significantly during this period, despite the argument that increased prices 
lead to substitution with wind. The actual deployment of natural gas power plants 
indicates that utilities use forecast prices for selection of power plants and not spot 
market prices (see Generation Flexibility, Figure 22, above).  
 
Figure 32: US Natural Gas Wellhead Spot Price (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet) 
Source: EIA, 2014 
 
Researchers utilize the correlation of price to deployment, arguing that wind 
competes with natural gas when the dependent variable has been the deployment of wind 
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energy facilities (Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Ohler 2009). Unfortunately, researchers 
are again confusing the electricity market with the market for power plant technologies. 
Simple examination of the deployment of wind energy and natural gas in nameplate 
capacity clearly demonstrates that that instead of a substitution occurring, these two 
technologies are experiencing simultaneous robust development (Figure 22). Apparently, 
previous research has confused the market prices with the forecast prices and reached 
conclusions that are unsupported as a result.  
Examining the average prices for coal in real dollars over the period, a different 
pattern emerges than is seen with natural gas prices (Figure 33). In this case, the real 
price of coal does provide a similar price pattern to forecast prices. The real price 
increases are accelerated in comparison to the forecasts. With respect to additional coal-
fired generation, deployment has remained stagnant. This result also supports the 
argument that forecast prices, not current prices govern the selection of future power 
plants more so than current prices. Reviewing the literature that compares prices to 
deployment, no analyst has utilized forecast prices to match the planning and 
construction periods for each technology. 
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Figure 33: US Coal Average Price (Dollars per Short Ton) 
Source: EIA, 2014 
 
Considering that wind energy has no fuel costs, it is not possible to directly 
compare the effects of this aspect of price on the selection of various technologies. 
Arguably, the forecast prices would provide a better indicator for the effects of the 
development of various technologies. Nonetheless, forecast fuel prices tell only a portion 
of the story, since capital costs, financing costs and operations and maintenance are not 
included. In addition, no consideration is made regarding the integration of competitive 
sources of electrical generation. Thus, the use by researchers to correlate spot fuel prices 
or forecast fuel prices is not appropriate.  
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Levelized cost of energy comparisons. Researchers have also used the levelized 
cost of electricity (LCOE) as another means to compare across technologies. LCOE is a 
method that has been used to directly between the energy produced from various 
technologies based on total costs, electricity production, and life of the facility. The 
LCOE is inclusive of the capital, operation and maintenance, fuel, and other costs 
associated with the facility, throughout the facilities life. Therefore, a deeper examination 
of the appropriateness of the use of LCOE measures for technology cost comparisons is 
warranted.  
Costs for facilities are typically broken down into overnight, fixed, and variable 
costs. Overnight costs are the total capital equipment and construction costs of the 
facility, which are typically significant. Fixed costs typically refer to the fixed portion of 
the operations and maintenance costs or the costs of physically maintaining the facility. 
Variable costs are the fuel costs – the costs that researchers have typically considered. 
Finally, all of these costs must be financed which also adds to the total costs of the 
facility. LCOE is therefore a measure that is intended to capture the “all-in” costs for 
electrical facilities.  
The literature to date that has used fuel costs alone has not considered the actual 
total costs of the facility itself when comparing costs to the nameplate deployment. Total 
costs is an important variable when considering the actual selection of a technology for a 
portfolio of generation assets, since typically assets enter into a bid process to provide 
electricity whereas the total costs and not just the variable costs dictate the price that is 
provided for generation in a competitive bid to a utility. In other words, when developers 
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are providing a cost to a utility to propose a new source of electricity, they obviously do 
not base those costs on the fuel costs alone.  
LCOE accounts for all of these costs by essentially calculating the costs of 
various forms of generation at the interconnection point. The LCOE is the price at which 
electricity must be generated to break even over the life of a project. LCOE is therefore 
an assessment of the system’s economic performance over the life of the project, 
excluding the developer’s profit. LCOE is defined as: 
ܮܥܱܧ ൌ 	
∑ ܫ௧ ൅ ܯ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௧௡௧ୀଵ
∑ ܧ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௧௡௧ୀଵ
 
  Where: 
LCOE = levelized costs of electricity over the life of the project 
It = Investment Expenditures in the year t 
Mt = Operations and maintenance expenditures in the year t 
Ft = Fuel expenditures in the year t 
Et = Electricity generation in the year t 
r = Discount Rate 
n = Life of the system 
At first blush, the use of LCOEs would appear to present a straightforward 
method to compare costs across various technologies for electricity generation. However, 
when estimating LCOE the system boundaries for the calculations are important. For 
example, integrating renewables may require additional generation assets to balance the 
grid because of variable electricity production. Yet, the literature examining integration 
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costs for electricity production from variable resources is inconclusive. Scholars have 
provided a range of costs that depend on the percent of variable energy provided to the 
grid. Costs range from 1.85 to 4.97 $/MWh for penetration rates of 3.5 to 15% but values 
as low as 2.92 $/MWh for 29% penetration have also been estimated (DeMeo et al., 
2005; Kirby & Milligan, 2008). Other scholars have claimed that the median costs are as 
high as $15/MWh (Mills, Wiser, & Porter, 2012). Therefore, the variability of these 
integration costs is significant and are not typically included in LCOE estimates. In 
addition, the specific variables, such as discount rates that are utilized to calculate the 
LCOEs are subject to intense debate. Finally, LCOE represent the lowest cost estimate 
for a facility, not necessarily the price a developer may supply to a utility when proposing 
a project. 
LCOEs are a highly contentious measure that would be inappropriate to use in 
this study as an indicator of price because of the significant variance in the values 
reported. In addition to the difficulties with fuel costs and LCOE measures, there are 
market distortions that result from RPS policies that also have an effect on the wholesale 
generation market. These effects should be examined since RPS policies actually segment 
the market and therefore, relative prices may not be an appropriate metric, regardless of 
the method of measurement. 
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Economics of RPS policies. RPS policies distort the market in a fashion that does 
not allow for the direct comparison of non-RPS technologies to those technologies that 
are subject to the RPS. In essence, an RPS provides a market set aside for renewable 
technologies where prices are differentiated from the non-renewable share of the market. 
Figure 34 depicts the supply and demand associated with an RPS standard set as a 
percentage of the total wholesale generation (Berry, 2002). The values in the figure are 
hypothetical but the figure depicted does describe the basic market effects of an RPS 
standard. 
 
Figure 34: Effect of an RPS on the Wholesale Generation Market  
Source: Berry, 2012 
 
As shown on Figure 34, the demand curve slopes down from left to right and 
intersects the combined supply curve at point “C”. The combined supply curve is the 
summation of the renewables and conventional supply curve depicted by the solid line 
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sloping up from left to right. Note that the presumed price of wholesale electricity in this 
graph would be the cents per kilowatt (left axis) at point “C” and where the demand curve 
intersects the conventional supply curve. In this graph Q* represents the proportion of 
generation by conventional sources, while the RPS line represents the proportion 
generated by renewables (Berry, 2002). The analysis indicates that an RPS distorts 
markets by providing a separate market and more importantly, separate prices for 
renewable energy and conventional energy sources. As hypothesized in this study, the 
price of wind energy is not comparable to conventional generation because of these 
market distortions and the inherent difficulties in making direct comparisons with prices 
of conventional fuels. 
Findings by Maguire and Adelaja et al. (2010), support this assertion. In her 
quantitative study based on a supply and demand framework, Maguire investigated the 
relationship of several market factors including wind project costs, coal prices, natural 
gas prices, and total net electricity generation. The results for all of these factors were not 
significant; however, the market factors were overall jointly significant. According to 
Maguire, this would indicate that there is an overall influence from markets after 
considering the influence of the regulatory environment. I would contend that other 
factors, such as subsidies, RPS standards, and physical infrastructure availability might 
be more of a factor in influencing the deployment of wind energy. 
Instead of comparing prices between technologies or fuels, instead this study 
compares the regional price of wind energy generation to the deployment in nameplate 
MWs developed by each state. The obvious question is not whether relative pricing 
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effects occur, but whether there is any impact to deployment from actual contracted wind 
prices. Examining wind prices and deployment in this manner assesses whether or not the 
market is sensitive to actual wind energy prices indicating whether the wind market is 
segmented or separated from fossil generation facilities.  
Wind energy prices. The state level wind energy prices used in this study are 
based upon research conducted by Berkeley Labs for the actual power purchase prices 
negotiated (Wiser & Bolinger, 2012). The price database consists of 302 agreements that 
represent 42% of all wind power contracts and 70% of wind power capacity that was 
built between 1998 and 2012. The prices are expressed on a levelized basis that captures 
the price escalation that is typically provided for in the long-term contracts. In addition, 
the analysis that Berkeley conducted is capacity weighted, in other words the contract 
prices are averaged based on the number of MWs associated with each agreement. The 
receipt of federal and state incentives also reduces these prices, so the prices do not 
represent costs but instead the actual negotiated prices inclusive of incentives.  
Examining the generation weighted average data on a nationwide basis, the costs 
of wind energy rose from 2001 through 2009 (Figure 35). Prices were lowest nationwide 
during the period of 2002-2003 and almost doubled by 2009. Prices have decline on 
average sharply since 2009, approaching the lows experienced in the early part of this 
century. As also shown on Figure 28, regional variation occurs in PPA pricing. This 
regional variation is important, since regional average prices can be utilized to test cross-
sectional variation for the effects of pricing to the deployment of wind energy. 
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Figure 35: Generation Weighted Average Levelized Wind PPA Prices by PPA Execution 
Date and Region 
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012 
 
The underlying data that were utilized to determine the average regional prices are 
confidential, so individual state prices cannot be determined from this data. Therefore, 
the regional average prices are assigned to the state within each region on an annual basis 
to provide the prices for this study. Furthermore, where data gaps exist in the annual 
prices, the trends are extrapolated and the values are assigned to each of the states within 
each respective region. Figure 36 depicts states as assigned to the respective region and 
Table 13 provides the average data by region 
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Figure 36: Regional Boundaries Assigned for State Level PPA Prices  
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012  
 
 Table 13: Generation Weighted Average Levelized Wind PPA Prices by PPA Execution 
Date and Region  
 
PPA 
Execution 
Year 
Nationwide 
2012 
$/MWh 
Great 
Lakes 
2012 
$/MWh 
Interior 
2012 
$/MWh 
West  
2012 
$/MWh 
Northeast 
2012 $/MWh 
1996-99 $42.00   $40.15  $60.11   
2000-01 $35.69  $90.65  $32.24  $33.33  $47.11  
2002-03 $33.25   $29.25  $41.56  $46.31  
2004-05 $37.20  $63.09  $34.11  $50.70   
2006 $50.05  $52.65  $44.23  $61.48  $62.10  
2007 $51.12  $60.93  $42.79  $69.43   
2008 $63.67  $63.35  $52.27  $87.06  $89.39  
2009 $67.30  $74.77  $52.97  $94.26  $67.23  
2010 $60.57  $75.44  $43.66  $95.08  $99.17  
2011 $41.85  $56.65  $32.20  $74.31  $58.04  
2012 $38.11  $47.50  $31.27  $84.00  $53.43  
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012 
Although these prices are not representative of each state, they do represent actual 
prices for wind energy as negotiated between wind developers and LSEs. These regional 
prices will be assigned at the state level to represent the prices for each state. Although 
this decreases the cross-sectional variation, the temporal variations are significant and 
should provide some indication of the effects of wind energy pricing. Data was not 
	
	
	
	
149
provided for the states included in the sample that are in the southeastern US. The states 
within the respective region that are part of the study population were assigned prices 
based on the proximity to the nearest region. For example, Maryland borders the 
northeast region and is assigned the northeast regional price. West Virginia borders the 
Northeast and Great Lakes regions and was therefore assigned an average price for these 
two regions. Where data gaps occurred between years, the average was taken of the 
proceeding and following year to determine a PPA price. The price data are provided in 
Appendix C on Table C-14. 
Unfortunately, regional prices are the best available public data to utilize in 
determining the influence of wind energy pricing to wind energy deployment and state 
level pricing is not available. However, should wind energy deployment not be sensitive 
to price, this would support the hypothesis that wind subsidies and RPS policies distort 
the market to a point where comparisons with existing fossil generation and fossil fuel 
prices are specious. 
Electricity demand. Complementing the effects of retirement are the effects that 
can be associated with demand increases or demand reductions for electricity. Where 
retirement affords opportunity by allowing market space, growth in demand can also 
accelerate the deployment of electrical generation facilities to meet base demand and to 
provide reserve requirements. Demand is hypothesized to influence the deployment of 
wind energy facilities directly, since increasing demand requires increased supply and 
decreased demand can decrease the requirement for additional power. Demand is 
therefore a factor that increases or decreases the market space, increasing or decreasing 
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opportunities for entrants into the market. Thus, accounting for demand is essential to 
understand the effect of depreciation. 
Historically, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and electricity demand were strongly 
correlated; however, recently this relationship has become decoupled to some degree. 
During the period of this study demand has grown by 9.3% (EIA 2014). In contrast, real 
GDP increased from $12.71 trillion to $15.43 trillion or approximately 24% during this 
same period (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014). While electricity growth has 
continued, the recession of 2008 did decrease demand severely for a short duration and 
the growth rate appears to be slowing. The total demand for the population from 2001-
2012 is depicted on Figure 37. 
 
      Figure 37: Electricity Demand in the Study Population (Million MWh) 
Source: EIA, 2014 
 
In addition to increasing consumption over time, the population showed variance 
across the data (Figure 38). Examining the year 2012, two obvious high consumers were 
Texas and California. Interestingly, these states demonstrate that consumption is not 
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directly in proportion to population. Regardless, sufficient variance exists across the data 
over time and across jurisdictions to provide a reasonable measurement of the effects of 
the demand to wind energy deployment. 
 
 Figure 38: US Electricity Demand by State Year 2012 (Million MWh) 
Source: EIA, 2014 
 
Despite the speculation presented in Chapter One that faster demand growth may 
lead to faster wind development, the previous research indicates that demand is not a 
significant factor in wind energy deployment. Two previous studies were identified that 
have examined the total demand as a determinant of the wind energy deployment. Kneifel 
(2008) used total generation (total generation is equal to total demand) as a variable in his 
study of the influence of policy. His finding was that total generation was insignificant; 
however, he states that the results cannot be easily interpreted because of the multiple 
ways that existing generation may impact a state’s level of renewable capacity. Maguire 
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(2010) also found that net electricity generation (demand) was not a statistically 
significant factor in the deployment of wind energy.  
Thus, although no significant correlations have been found between demand and 
deployment, this factor needs to be examined when testing the effects of depreciation or 
other factors that may differentially influence demand, such as policy. In this study, the 
data for total demand by state for electricity is the retail sales of electricity within a state. 
The data for retail sales is from the EIA data browser (Energy Information Agency, 
2014). Retail sales data are gathered by the EIA for each sector including residential, 
commercial, industrial, transportation and other. Data are expressed in units of million 
kWh. Data for demand utilized in this study is inclusive of all sectors within each state. 
The data for the sample states is provided in Appendix C, on Table C-15.  
Electricity import and export. Electricity import and export occurs between states 
because of the high voltage transmission network. The import and export of electricity 
may affect the deployment of wind power in several ways. First, states may be 
incentivized to decrease imports and pursue instate renewable resources, hence increasing 
deployment. Second, importing and exporting of electricity may also interact with the 
flexibility of the generation mix within a state and decrease the ability to balance variable 
resources. Flexibility effects do not occur, since long term contracts typically govern 
long-distance transmission and the imports can be thought of as a constant supply, with 
in-state loads balanced by in-state resources. On the other hand, transmission may also 
deliver renewable resources long distances; hence, a state’s deployment may be related to 
the resources and the ability to export wind power and not policy. In addition, correlation 
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between exports/imports and deployment could be interpreted as a proxy for the 
interconnection between states. Therefore, the export/import variable indicates the 
importance of transmission between states. To examine and test for correlations in 
deployment and imports/exports this study has developed a measure of import and export 
for each state. 
The measure of import and export of electricity is derived from the net generation 
of electricity for all fuels within a state and the retail sales of electricity within a state 
(Energy Information Agency, 2014). Should retail sales exceed net generation within a 
state, then the state is a net importer of electricity. Should retail sales be less than the 
generation in a state, then the state is a net exporter of electricity. The measure is the total 
MWhrs of the net in-state generation that is either imported or exported. Therefore 
import/export is operationalized as: 
Import/Export = Energy Sales – Generation 
Negative values of indicate the amount of increase in generation that a state 
would need to fulfill the demand from retail sales. Positive values of indicate the amount 
of production over the in-state demand that is exported. The data for net generation and 
total retail sales is obtained from the EIA’s electricity data browser (Energy Information 
Agency, 2014). The import and export data derived for this study are presented in 
Appendix C on Table C-16. 
Significant variation exists across the states in the import and export of electricity. 
For example in 2012, Maryland and Massachusetts import a large percentage of the 
instate demand, while Wyoming and North Dakota export large amounts of electricity. 
	
	
	
	
154
Over time, these values have not remained constant in many cases. For example, Idaho 
has significantly decreased imports. On the other hand, California imports have 
fluctuated slightly over time, but for the most part have remained relatively constant. In 
the case of exports, the same is seen across states over time, where some exporters, such 
as Maine have decreased the level of exports, while others, such as Wyoming have 
maintained stable levels of exports.  
Previous research has operationalized the measure of electricity import as the 
percent of retail sales, not of generation. The proposed measure for this study is not retail 
sales but instead the amount of the total generation exported by a state, or conversely the 
amount of in-state generation that is necessary to make up for imports. This measure 
should accurately reflect the imports or exports of bulk electricity, versus the percentage 
of sales. Percentage of sales reflects instead the percent of import or export that is the 
portion of the total demand and not of generation. Since this study focuses on is the 
generation and not sales, this measure is deemed more appropriate for this research. 
Previous research that has examined the import and export of electricity has 
included Sine and Lee (2009), Powers and Yin (2010), and Gong (2011). Unfortunately, 
none of these previous studies has used deployment of wind energy as the dependent 
variable. Sine and Lee examine entrepreneurial activity in the wind power sector and use 
registration of wind energy entities with the FERC and the dependent variable. Gong 
studies the effectiveness of an RPS, examining the effect on consumer surplus, thus not 
considering the deployment levels of renewables as the dependent variable. Powers and 
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Yin are attempting to determine the effects of an RPS; however, their research is based 
on the outcomes for renewable energy generation.  
Powers and Yin find that interactions between the import ratio and the 
incremental share of non-hydro renewables is essentially not a significant factor. They 
suggest that the success of an RPS is therefore not dependent on the imports of a state. 
Regardless, for the purposes of this study, should this finding hold, then the deployment 
of resources is probably due to in-state factors, rather than the result of the influence of 
out of state exports or imports.  
Electricity price. Electricity prices vary between states because of the 
differentiated sources for electricity, levels of demand and other factors. The price of 
electricity within a state may affect the deployment of wind power through the price 
mechanism. On the one hand, wind energy, subsidies may decrease the price of electricity 
resulting in lower prices within a jurisdiction. On the other hand, wind energy 
requirements may lead to higher prices if wind energy PPA prices are high. Wind energy 
may push prices either lower or higher, depending on the prices within a jurisdiction and 
the wind power price. To test for correlations in deployment and prices this study uses the 
average of retail and commercial prices within each state. Electricity prices were obtained 
from the Energy Information Agency (2014). Data are presented in Appendix C on Table 
C-17. 
Significant variation exists across the states for the price of electricity. For 
example, in 2012 prices ranged from a low of 6.89 cents/kWh in Idaho to 15.08 
cents/kWh in New York. Over time, these values have not remained constant but have 
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increased. For example, the price in Idaho was 4.92 cents/kWh in 2001. On the other 
hand, states like Texas and Pennsylvania have seen price increases followed by price 
decreases during this same period. Regardless, significant variation exists in pricing 
across states. 
Previous research has operationalized the retail price of electricity as the average 
price of across all sectors (commercial, residential, and industrial) (Carley, 2009; Delmas 
& Montes-Sancho, 2011; Hitaj, 2012; Gong, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010). One of these 
studies focused on determinants of renewable energy deployment and another on wind 
energy deployment. The first, by Carley (2009), indicated that the effect of price was 
negative and significant. The second by Hitaj (2012), indicated that the influence of price 
was positive and significant. The other studies that considered retail price did not find 
any significant influence. The mixed findings demonstrate that price effects are not clear.  
 
Summary of Independent Variables  
The independent variables described above have the potential to influence the 
deployment of wind energy in either a positive or a negative manner. These independent 
variables proposed should have the greatest effect on wind energy deployment. These 
variables are proposed from examining the system as a market for power plants and not 
as a market for electricity. Hence, this study proposes to measure the effects of baseload, 
intermediate, and peaking generation resources, provide an improved operationalization 
of the transmission assets, governance, and include the effects of facility retirements. The 
hypothesized effects of these variables to deployment are summarized in Table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Summary of Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables  
Variable Operationalized as Units Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Renewable Energy 
Production 
Incentives 
Production Tax 
Incentive (PTC) 
$/MWhr Positive 
Renewable Energy 
Capacity 
Incentives 
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) 
 GWhrs Positive 
Wind Energy 
Financial 
Incentives 
Sales Tax Incentive Binary 
Variables 
Positive  
Property Tax Incentive 
Wind Siting 
Policies 
Federal Land Area Acres of Land Negative  
Transmission 
Governance 
RTO-ISO Territory 
Area 
Square Miles of 
Land 
Positive  
Transmission 
Stocks 
Transmission  Circuits  Miles Positive 
Flexibility of 
Generation Assets 
Baseload Generation Nameplate 
MWs 
Negative for 
Baseload, 
decreasing with 
increased 
flexibility 
Intermediate 
Generation 
Nameplate 
MWs 
Peaking Generation Nameplate 
MWs 
Generation 
Retirement 
Retired Generation Nameplate 
MWs 
Positive 
Wind Energy 
Resources 
Potential Wind 
Generation 
MWs Positive 
Price of Wind 
Generation 
Power Purchase 
Agreement Price 
$/MW No Correlation 
Electricity Demand Total in-state demand TWhrs Positive 
Import-Export Negative for states that 
import, Positive for 
states that export 
MWhrs Higher Imports – 
Positive 
Higher Exports – 
Negative 
Electricity Price Average of retail and 
commercial sales price  
$/MWhr Higher Price – 
Positive 
Lower Price - 
Negative 
 
Analytical Procedures 
This study proposes that states possessing divergent incentives, infrastructures, 
and economic conditions differentially influence the development of wind-generated 
energy. It is unclear how each of these differing factors contributes to wind power 
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development. To explore the relative influence, researchers have typically employed 
econometric techniques. Econometric analysis is a quantitative method typically used by 
researchers to attempt to identify the separate effects of independent variable to the 
dependent variable. Specifically, researchers in renewable energy policies related to 
renewable energy deployment have used variations of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression analysis techniques (Carley, 2009; , Hitaj, 2012; Kneifel, 2008; Menz & 
Vachon, 2006; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011). Similar techniques are utilized in this study as 
described below.  
 
Data structure and quantitative modeling. The data for this study consists of 
cross-sectional and time series data with 35 states observed over 12 years. The panel data 
is balanced, meaning all individual are observed over all times. The balance results from 
the extrapolation of the transmission governance, circuit mileage data and PPA prices. 
These extrapolations were undertaken (as described in Chapter Three, above) to support 
the investigation of the time series variance during the period of the investigation. The 
data are considered a short panel, where there are many individuals and few periods. 
Varying, time invariant and individual invariant regressors are found within the 
data. Varying regressors include production incentives, capacity incentives, tax policies, 
transmission variables, generation assets and retirement, wind energy prices, demand, 
import-export, and electricity price. For some states within the dataset, the capacity 
incentives are time and individually invariant since some states may not have an RPS 
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requirement. Time invariant regressors for all individuals include the wind energy siting 
variable and the wind energy potential.  
The panel data in this study therefore exhibits overall variation, or variation over 
time and individuals. In addition, data varies between individuals (between variation) and 
within individuals (within variation) over time. The type of variation found within the 
data is important, since estimators used for modeling the data are based on the variation 
(between or within) exhibited by the data. However, tests must be performed to 
determine the appropriate models, regardless of the data structure. 
Specifically, the between variation is defined for each individual as the mean of 
the specific observations over time subtracted from the mean of all observations over 
time. The within variation is defined for each individual as the value of the observation 
minus the mean for the individual. Finally, there is a modified version of within variation 
for the data where the overall mean and individual mean for each observation for each 
variable at each time is subtracted from the observation. Simply stated, between variation 
examines variation in the individuals irrespective of time, within variation is the variation 
over time for each individual and the modified within variation examines variation within 
and between individuals on a normalized basis.  
The OLS regression panel models explore the relationship across time and 
individuals in the context of the method to measure the variation. The panel data models 
use different estimators based the within and between variation in the data. The selection 
of the appropriate model is based on the consistency and efficiency of the estimator. 
Consistency is a property based on the law of large numbers where the addition of 
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observations tends to provide more precise and accurate estimates. Estimator efficiency is 
established by finding the minimum variance. To select the appropriate model, 
consistency is first examined, then efficiency. These selections are made through 
comparative testing of the results of each model. The testing procedures to determine the 
appropriate models are described following the description of the models. 
Basic OLS regression models include pooled OLS, fixed and random effects 
models. The pooled OLS model uses both the between and within variation to estimate 
parameters. The pooled OLS estimator “pools” the data across individuals and times to 
estimate the effects of each regressor. Therefore, pooled OLS essentially ignores the 
temporal and individual nature of panel data, and may be inconsistent for the modeling of 
panel data. To be consistent, pooled OLS the error terms must be uncorrelated with the 
regressors.  
Fixed effects models examine the individual-specific effects of the regressors. 
The fixed effects model uses the within variation for each individual. Time is considered 
within each individual. Since individual variation is the basis for the model fixed effects 
models are limited when dealing with time-invariant variables. Time-invariant variables 
are therefore dropped from the models and the coefficients for these regressors are not 
identified. Similar to pooled OLS, tests must be conducted to assess the consistency and 
efficiency of the model. 
Random effects models examine the individual effects over time and across 
individuals. Random effects models therefore allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
error term across individuals. Coefficients are provided for all regressors, including time-
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invariant measures. From the structure of the data, with time-invariant, between and 
within variation, a random effects model may be applicable to the data. However, a 
random model may not be consistent in comparison to the fixed model and tests must be 
conducted to assess the applicability 
Tests performed to determine the selection of pooled OLS, random, or fixed 
models are based on the comparison of the consistency and efficiency of the estimators. 
Consistency and efficiency are related to the estimated error terms within each model. 
Therefore, comparing the error terms across models determines the appropriate model. In 
the case where the error terms are uncorrelated with the regressors, pooled OLS is an 
appropriate approach; however, fixed models apply when the error terms are correlated 
with the regressors. Random effects models are appropriate when the error terms are 
uncorrelated with the regressors and when the model is the most efficient.  
The method for determining the appropriate model is straightforward. Each model 
(pooled OLS, fixed and random effects) is applied to the panel data and the results 
obtained. The results of the random effects are compared to the pooled OLS results to 
determine significance of the random intercepts. Should significance be determined, then 
the random effects models is the most appropriate of these two models, since the results 
indicate the random effects models is the most consistent. To determine if the errors are 
correlated with the regressors, and if a fixed model is appropriate, a Hausman test is 
performed. Should the resulting p-value of this test be significant, then a fixed effects 
model is appropriate, if not, then the random effects model is appropriate.   
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Fixed effects models examine the effects across individuals and random effects 
models vary (Gelman 2005). In other words, in fixed effect models the differentiation is 
related to whether observed effects are related to the characteristics of each individual 
(the US states in this context) or if the effects are instead related to observations across 
individuals. Therefore, if a fixed effects model is more appropriate, then the observations 
within each state’s provide more explanation of the dependent variable than the classes of 
observations (potential wind energy, policies, etc.) across states. 
This study will also utilize cross-correlational analysis of selected independent 
variables to the dependent variable to explore the temporal relationships. The time series 
data from the dependent and independent variables is used to explore the leads and lags 
that in the time series data. Specifically, cross-correlation and covariance of two 
univariate variables are examined in tandem to consider the temporal relationship from 
the panel data (Venables & Ripley, 2002). This analysis will consider the relationship of 
significant regressors determined through the econometric modeling. 
The statistical modeling software selected for the analysis is R. R is a software 
environment for statistical computing and graphics (R Core Team, 2015). The R software 
is implemented using the R-Studio graphical interface that is an open source integrated 
development environment for R. The R-Studio edition utilized in this study is RStudio 
Desktop (2015).    
Qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is guided by the quantitative 
results. Three states are selected for qualitative examination from the states that exceed 
the predicted levels of deployment, those that meet predicted levels and those states that 
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lag predicted values. For each of these states, the contextual variables along with the soft 
and hard infrastructure variables are compared. The cases that vary from the predicted 
values were selected to explore why these states show significant variation from the 
modeled results.     
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
	
Results and Discussion 
In this chapter, the results of the quantitative analysis of the data and a 
comparative case study are presented. Discussion of the results is provided for 
quantitative and qualitative results within each respective section. Following the 
presentation of these results, the quantitative and qualitative results are compared and 
discussed. 
 
Quantitative Results 
Summary statistics were developed for the dependent and independent variables. 
The location or central tendency of the data is provided by the median, mean and 
interquartile means. The data spread or statistical dispersion is summarized by the 
standard deviation. Summary statistics are presented in Table 15.  
Table 15: Summary Statistics 
Variable Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Wind Deployment 
(Nameplate MWs) 0 1 130 691.5 12214 633 1334 
PTC Subsidy  
($/MW) 0 18 20 22 32 17.21 7.87 
RPS Requirements 
(GWh) 0 0 0 1179 49138 1773 5395 
Sales Tax  
(binary) 0 0 0 0 1 0.2476 0.4316 
Property Tax  
(binary) 0 0 1 1 1 0.5381 0.4985 
Federal Land  
(Acres) 81692 406734 1865374 26921861 56961778 11028314 15794781
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RTO-ISO 
Territory 
(Sq. Miles) 
0 7800 30843 55519 248954 39739 46913 
Transmission  
(Circuit Miles) 117 2375 3176 4343 24911 3690 3134 
Baseload 
Generation 
(Nameplate MWs) 
936 5310 9144 20822 63644 13603 12282 
Intermediate 
Generation  
(Nameplate MWs) 
0 289 1948 4051 42518 3886 6741 
Peaking 
Generation 
(Nameplate MWs) 
3 649.5 2147 4898.5 14374 3315.5 3434 
Wind Resource 
(Potential MWs) 1028 9200 54920 516822 1901530 298763 421368 
Retired Generation 
(Nameplate MWs) 0 3.75 78 363.25 11907 606.26 1524 
Power Purchase 
Agreement 
($/MWhr) 
29.25 39.7 52.27 63.35 99.17 54.05 19.16 
Demand  
(Million MWhrs) 5352 23255 49576 98419 376065 71671 70795 
Import (positive) 
or Export 
(negative)  
(Million MWhrs) 
-61137 -3268 6756 18426 80788 9410 24895 
Retail Electricity 
Price ($/MWhr) 44.6 64.3 74.95 93.53 163.8 82.56 25.85 
 
Following the estimation of the summary statistics, independent variables were 
cross-correlated to check for collinearity in the data. Collinearity of the regressors could 
lead to under or over estimation of the significance of closely related regressors.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were estimated for each of the pairs of independent 
variables. This measure returns values ranging from -1 to 1, with -1 being a perfect 
negative correlation, zero meaning no correlation, and 1 being a perfect positive 
correlation. Values above 0.5 or below -0.5 show stronger associations between the 
independent variables and should be considered when interpreting results. This level of 
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correlation may mask the effects of the correlated regressors and the individual effects 
may not be distinguished as a result. 
The variables for the PTC, sales tax, property tax, federal lands, PPA price, 
import-export, and electricity price showed no correlation values >0.5 or <-0.5. No 
variables showed a negative correlation below -0.5. The variables for RPS, RTO-ISO, 
transmission miles, baseload MWs, intermediate MWs, peaking MWs, potential MWs, 
retired MWs, and demand all showed positive correlations within this group of regressors 
that were above 0.5. The correlations for variables that were above 0.5 are presented in 
Table 16.  
Table 16: Cross-Correlation of Independent Variables 
 RPS RTOISO Tmiles BaseMWs IntMWs PeakMWs PtMWs RetMWs Demand 
RPS 1.00         
RTOISO 0.47 1.00        
Tmiles 0.40 0.80 1.00       
BaseMWs 0.40 0.70 0.77 1.00      
IntMWs 0.55 0.75 0.85 0.77 1.00     
PeakMWs 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.74 0.49 1.00    
PtMWs 0.05 0.65 0.54 0.22 0.39 0.01 1.00   
RetMWs 0.61 0.57 0.68 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.25 1.00  
Demand 0.56 0.75 0.80 0.95 0.83 0.81 0.22 0.71 1.00 
 
Interpretation of these correlations is relatively straightforward and the 
relationships are as expected considering the regressors are economic complements or 
inputs. For example, the demand variable is correlated with generation, transmission, and 
retirements. Logically, the increased demand would require the construction of 
complementary inputs to meet the demand. Therefore, with increased demand, each of 
the variables for transmission and the various types of generation would also be required 
since generation fills demand and transmission is necessary to deliver the services from 
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generation. In addition, demand is correlated with the RPS requirements. RPS policies 
often require that a percent of generation or sales is provided through renewable energy 
generation, so this correlation is not surprising and expected.  
More interesting are the correlations that occur between the RPS, RTO-ISO 
variables, infrastructure, and contextual variables. For the RPS variable, the correlation of 
the intermediate generation is >0.5 indicates that the coefficients determined for this pair 
of variables should be interpreted carefully. RTO-ISO areas are correlated with 
transmission and generation regressors, which is expected since the nature of these grid 
governance structures is to facilitate coordinated transmission planning and to foster 
transmission construction. Hence, RTO-ISO governance effects may be masked. To 
examine the correlation of the independent variables and to assess the relative strengths 
of the policy variables to the infrastructure variables, a step-wise modeling approach was 
taken (additional measures tested the stability of the model with the presence of highly 
correlated variables – see Model Testing, below).  
To determine relative strengths of the independent variables, initially a policy 
model was estimated with policy regressors and contextual variables to determine the 
effects of the various policies to the dependent variable. Subsequently, an infrastructure 
model was estimated with infrastructure and contextual variables only (no policy 
variables) to examine the effects of the infrastructures to the dependent variable. Finally, 
all regressors were modeled to determine the effects of the independent variables. 
Relative strengths of regressors are assessed through this process, since the significance 
of less relevant regressors will diminish when compared in the overall model. In addition, 
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by examining the regressors in a comparative fashion, the method determines if omitted 
variables bias exists.  
All models were tested to determine the appropriateness for analysis of the data. 
Pooled OLS, fixed, and random effects models were constructed and the results 
compared. Lagrange multiplier tests and Hausman tests were utilized to determine the 
most efficient and consistent model for the data (Hausman, 1978; Honda, 1985). A fixed 
effects model was indicated as the most appropriate model for the policy, infrastructure 
and combined models. When modeling is conducted using fixed effects coefficients are 
not developed for time-invariant variables, since the fixed effects model utilizes within 
variation for each state. Therefore, coefficients are not developed for time invariant 
variables for federal lands or wind energy potentials in the model analysis. The results of 
all models and model testing for this study are presented in Appendix D. The results for 
the policy, infrastructure and combined models are summarized in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Summary of Model Results 
Dependent Variable (total MWs) 
Independent Variable Policy Model Infrastructure Model Combined Model 
Production Tax Credit           
($/MWhr) 1.5513715   -- -- 3.8028000   
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (MWs Required) 0.0564127 *** -- -- 0.0366540 ** 
Sales Tax Incentives              
(0/1) 398.9925802 * -- -- 244.5800000 . 
Property Tax Incentives        
(0/1) -19.2472371   -- -- -344.1300000 * 
RTO-ISO Present                  
(Sq. Miles) -0.0148085 ** -- -- -0.0031538   
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Transmission                         
(Circuit Miles) -- -- 0.5220108 *** 0.5218000 ***
Baseload Generation             
(MWs) -- -- -0.0944555 . -0.1009200 . 
Intermediate Generation        
(MWs) -- -- -0.0883995 *** -0.1216300 ***
Peaking Generation               
(MWs) -- -- -0.0777722   -0.0950950   
Retired Generation                
(MWs) -- -- 0.2803509 *** 0.2580100 ***
Power Purchase Price            
($/MWhr) -9.4326174 *** 0.9947734   0.7262600   
In-State Electrical Demand   
(GWhrs) 0.1168185 *** 0.0480252 *** 0.0506300 ***
Imports/Exports of 
Electricity   (GWhrs) 0.0154913 . 0.0352537 *** 0.0432420 ***
Retail Electrical Price            
($/MWhr) 16.7656269 *** 6.5252421 * 5.5150000 . 
R-Squared 0.52539 0.75304 0.76735 
Adj. R-Squared 0.47035 0.67415 0.67782 
F-Statistic 46.2477 127.389 85.4039 
Degrees of Freedom 376 376 371 
p-Value <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’  0.001  ‘**’  0.01  ‘*’  0.05  ‘.’  0.1 ‘  ’ 1 
 
The model for the policy and contextual variables estimates positive and 
significant coefficients for the RPS, sales tax, demand, import-export, and electricity 
price variables. Negative and significant coefficients are estimated for the RTO-ISO and 
PPA variables. Since the RPS policy sets aside a portion of the market for wind energy, 
this variable is positive and significant as hypothesized. Similarly, demand that drives the 
RPS requirement is positive and significant. The import-export variable indicates that 
wind deployment is correlated with states that either import or export electricity in the 
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policy model. Electricity prices are also relatively straightforward and states with higher 
prices appear to promote development. The PPA price would indicate that where wind 
energy prices are high, deployment levels are decreased. The negative coefficient 
associated with the existence of an RTO-ISO area is unexpected; however, examining the 
data, the RTO-ISO expansions occurrs in states that did not deploy wind capacity over 
time. The RTO-ISO territory areas have been relatively constant during the period of the 
study in states with wind development, while RTO-ISO expansion occurred Virginia and 
Arkansas that have developed no wind energy during period of the study.  
The model for infrastructure and contextual variables estimates positive and 
significant coefficients for the transmission miles, retirement of generation, demand, 
import-exports, and lower significance for the electricity price. The interpretation of these 
results is similar to the policy and control model, where the demand, import-export, and 
price are hypothesized to effect deployment in a similar manner to the policy model. The 
transmission and retirement coefficients estimated are as hypothesized, where the states 
that build transmission and retire facilities show increased wind energy development. 
Negative and significant coefficients are associated with the baseload MWs and 
intermediate MWs, which would be expected, since these are competing resources to 
wind development. Peaking MWs are not significant and indicates the complementary 
nature of more flexible resources to wind energy deployment. The control variable for 
PPA prices is also not significant in this model, juxtaposed to the weak significance in the 
policy model. This indicates that PPA prices are not as strong a factor in wind energy 
deployment as the infrastructure variables and is consistent with the hypothesis that PPA 
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prices are not correlated with deployment. Since a strong cross-correlation for PPA prices 
is not apparent this leads to more support to the hypothesis that wind energy is price 
insensitive. In addition, the decreasing significance indicates omitted variables exist. 
The combined model shows positive and significant effects for the RPS, sales tax, 
transmission, generation retirements, demand, and import-export. Significance levels for 
the RPS and sales tax policies are diminished relative to the policy model but the 
transmission, generation retirements, demand, and import-export show elevated 
significance. These results indicate that infrastructures are omitted variables in policy 
analysis. In addition, the baseload and intermediate generation retain their significance 
while the peaking generation remains insignificant. The results are consistent with the 
conceptual model that proposes infrastructures are important economic complements for 
determining the deployment of wind energy. Therefore, the results suggest that 
deployment will occur in areas where demand is high and transmission provides access to 
markets. The highly significant and positive coefficient for demand and retirements 
indicates that “market space” or opportunities to sell power are significant factors.  
The negative property tax variable is surprising since developers should react 
positively to decreased tax burdens. However, the property tax variable was not 
significant within the policy and control model. Importantly, the property tax and sales 
tax were operationalized as binary variables and therefore do not provide differentiation 
on the magnitude of the effects of these policies across the states. Further research is 
necessary to provide adequate quantitative measurements for the differential effects of 
these policies across the population. 
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The intermediate and baseload generation variables were both negative, with 
baseload generation showing a weak significance and intermediate generation showing a 
strong significance. Peaking systems showed no significance and appear not related or in 
this case, not competitive with wind energy. These relationships are as hypothesized; 
where the less flexible systems are less amenable to incorporation of higher levels of 
wind energy deployment and vice versa.  
The PTC variable, as operationalized, is not significant within either the policy or 
overall model; however, the PTC is a federal instrument that is consistent across states 
and only three states provide a state level PTC. Of these states, one has implemented a 
decreasing level of PTC support over time (Oklahoma) and another has very few 
developed MWs (Utah). Hence, for the majority of states the PTC variable is uniform, 
regardless of whether the state has developed or not developed any level of wind energy. 
Therefore, variance exists across states for the dependent variable of nameplate MWs but 
not in the independent variable of the PTC. Furthermore, PTC expirations occurred early 
in the study period, when low levels of wind deployment were taking place. PTC subsidy 
increases were also greater during the earlier part of the study period and were lower on 
an annualized basis in the year 2008-2012 (Table 8). As a result, no correlation is likely 
using the variable as operationalized in this study. Support for the PTC as an important 
policy instrument is still evident since a lack of correlation is evident between wind 
energy PPA prices and wind energy deployment. This price insensitivity indicates that 
the support given to developers from policies are a strong driver of wind energy 
deployment.  
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Relative strengths of independent variables. To examine the relative strengths 
of the independent variables to the deployment of wind, standardized coefficients were 
estimated. The resulting model has the same significance for each variable but estimates 
the coefficients in terms of the sample standard deviation of the dependent variable, per 
the sample standard deviation increase in the regressors. Standardized coefficients may 
be an inaccurate assumption in the case of non-normal distributions, therefore, the 
interpretation is limited to in this study to the relative ranking of the effects. Regardless, 
the relative rankings do indicate the strength of the policy factors to the contextual 
factors. The complete results of all standardized models are presented in Appendix D. 
The standardized results are summarized in Table 18. 
Table 18: Summary of Results – Standardized Coefficients 
Dependent Variable (total MWs) 
Independent Variable Policy Model Infrastructure Model Combined Model 
Production Tax Credit     
($/MWhr) 12.214   -- -- 29.94   
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (MWs 
Required) 
304.722 *** -- -- 197.99 ** 
Sales Tax Incentives       
(0/1) 398.993 * -- -- 244.58 . 
Property Tax 
Incentives                        
(0/1) 
-19.247   -- -- -344.13 * 
RTO-ISO Present            
(Sq. Miles) -695.549 ** -- -- -148.13   
Transmission                   
(Circuit Miles) -- -- 1638.261 *** 1637.61 ***
Baseload Generation       
(MWs) -- -- -1161.545 . -1241.02 . 
Intermediate 
Generation                      
(MWs) 
-- -- -596.662 *** -820.95 ***
Peaking Generation         
(MWs) -- -- -267.436   -327.00   
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Retired Generation          
(MWs) -- -- 427.775 *** 393.69 ***
Power Purchase Price      
($/MWhr) -180.954 *** 19.084   13.93   
In-State Electrical 
Demand               
(GWhrs) 
8280.124 *** 3404.037 *** 3588.63 ***
Imports/Exports of 
Electricity          
(GWhrs) 
386.119 . 878.698 *** 1077.80 ***
Retail Electrical Price     
($/MWhr) 433.423 *** 168.69 * 142.57 . 
R-Squared 0.52539 0.75304 0.76735 
Adj. R-Squared 0.47035 0.67415 0.67782 
F-Statistic 46.2477 127.389 85.4039 
Degrees of Freedom 376 376 371 
p-Value <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 <2.22e-16 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’  0.001  ‘**’  0.01  ‘*’  0.05  ‘.’  0.1 ‘  ’ 1 
 
Examining the highly significant standardized coefficients within the policy 
model, demand is the overwhelming factor in increasing wind energy deployment. In 
relative terms, the RPS and electricity prices provide roughly the same level of effect. 
Negative factors include the PPA prices that are highly significant but weakly negative. 
Again, the RTO-ISO is less significant but it is strongly negative, which is again 
unexpected. Therefore, when considering the relative strength of the policy to the 
contextual factors, demand (a contextual factor) provides elevated influence relative to 
policies. However, as discussed, the PTC operationalization may not afford the variation 
necessary to measure the effects of this policy; therefore, the effects of this policy may 
not be reflected in the results. 
Standardized coefficients estimated for the infrastructure variables show the 
relative strengths of these variables to the contextual factors. The results of this analysis 
show that demand is again the overwhelming factor in deployment. Transmission follows 
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demand as the next strongest factor for deployment in the infrastructure model, followed 
by the import or export of electricity. Retirement also shows a positive effect, although 
weaker than the aforementioned factors. Examining generation, baseline generation is 
less significant but the strength is higher than that of intermediate generation, which is 
highly significant, while peaking generation shows no correlation with deployment. The 
ordinal ranking of the generation assets are as hypothesized where increasing generation 
flexibility is less competitive withwind energy.   
Considering the combined policy, infrastructure and policy model, standardized 
coefficients show the strongest factor in determining deployment is demand followed by 
transmission, imports and exports, and retirement of facilities. For the policy measures, 
the RPS is a positive influence, followed by the sales tax measure but these policy 
measures are less influential than the contextual or the infrastructure variables. Retiring 
facilities shows slightly greater positive influence than the RPS policies. Finally, the 
standardized coefficients for differing generation types are consistent with the 
interpretations above and flexible resources are less competitive to wind energy. The 
caveat to these analyses is the relative strength of the PTC is not available through this 
model nor are the fixed regressors that include the state wind energy resources and the 
federal lands that are a proxy for an additional permitting regime. These factors are 
discussed further in subsequent sections.  
Investigation of leading and lagging regressors. Models were developed for 
each of the regressors with elevated significance (significance >0.01) to examine the lead 
or lag of these to the dependent variable of deployment. Correlation coefficients for the 
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factors were plotted versus the amount of lag to determine whether there is a higher 
probability of occurrence for a particular regressor to lead or lag deployment. Lead-lag 
plots for all significant variables and the plots of the actual deployment to significant 
variables are provided in Appendix E. 
The analysis shows deployment of wind energy occurs in advance of RPS 
requirements. Developers and utilities act in advance of mandatory RPS requirements 
since these policies often include penalties for failure to meet the standard. Transfer of 
renewable energy credits to meet RPS requirements may also facilitate the development 
of wind in advance of mandatory requirements. States that have low or no RPS 
requirements that desire to export wind energy to states with RPS requirements may add 
to the deployment in advance of the requirements. Therefore, the import and export of 
wind may be enhanced by RPS requirements and fulfillment of demand in other states. In 
addition, California deployed a large portion of the wind fleet in that state prior to the 
RPS, arguably because of lucrative tax credits (Asmus, 2001). California’s deployment 
level was 40% of total US deployment in 2001 and this deployment was in advance of the 
RPS requirements that were promulgated in that state in 2003. Arguably, this large 
deployment in advance of requirements may lead to a distortion in the cross-correlation.  
Examining transmission, the pattern of development is quite different from the 
RPS policies. The correlation of transmission to deployment indicates that the probability 
is higher of transmission construction leading to the deployment of wind energy. This 
relationship is logical, since without transmission, power cannot be moved to markets and 
developers cannot construct facilities without this essential infrastructure. Transmission 
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leading deployment suggests that proactive construction of transmission would facilitate 
the development of wind energy.  
Intermediate generation shows a similar pattern to transmission, where this 
competing resource is often developed in advance of wind energy deployment. Although 
the resource is competitive, speculatively, transmission may have been constructed to 
support these facilities. If so, excess transmission may have been utilized by wind 
developers. In addition, the early construction of natural gas may also be complementary 
since this technology is more flexible than baseload technologies, particularly coal. Thus, 
by deploying flexible generation technologies in advance may also foster wind 
generation.   
Demand shows a two-tailed effect, where demand and deployment of wind, are 
more highly correlated both before and after the period when wind is deployed. This is an 
artifact of the use of wind to fill demand that is created before deployment as well as 
afterwards. Retirement of generation, which is hypothesized to add to demand, shows a 
pattern where the probability of plant retirement is most highly correlated at the time of 
wind energy deployment. The lead-lag correlation indicates a bi-directional relationship 
where retirement of facilities leads to wind energy deployment and conversely, wind 
energy deployment leads to retirement.  
Finally, the pattern of correlation in the import and export of electricity show 
relatively low correlation coefficients. Examining the actual data, a bifurcated effect is 
apparent. States that import electricity develop wind energy as do states that export 
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electricity. The individual states also have varying leads and lags in the deployment of 
wind to the import and export of electricity, leading to the low correlation coefficients.  
Model testing. To test the findings of the model, several techniques were utilized. 
Initially, the states with the largest deployment in nameplate MWs of wind energy were 
each sequentially removed from the model to assess the effects to the results. These 
states, Iowa, California, and Texas represent 38% of all US deployment as of 2012 and 
therefore should provide elevated influence in the model relative to states with lower 
levels of deployment. Should the findings hold across these models, then individual state 
effects do not significantly affect the results.  
Examining these models, the RPS, transmission, intermediate generation, 
retirement of transmission, demand and export-import variables retained significance. 
The sales tax and property tax variables lost significance (particularly when omitting 
Texas). When Iowa was omitted, the sales tax influence coefficient direction changed 
from positive to negative. The decreasing significance and positive to negative change 
indicates that the property and tax variables require improved operationalization.  
The baseload MWs coefficients became positive and slightly significant without 
the presence of the data including Texas. Texas has increased intermediate MWs over the 
period of the study while deploying the largest wind fleet in the US, shifting away from a 
baseload generation fleet to a more flexible generation fleet with a large wind fleet. 
Therefore, Texas has largely shifted away from less flexible baseload assets and this 
retirement of baseload assets and the strategy is positive for wind. Nevertheless, it is 
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important to note that the findings for the RPS, transmission, intermediate generation, 
retirements, demand and import-export remained consistent throughout this test. 
A second technique to test the model incorporates time as an independent variable 
in the model. If time is a significant predictor, then other factors exogenous to the model 
account for the temporal correlation. As expected, time is a significant predictor of the 
deployment of wind and the unaccounted variation may be partially explained by the 
operationalization of the policy variables, the technological changes in wind turbines over 
the period, or related to decreasing institutional barriers allowing greater incorporation of 
wind energy assets.   
A third check that was performed plotted each of the independent variables 
against the dependent variable to explore the potential for non-linear relationships of the 
dependent variable to each regressor. Non-linear patterns, such as exponential or 
saturation types (S-curve) were not identified in the data. In addition, scatterplots that 
contained the dependent and independent relationship for each state were constructed to 
examine the potential for patterns to exist at the state level that may not be easily be 
recognized in a composite scatterplot of all data. All scatterplot data is presented in 
Appendix F.  
To investigate the potential for highly correlated regressors to effect model results 
in the infrastructure model, a forward step-wise fixed effects model was constructed. This 
model verified the stability of the infrastructure model, since regressors identified within 
the fixed model retained significance and direction throughout the test. The infrastructure 
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model was selected for this test, since this model contained the majority of the highly 
correlated regressors. 
In addition, a forward step-wise model was constructed using a between estimator 
to determine if any regressors were significant predictors of the mean level of wind 
energy deployment across states. The import and export of electricity, the RPS variable 
and the level of wind resources within a state were significant in the between model. This 
result emphasizes the importance of policies, resources, and ability to import or export as 
factors that influence the mean of the deployment of wind energy across states. 
Finally, the model residuals or the difference between the observed values and 
predicted values of the dependent variable was used to assess the appropriateness of the 
use of a linear model. Each of the state residuals is shown on Figure 39. In the figure each 
color represents a state. Model residuals in MWs difference from the predicted values are 
on the left axis and y-axis represents the number of cases within the model (35 states x 12 
years or 420 cases). The plot of the residuals shows a random distribution with no 
apparent pattern that would indicate the need for a non-linear model.  
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Figure 39: Model Residuals 
Qualitative case selection. Three qualitative cases were selected by assessing the 
model residuals to determine the two states (Iowa and Ohio) that varied the most and the 
one state (Nebraska) that deviated the least from the model findings. Of the two states 
that varied the most from the predicted values, one state (Iowa) deployed greater amounts 
of wind power than predicted, while the other state (Ohio) deployed less wind power than 
expected. These two states therefore represent cases that most significantly depart from 
the statistical findings; therefore, should be examined in detail. Residuals for the state of 
Nebraska do not exceed 205 MWs. Nebraska therefore represents a state that conforms 
the most with the model and should therefore be considered in conjunction with the two 
cases that depart from the model. This case study comparison considers groups of factors, 
first policy variables, then infrastructure, and finally contextual variables. Fixed variables 
not amenable to the quantitative analysis are also considered in this section. Prior to the 
comparison of the cases, first we will examine the varying outcomes in the states 
selected.  
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Outcomes. Deployment of wind power in Nebraska and Ohio has reached 
relatively the same level of wind energy deployment as of 2012, with each state 
deploying 449 and 428 MWs, respectively. The development level in these states is 
relatively modest, with Nebraska and Ohio ranked 23rd and 26th, respectively, in wind 
deployment. Together, these two states only represent 0.7% of all wind development in 
the population. Nebraska added wind gradually over time, while the majority of 
deployment occurred in Ohio in the period from 2009 to 2012. Iowa has developed an 
order of magnitude more wind than either state, with 5,133 MWs and ranks third in the 
United States with over 8.5% of the total deployment (Figure 40). 
 
Figure 40: Deployment of Wind over Time – Case Study States 
Source EIA, 2014 
 
Policy variables. Examining the permitting regimes, all states in this case utilize 
the local-based or standard permitting model. The amount of federal lands does vary 
across the states, and Nebraska has almost twice as much federal land as Ohio and less 
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than five times the federal land area than Iowa. However, the total federal area within 
each state is very low at less than 1.5% of all land within the states. Hence, the selected 
cases are not appropriate for assessing the potential for developers to avoid difficult 
permitting processes. 
Governance of the grid has varied across the cases, with Iowa and Ohio part of an 
RTO/ISO since the beginning of the study period. Nebraska transitioned to RTO/ISO 
governance between the years of 2006 and 2009, with the vast majority of the state within 
an RTO/ISO territory by 2009 (See Figures 16-19). Deployment in Nebraska did increase 
coincidentally with the incorporation of the majority of the state into the RTO/ISO 
governance but the comparison across these cases does not clearly indicate the 
effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of these governance infrastructures. 
Significant state level PTCs are not available in any of these states but the federal 
PTC does apply across the states. Iowa did have a PTC credit that was enacted in 2005 at 
a level of 1.5 cents/kW for 10 years; however, this credit was limited to 2.5 MWs per 
qualifying facility and is too limited to provide a significant incentive. Importantly, the 
federal PTC expiration years of 2002 and 2004 did not decrease the deployment in these 
states, since each state expanded wind energy during these years (albeit at low levels in 
comparison to later periods in the study). Perhaps even more importantly, the deployment 
levels during the PTC expiration periods were very low in comparison to the 
development levels that occurred in the later years of this study. The continued 
deployment during the expiration periods would contribute to the lack of significance of 
the PTC variable in this study.  
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Examining the sales tax, property tax, MGPO, GPP, and RPS policies for each 
state, Iowa and Ohio have always provided property tax relief while Nebraska has not. 
Sales tax relief has been provided in Ohio over the study period, while Iowa implemented 
this policy in 2006 and Nebraska provided this relief in 2007. Following the year 2006 in 
Iowa and 2007 in Nebraska, expansion of the wind fleet accelerated but this expansion 
may only be coincidental with the implementation of sales tax relief, since this level of 
relief is relatively low and other factors may have contributed to this acceleration. MGPO 
are required in Iowa but not in Nebraska or Ohio. Regardless, these MGPO policies may 
have added to aggregate demand and increased deployment. GPP programs have not been 
implemented in these states.  
RPS standards exist in Iowa and Ohio but not Nebraska. The RPS in Iowa is a 
modest standard, requiring only 210 MWs, but was implemented in 1983. The RPS in 
Ohio is recent and was enacted in 2008 with a requirement of 12.5% of electricity from 
renewables by 2026. The ramping up of the renewable energy requirement in Ohio during 
the study period is therefore modest. However, the rate of deployment did accelerate in 
Ohio after RPS enactment supporting that the RPS is effective (Figure 40). 
Considering all cases, the total number of policies enacted to promote either 
energy conservation or to stimulate renewable energy development are 61, 51 and 19 for 
Iowa, Ohio and Nebraska, respectively (DSIRE, 2015). Thus, total policy support is far 
greater in Iowa and Ohio than in Nebraska. Temporally, Iowa was an early adopter of 
renewable support policies with the earliest US RPS standard, while Ohio has adopted the 
RPS measure later in the period of the study. Therefore, it appears that the number of 
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policies and timing of implementation supports the argument that policies do matter; but 
with the caveat that the timing of implementation and interactions between instruments 
are important.  
Infrastructure variables. Turning to the infrastructures and the outcomes, 
transmission, generation mixes, and retirements have varied across the cases. 
Transmission mileage in Iowa increased modestly by approximately 10%, Ohio 
transmission mileage almost doubled over the period of the study, while mileage in 
Nebraska increased by almost 9%. The lack of expansion in Iowa is surprising but the 
data show that Iowa has increasingly exported wind power and may therefore be 
benefitting from improvements in transmission in neighboring states or the construction 
of key linkages to improve in-state capacity for export. Generation percentages for 
baseload, intermediate, and peaking assets changed across time for all states. All states 
have shown a decrease in the amount of baseload generation and an increase in the 
percentage of intermediate assets. Baseload generation in Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio 
decreased by 11%, 7%, and 19%, respectively. Intermediate assets increased by 10%, 
5%, and 12% for these same states. Peaking assets in Iowa and Nebraska were relatively 
high at the beginning of the study period at 22% and 20%, respectively and remained 
constant through the period, while Ohio increased peaking assets from 15% to 21%. 
Finally, Nebraska retired only 8 MWs during the period of the study, while Iowa and 
Ohio retired 428 and 3,665 MWs, respectively. In Iowa and Ohio, the retirement of assets 
accelerated over the period, with levels increasing particularly in the period of 2010 
through 2012 for both states.  
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Contextual variables. For the cases selected, the potential MWs of wind 
deployment are highest in Nebraska at 917,999 MWs, relatively elevated in Iowa at 
570,714 MWs and low in Ohio in 54,920 MWs. The PPA prices in Nebraska and Iowa 
are the same since regional PPA data is used in this study, while wind prices in the Ohio 
region are much higher. Demand was greatest in Ohio but actually decreased over the 
study period. Absolute demand was lowest in Nebraska, but increased by the highest 
percentage over the period. In Iowa, the demand has also increased over the period. Iowa 
has increasingly exported electricity during the period, while Nebraska has exported but 
at decreasing levels. Ohio has gone from importing to meeting demand and back to 
importing over the period. The electricity prices started the period as lowest in Nebraska 
and highest in Ohio. At the end of the period, prices were lowest in Iowa and remained 
highest in Ohio.  
This examination of the outlier cases indicates that one of the fixed variables, 
resource potentials, may play a role since Ohio was lacking resources and development 
relative to Iowa. Nebraska, while possessing much greater wind resources has limited 
access to export transmission, with only one transmission line to Wyoming, one to 
Western Kansas, one to South Dakota and a single point of connection to Missouri. All 
other large transmission lines from Nebraska lead to Iowa. Hence, Nebraska is limited by 
transmission either to areas with very little load or load growth or to Iowa, who exports 
wind power (Platts, 2013). Thus, the potential for Nebraska to export wind resources is 
limited. The step-wise between analysis results support the assertion that wind is an 
important factor, since the analysis indicates that the mean of all state deployment is 
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influenced by wind resources. In addition, demand is supported as an influence, since 
demand in Ohio has fallen throughout the study period and Ohio development has lagged, 
despite increasing transmission and retirements. The assertion of demand as the dominant 
factor is further supported since demand in Iowa has increased over the period.  
Iowa’s deployment level is one of the highest in the nation, despite lower relative 
levels of increases in transmission. This may be the result primarily of export to 
neighboring states and efficiencies in transmission improvements. Speculatively, Iowa 
may have taken advantage of existing transmission and location to export to a large 
market in neighboring Illinois. In addition, Iowa’s proximity and position between 
Nebraska and the larger markets to the east may effectively block power transmission 
from Nebraska, shutting off development within that state. The combination of the 
growth of Iowa as a power exporter and the lack of transmission development lends some 
support to this hypothesis. The comparison of these cases and the quantitative analysis 
show that the market demand and the ability to supply to markets matters in determining 
where wind energy is deployed. 
Review of hypotheses. Nine hypotheses were presented in Chapter One, and each 
of these is considered below in light of the evidence from the quantitative and qualitative 
examinations. The hypotheses are presented with a brief discussion following each. 
1. Wind energy deployment is increased in states with elevated wind energy 
potential. 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis includes the step-wise between modeling that 
shows the mean of the deployment increases because of greater wind resources. 
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Qualitatively, Iowa shows much greater deployment than Ohio while Nebraska has a 
greater resources but has limited load and transmission. 
2. Policies for siting wind that require an additional level of analysis 
decrease levels of wind energy deployment. 
No evidence confirms this hypothesis through either the quantitative or the 
qualitative examination. 
3. Policies that require increased wind energy generation capacity increase 
wind energy deployment. 
Quantitative evidence shows that RPS policies increase wind energy deployment. 
Qualitatively, Iowa has had a long standing RPS and has elevated deployment. Nebraska, 
which has no RPS has demonstrated low growth rates. Ohio’s growth rate accelerated 
after RPS implementation. Thus, qualitative and quantitative studies confirm this 
hypothesis. 
4. Policies that incentivize wind energy production increase wind energy 
deployment. 
Direct evidence for this hypothesis is limited. The PTC as operationalized in this 
study shows little variation across states and PTC expirations were early in the study 
during a period of low deployment. None of the states in the qualitative studies has a 
state-level PTC. 
5. Policies that provide financial incentives to wind energy increase wind 
energy deployment. 
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No evidence was found to support the property tax relief, although some 
quantitative evidence supports the sales tax policies. Some support for sales tax policies 
is found in the qualitative study. Therefore, this hypothesis is plausible for sales tax 
policies. 
6. Grid governance that provides non-discriminatory access increases wind 
energy deployment. 
No evidence was found to support this hypothesis, either qualitatively or 
quantitatively. 
7. Increased generation asset retirements increase wind energy deployment. 
Quantitative evidence supports this hypothesis. Qualitative evidence was 
indeterminate. This hypothesis is plausible. 
8. Generation that is more flexible is complementary to wind energy 
deployment. 
Strong support is afforded to this hypothesis by the quantitative evidence; 
however, the case study analysis was not clearly supportive. The hypothesis is plausible. 
9. Higher levels of transmission stocks increase wind energy deployment. 
This hypothesis was strongly supported by the quantitative evidence. The case 
study analysis does provide evidence to support the hypothesis through the comparison of 
Iowa and Nebraska. The hypothesis is plausible. 
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Discussion 
The argument that infrastructure influences wind energy development as 
compared to policy interventions is supported; however, it is important to note that the 
influence of the PTC and RPS are certainly factors that influence deployment, since price 
insensitivity is evident which likely results from large subsidies and the market set-asides 
afforded from the RPS standards. Price insensitivity is concordant with economic models 
of an RPS that show that renewable energy does not directly compete with fossil energy 
via price (See Figure 34 and Berry, 2002). Since wind energy has been the lowest price 
renewable resource to fulfill RPS requirements because of technological advantages and 
the PTC subsidy, it is no surprise that the wind energy has grabbed the lion’s share of the 
RPS requirements (See Table 5, comparison of wind versus non-wind deployment and 
Figure 13, RPS requirements and wind deployment). 
Support is provided for the hypotheses that transmission improvements and 
retirement of generation assets are factors that are positive for wind development, 
although wind development may also lead to retirement of facilities. Evidence was also 
found to support the hypothesis that policies such as the RPS, which require increased 
renewable energy, are also positive factors for increasing nameplate deployment of wind 
energy. Also supported is the hypothesis that higher levels of generation flexibility are 
less competitive with wind energy and in fact may be complementary and lead to 
increased wind energy deployment.   
The use of fixed effects modelling does not allow the estimation of coefficients 
for siting policies and wind energy resource variables. Forward step-wise between 
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modeling did indicate that wind resources are an important factor. The qualitative 
analysis do not provide evidence for the effects of siting policies, since the cases selected 
did not provide variation for this variable. Quantitative analysis and comparison across 
cases was inconclusive regarding the hypothesis that PTC policies increase wind energy 
deployment. However, indirect evidence supports the influence of the PTC as an effective 
instrument, since wind energy deployment is insensitive to PPA prices. Sales tax policies 
that subsidize wind are supported as increasing deployment.  
This study makes similar findings to other quantitative analysis within the 
literature, but also departs in some aspects. For example, this study finds that a capacity 
incentive, in this case the RPS, is a contributing factor to wind energy development. This 
finding is similar to Bohn and Lant (2009), Carley (for total MWs) (2009), Gong (2011), 
Kneifel (2008), Maguire (2010), Menz and Vachon (2006) along with Yin and Powers 
(2010). This study also claims that subsidies, such as sales tax policies are also supportive 
to wind energy deployment, although this association is weak. The finding that sales 
taxes relief is a positive factor is juxtaposed to findings by Carley (2009), but agrees with 
findings by Hitaj (2012). The negative association of property tax relief to deployment is 
surprising and agrees with findings from Hitaj. She found negative coefficients for 
property tax relief (significant at the 10% level) within a pooled OLS model constructed 
at the county level. Indirect evidence in the form of a lack of price sensitivity is 
hypothesized to support that the PTC in combination with the RPS is an effective policy 
instrument (see discussion above). However, state level analysis of the PTC is 
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problematic as previously discussed. The PTC has been argued as effective by Maguire 
(2010) and Hitaj (2012).  
The negative coefficient for the RTO/ISO governance is somewhat surprising but 
as previously discussed; the operationalization at the state level may be problematic to 
discern the effects of this variable. Hitaj (2012) claims positive effects to wind 
deployment from RTO/ISO governance when examining county level data, which may be 
a more appropriate level for the analysis of this variable. County level data would allow 
for a more granular analysis of the locations of wind facilities versus the presence or 
absence of RTO/ISO territories than total RTO/ISO area per state. On the other hand, 
regional level data that considers RTO/ISO territories to areas without a similar 
governance structure may provide additional insight. 
The findings of this study that transmission plays a large role in the deployment of 
wind are not surprising and agree with the previous investigation by Hitaj (2012). 
However, this study utilized a time-variant dataset to examine transmission, juxtaposed to 
static data that was used by Hitaj. Importantly, since the study by Hitaj was focused on 
policies, the consistency of transmission being significant within her study adds to the 
weight of the evidence that transmission in an important economic input is an under-
examined factor in wind energy deployment.   
Unique to this study is the disaggregation of the competing generation assets to 
baseload, intermediate and peaking sources. The findings of this study agree with 
previous literature that natural gas is competitive with wind (Gong 2011; Kneifel, 2011; 
Lyon & Yin, 2010; Shrimali & Maguire, 2010). However, this study goes further and 
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suggests that peaking generation (including natural gas) does not compete with wind and 
that more flexible resources are likely complementary with wind deployment. This study 
also suggests that increased baseload power is more of a factor in decreasing wind energy 
deployment (although the finding is less significant). These aspects of wind deployment 
have not been investigated previously. 
Also unique to this study is the finding that retirement of power plants is an 
important factor in providing market space for new entrants or that wind energy forces 
retirement of other generation. While logical and not surprising, this aspect of the 
electrical power system has not been investigated with respect to wind deployment. 
Regardless, this finding is significant, considering that the US generation fleet and others 
throughout the world are rapidly approaching the end of the life for much of the existing 
capital stocks. 
The emergence of demand as an overarching factor in the deployment of wind is 
not surprising but previous investigations by Kneifel (2008) and Maguire (2010), did not 
reach a similar conclusion. These researchers found demand as statistically insignificant 
within their models. This finding may be an artifact of the study periods. Both Maguire 
and Kneifel examined periods prior to the 2008 financial crisis. This study spanned that 
period and extended through the demand decreases that occurred during the 2008 
financial crisis. The demand decreases were associated with decreasing wind deployment 
as utilities forecast lower growth in electrical demand and cut back on purchases from 
new assets. In other words, the correlations in these earlier studies may not have been as 
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strong, since deployment levels were lower and were not subject to correlation with 
increasing then decreasing demand.   
The finding that imports and exports of power are an important factor agrees with 
previous studies. Yin and Powers found that found that an import-export ratio is positive 
and significant. Gong found that the percent of renewables a state imports or exports is 
also positive and significant. The operationalization in this study examined the difference 
between in-state demand and in-state supply in TWh, with negative values for states that 
must import and positive values for those states that export, unlike previous studies that 
utilized percentages or ratios. Regardless, the agreement across studies leads additional 
support that imports and exports are a determining factor for wind energy deployment. 
Importantly, this indicates that interstate transmission capabilities are an important factor 
for wind energy and interstate linkages should be promoted. 
Retail electricity prices were not significant, which agrees with a number of 
previous studies (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010; 
Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Yin & Powers, 2010). However, this disagrees with the 
countervailing findings by Hitaj (2012) of a positive effect with prices, and negative 
findings by Carley (2009).  
Finally, wind energy PPA prices were found by this study as statistically 
insignificant. This finding is counter to Bohn and Lant (2011), who found a weak 
negative association with price and deployment. The finding is also counter to findings 
by Kneifel that a weighted average of renewable energy prices for the US is negative for 
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non-hydropower renewables. The finding is consistent with the economic effects of an 
RPS and likely indicates a lack of price sensitivity because of the RPS and PTC subsidy.   
In summary, the systemic examination of the main drivers that influence wind 
energy deployment supports the main argument of this study that the economic context 
and supportive infrastructures are important factors to consider with policies. Based on 
the quantitative analysis and comparison across cases, the deployment of wind is in large 
part determined by demand for electricity. This demand can be from economic growth, or 
the retirement of assets. Some portion of the total demand is set aside by capacity 
policies, such as the RPS or spurred on by MGPO policies. The locations that are 
successful for the deployment of wind are conditioned on the availability of resources, 
transmission and the flexibility of the generation assets within the jurisdiction. States 
with greater baseload resources decrease the deployment, while flexible peaking 
resources are less competitive with wind energy. States also developed resources to assist 
with deficiencies of in-state production or to export power. 
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Research 
Summary of Findings 
 This study assessed the determinants of wind energy development in the United 
States. The population in this study consists of 35 states that have wind resource 
potentials greater than 1000 MWs within the 48 contiguous US states. The study period 
extended from 2001 to 2012. The determinants of wind energy assessed consists of 
policies, infrastructure, and contextual variables. The specific policies assessed included 
the federal and state PTC, state level RPS mandatory deployment requirements, sales tax 
relief, property tax relief, the potential for a federal permitting process, and grid 
governance by RTO-ISOs. The infrastructure variables assessed include transmission, 
baseload, intermediate, and peaking generation along with retirement of generation 
assets. The contextual variables include the wind energy potential, import, and export of 
electricity, electricity demand, wind energy prices, and electricity prices.    	
This study assesses these factors through two principle methods, quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis consisted of three models: (1) a policy and 
contextual factors model, (2) an infrastructure and contextual model, and (3) a combined 
policy, infrastructure and contextual model. This modeling approach was utilized to 
assess the relative strengths of the infrastructure and policy variables. Three qualitative 
cases were selected by assessing the model residuals to determine the two states (Iowa 
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and Ohio) that varied the most and the one state (Nebraska) that deviated the least from 
the model findings. Of the two states that varied the most from the predicted values, one 
state (Iowa) deployed greater amounts of wind power than predicted, while the other state 
(Ohio) deployed less wind power than expected. 
Quantitative modeling found that the overarching factor determining the 
deployment of wind energy in this study is in-state demand. Transmission deployment 
within each state is also highly significant and is the second largest factor in increasing 
wind deployment. Lead-lag analysis indicates a higher probability that transmission 
deployment leads wind deployment. Imports and exports are the third largest factor; 
therefore, states not only deploy wind energy to decrease imports but also to increase 
exports. Retirement of electrical facilities is the next largest contributor to deployment, 
with a bi-directional relationship where retirement of facilities leads to wind energy 
deployment and conversely, wind energy deployment leads to retirement. Sales tax and 
RPS policies also contribute to wind energy but the effects of sales tax are less 
significant. Deployment of wind leads RPS requirements, indicating that wind plants are 
placed in service to meet anticipated mandatory requirements.	
The baseload, intermediate, and peaking generation sources show a pattern of 
declining influence to wind deployment. In other words, the presence of less flexible 
baseload power decreases wind deployment by a greater amount than intermediate 
resources. Finally, peaking resources are not statistically significant in the model 
indicating that these resources are not competitive with wind. The deployment of 
intermediate generation resources tends to lead the deployment of wind. Deployment of 
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intermediate resources in advance of wind energy supports the hypothesis that more 
flexible generation assets are favorable to the incorporation of wind energy. 	
The PTC and PPA prices are not significant in the model. The lack of significance 
of the PTC is surprising; however, within this study, there is a lack of variance of the 
PTC level across the states while state level deployment varies significantly. The federal 
PTC is uniform across states, and the PTC subsidy increases relatively slowly during the 
later period of this study when most wind development occurs, leading to a low potential 
of correlation between this instrument as operationalized and the deployment of wind 
power. The PTC did expire twice during this study in 2002 and 2004; but deployment 
levels were low in comparison to the levels from 2005 to 2012 when the PTC was in 
force. Furthermore, state level PTC programs are in states that have limited deployment, 
except for Oklahoma, which has had a decreasing PTC. A lack of correlation of PPA 
prices and deployment indicates that wind power is largely insensitive to price, which is 
likely a result of the economic effects of the RPS combined with the PTC. Therefore, 
although the quantitative findings did not indicate the PTC was a significant factor, the 
lack of price sensitivity would tend to support this instrument as a positive factor for 
wind deployment.	
A fixed-effects model was determined as the appropriate and consistent model for 
the quantitative analysis. This type of model accounts for variation within states to 
estimate the effect of the individual regressors to the level of wind energy deployment. 
As such, the effects of time-invariant variables including the use of federal lands as a 
proxy to examine avoidance of extensive permitting processes and the wind energy 
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potentials could not be determined. 	
The model results were tested through several methods. Initially, the underlying 
data was examined via plots of the individual regressors to the dependent variable. These 
plots were constructed to consider the potential for non-linear relationships. The plots 
were assembled to examine the aggregate data and within state data. Non-linear 
relationships were not identified within the data. Additional checks were performed by 
serially extracting the data from states with the highest deployment (California, Texas, 
and Iowa). For the most part, the findings remained the same through this analysis. Time 
was incorporated as a variable and found significant, thus indicating that additional 
factors outside of the study regressors account for a portion of the variance over time. 
These factors may include but not be limited to technological improvements in wind 
generation, breaking down of institutional operational and governance variables that 
allow for operation of the grid at higher wind penetration and acceptance by utilities of 
wind as a viable resource. 	
Finally, step-wise fixed effects and between models were constructed. The step-
wise fixed effects models showed that the cross-correlation of the infrastructure variables 
did not affect model stability. The step-wise between model showed that the RPS, wind 
resources and the import and export of power were factors that affect the mean of the 
deployment across states.  
The qualitative assessment of the cases showed that wind potential is likely be a 
significant determinant of wind energy development. Comparing Ohio, which has very 
little wind potential with Iowa that has a very high potential, the infrastructure and 
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contextual variables are more favorable in Ohio; however, the wind potential is much 
lower. Considering Nebraska and its high wind potential, the transmission is limited and 
export appears constrained, thus limiting comparisons with the other two states. No 
determination could be made from these cases on the effects of a permitting process, 
since each of these state utilizes the same process and the level of federal lands within 
each is very low.   
Conclusions 
This study has shown that supportive infrastructures should be considered when 
targeting policy prescriptions for a particular activity such as wind generation. 
Considering the domestic and international implications of these findings, 
complementary policies are necessary for complementary economic inputs to foster wind 
development. In other words, for states that desire to deploy utility scale wind power to 
address climate change or to meet climate commitments, these states should promulgate 
policies for to support complimentary generation and transmission assets that are 
complementary to wind. While prescriptive policy transference may not be effective, the 
findings for the complementary infrastructures should apply across states. In addition, the 
principle of decreasing the relative price of wind power of providing the set-asides for 
demand is also necessary. Therefore, governments that desire to foster a robust wind 
industry should promulgate policies to provide a supportive constellation of factors for 
deployment. 
Thus, four principles should guide policymakers in states that wish to foster wind 
energy development (1) utilizing policies such as an RPS and other means to increase 
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renewable energy demand, (2) providing incentives or policies that support the 
transmission necessary to bring wind from resource areas to markets, (3) promoting 
supporting complementary generation that allows for the integration of large scale 
variable resources, such as wind, and (4) providing the means to make wind the lowest 
cost power source relative to the conventional or fossil generation.  These supportive 
principles should be implemented in a temporal fashion. By examining the leads and lags, 
the data show that states with similar contextual profiles that install transmission and 
complementary generation (or electricity storage) increase the deployment of wind 
energy. By following these four principles, this study has indicated that wind deployment 
will be stimulated. By following these principles, states should be able to accelerate their 
energy systems towards sustainability.   
For developing states, the institutional knowledge and technologies that allow for 
the complex management of intermittent resources should be transferred. Advanced grid 
integration technologies are necessary since electricity storage methods are currently 
rapidly improving and costs are decreasing. Improvements in battery technology should 
allow for even higher levels of intermittent resource penetration; however, considering 
the energy density requirements of urban areas, importation of utility scale power appears 
necessary for the near future. Regardless, improved storage methods combined with 
higher renewable energy capture efficiencies may allow developing nations to “leap-
frog” the current grid models and move to a more decentralized electrical energy system.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
	
	
	
	
202
For wind power and infrastructures, additional research should be conducted to 
explore the relationship of existing capacity in transmission systems to the deployment of 
wind energy systems. Although this study approximated this relationship through the 
number of circuit miles of transmission that were deployed within states, this proxy may 
not reflect the initial available levels of capacity across states, since voltages and hence, 
capacities vary across lines.  
Similarly, additional investigation of the effects of various forms of generation 
could benefit from additional research. The three categories of generation, baseload, 
intermediate, and peaking are sufficient for an initial examining of the relationship of 
various types of generation; however, the baseload category contains multiple power 
generation technologies whose effects should be disaggregated further. An examination 
of the particular baseload generation technologies may lead to a determination of 
particular baseload technologies that are more amenable to wind energy deployment. 
Furthermore, an examination of the relationship between battery or other emerging 
electricity forms of storage should also be conducted. Many of these technologies have 
reactive times lower than fossil forms of energy and may exhibit an elevated 
complementary nature to wind or other renewables.   
Wind energy policy researchers need to develop superior measurements that 
capture the magnitude of the policy effects. In particular, improvements in 
operationalizing the sales tax and property tax variables are necessary to obtain measures 
that provide equivalent scales for these policies. For example, tax relief varies county by 
county and this variable needs to be measured based on dollars per MW (or MWhr) of 
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support. Similarly, the PTC and sales tax variables could benefit from similar treatment 
that allow for similar scaling of the variables effects to the dependent variable.   
Considering the demand policies, the quantification of the purchases of green 
power could be markedly improved. In addition, the distinction could be improved for the 
purchases required under mandatory purchase policies versus the purchases under 
voluntary programs. Preliminary research indicates that use of voluntary purchase 
programs is increasing rapidly (Heeter, et al., 2014). The disaggregation of these 
purchases may lead to improvements in the estimates for the effects of demand policies, 
versus voluntary purchases.   
On a broad scale, this study has shown that policymakers need to consider the 
relationship of policies, supportive infrastructures, and contextual factors when 
formulating policy prescriptions that target a particular sector or activity. The lens of 
looking back at patterns of development for targeted activities is important in determining 
interrelationships and shows where targeted policies may be improved. The relationship 
of targeted policies to the supportive infrastructures should be investigated to understand 
relationship of policy promulgation to policy effectiveness. Policy research in this 
overarching subject area may lead to more fruitful and effective policies.  
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BLM -  Bureau of Land Management 
DOE -   United States Department of Energy 
DOI -   United State Department of the Interior 
DSIRE -  Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy 
EIA -   United States Energy Information Agency 
ERCOT - Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
FERC -  Federal Regulatory Energy Commission 
GAO -  United State Government Accountability Office 
IOU -   Investor Owned Utility 
ISO -   Independent System Operators 
IEA -  International Energy Agency 
kV -  Kilovolt 
LSE -   Load Serving Entity 
LCOE -  Levelized Costs of Electricity 
MGPO - Mandatory Green Power Option 
MW -   Megawatt 
MWh  Megawatt-hour 
NERC -  North American Electric Reliability Council 
NREL -  National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
PPA -   Power Purchase Agreement 
PUC -  Public Utilities Commission 
PTC -   Production Tax Credit 
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RPS -   Renewable Portfolio Standard 
RTO -   Regional Transmission Organization 
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Baseload – minimal amount of electricity demand through a 24-hour period 
 
Baseload Generation – electricity generation assets typically dispatched to address the 
minimal daily load. 
 
Capacity Factor - the ratio between the ideal full load output over time and actual 
generation over time for a particular generator 
 
Circuits - the number of conducting lines on a particular transmission facility 
 
Circuit-miles - the distance the individual circuits on a transmission or distribution line 
cross 
 
Combined cycle power plant – a dual-stage generation technology (typically natural gas) 
that creates electricity from the driving force of a simple-cycle turbine, subsequently 
capturing the exhaust gases form the turbine to generate steam that is used to produce 
additional electricity 
 
Corporate Tax Incentives – a broad class of policy instruments that includes tax 
exemptions, credits and deductions available for renewable energy developers and 
producers 
 
Dispatch – selection of generation assets to meet demand for electricity 
 
Distribution - the movement of electricity into local areas for consumption 
 
Flexibility – the ability of a group of generators to ramp to meet changes in demand. 
 
Green Power Purchasing – a regulatory policy that requires the purchase of renewable 
energy by a particular consumer, such as the state. 
 
Hard Infrastructure – the physical structure and facilities necessary for the operation of an 
enterprise. 
 
Independent System Operator – a form of transmission and grid operation governance 
intended to provide non-discriminatory access to electricity markets and transmission 
 
Intermediate Demand – electricity demand above the baseload demand for the system, 
but below peak requirements  
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Intermediate Generation – electricity generation assets dispatched to address the demand 
above baseload, but below peaking requirements – typically natural gas combined cycle 
technologies. 
 
Kilovolt – 1000 volts, where a volt is a unit of electromotive force 
 
Load – demand for electricity 
 
Mandatory Green Power Option – a regulatory policy that requires consumers to be 
informed of the various types of generation that are available and allows for purchase of 
the consumer selected type 
 
Megawatt (MW) – a unit of power equal to one million watts 
 
Megawatt-hour (MWh) – a measurement of power equivalent to the use of one million 
watts continuously for one hour 
 
Nameplate Capacity – the theoretical output capacity of a generating unit operating 100% 
of the year 
 
Peak Demand – the highest demand for electricity within a period of time. 
Peaking Generation – electrical generation that meets the highest demand periods, 
typically natural gas simple-cycle, reciprocating engines, or other rapid start and/or 
ramping technologies. 
 
Power Curve – the output of a wind turbine as a function of increasing speed. 
 
Production Tax Credit – a policy instrument that generates tax credits to a qualifying 
resource, typically based on the number of kWh of generation. 
 
Property Tax Incentive – a policy that provides tax relief for the land improvements 
associated with renewable energy facilities. 
 
Ramping – change in the electricity output of a particular generator over time as 
controlled by operators. Ramping typically occurs in fossil fuel plants, not renewable, 
which are governed by natural inputs. 
 
Ramping Rate – the rate of change of electricity output from a particular generator, 
baseload assets typically have lower ramping rates, while peaking assets have the fastest 
ramping rates. 
 
Regional Transmission Organization – an organization for transmission and grid 
operation governance intended to provide non-discriminatory access to electricity 
markets and transmission similar to an Independent System Operator 
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Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard – standards typically enacted on a state level that 
prescribe a certain percentage of electricity sold or produced within a state be produced 
by renewable resources 
 
Sales Tax Incentives – a form of corporate tax relief where the sales tax within a 
jurisdiction is lower or dismissed for renewable energy developers. 
 
Simple Cycle Power Plant – electrical generation technology that typically uses liquid or 
gaseous combustible fuels as the driving force of a turbine to create electricity 
 
Soft Infrastructure – the societal organizational structures (rules, laws and processes) that 
are associated with the governance of a particular enterprise 
 
Steam Turbine – a device that converts pressurized steam to rotational energy 
 
Transmission – the infrastructure to move electrical energy from generation source to 
load centers (See distribution)  
 
Turbine – a device that produces rotary power by converting fluid movement 
 
Variable costs - production costs for electrical generators that change with variations in 
output 
 
Watt – a unit of power equivalent to one joule per second 
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Table C-1: Nameplate Capacity of Wind Energy Deployed in Sample States (MWs)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 128 138 238 
AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 1683 1823 2025 2095 2149 2376 2439 2537 2798 3253 3927 5542 
CO 61 61 223 231 231 291 1067 1068 1244 1299 1800 2301 
ID 0 0 0 0 75 75 75 76 147 353 618 973 
IL 0 0 50 51 107 107 699 915 1547 2045 2743 3568 
IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 131 1036 1339 1340 1543 
IA 324 423 472 634 836 932 1273 2791 3604 3675 4322 5133 
KS 114 114 114 114 264 364 364 921 1021 1074 1274 2713 
ME 0 0 0 0 0 9 42 47 175 266 397 431 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 120 120 
MA 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 6 15 18 46 103 
MI 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 144 138 164 377 988 
MN 320 338 558 600 745 896 1300 1753 1810 2205 2733 2987 
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 163 309 457 459 458 
MT 0 0 1 1 137 146 153 271 375 386 386 645 
NE 3 14 14 14 73 73 72 117 153 213 337 459 
NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 
NH 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 25 25 25 26 171 
NM 1 1 206 266 406 496 496 497 597 700 750 778 
NY 48 48 48 48 186 370 425 832 1274 1274 1403 1638 
ND 0 5 66 66 98 178 345 714 1203 1424 1445 1680 
OH 0 0 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 10 112 428 
OK 0 0 176 176 475 535 689 708 1031 1482 2007 3134 
OR 157 218 259 263 338 438 885 1067 1758 2104 2513 3153 
PA 35 35 129 129 129 179 294 361 748 748 789 1340 
SD 3 3 44 44 44 44 98 187 313 709 784 783 
TX 1096 1096 1290 1290 1992 2736 4353 7113 9403 10089 10377 12214
UT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 20 223 223 325 325 
VT 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 46 119 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WA 180 228 244 241 390 818 1163 1375 1849 2104 2573 2808 
WV 0 66 66 66 66 66 146 330 330 431 564 583 
WI 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 449 449 469 631 648 
WY 141 141 285 285 288 288 288 676 1099 1412 1412 1410 
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Table C-2: Total State and Federal PTC Value (cents/kWh) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
AR 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
CA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
CO 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
ID 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
IL 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
IN 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
IA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
KS 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
ME 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MD 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MI 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MN 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MO 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
MT 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
NE 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
NV 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
NH 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
NM 1.7 1 2.8 1 2.9 2.9 3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 
NY 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
ND 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
OH 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
OK 1.7 0 2.55 0.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.35 2.35 2.45 2.45 2.45 
OR 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
PA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
SD 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
TX 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
UT 2.05 0.35 2.15 0.35 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.45 2.45 2.55 2.55 2.55 
VT 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
VA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
WA 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
WV 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
WI 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
WY 1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
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Table C-3: Sales Tax Variable (Binary) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IA 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ME 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UT 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
WY 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table C-4: Property Tax Variable (Binary) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IL 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ND 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table C-5: RPS Total Capacity Requirements (GWh) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 35 69 104 120 164 215 678 713 748 878 1009 1118
AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 0 0 18676 20909 22851 26003 28479 31813 32839 43388 42962 49138
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 690 1316 1278 1081 2794 2763
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1086 4397 5557 6758 7634
IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IA 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1765 1771 1796
ME 3532 3308 3361 3615 3598 3436 3511 3571 2583 3543 3936 4007
MD 0 0 0 0 0 1838 2152 2620 2736 3509 4685 5519
MA 0 0 473 721 984 1199 1464 1669 5156 5852 6248 6631
MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4076
MN 0 2312 2213 2213 2873 4950 4027 4030 3995 7945 7925 10417
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1129 1138
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 472 468 943 946 928 
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NV 0 0 1271 1313 1205 1283 1979 1938 2526 2484 3111 3136
NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 631 803 1009 1082
NM 0 0 0 0 0 669 754 745 728 756 1196 1173
NY 0 0 0 0 0 1138 2359 3599 4834 2992 4453 5889
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 345 676 1314 1935
OK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1706 1677
PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 113 465 4313 5027 5552
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TX 0 5049 5049 5049 6824 6824 8994 8994 12907 12907 16820 16820
UT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2740 2740 2740
WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2232
WV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI 131 131 131 131 131 2594 2649 2713 2817 4154 4103 4065
WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table C-6: Total Acres of Federal Lands
State Total Federal Lands Acreage 
AZ 30,741,287 
AR 3,161,978 
CA 47,797,533 
CO 24,086,075 
ID 32,635,835 
IL 406,734 
IN 340,696 
IA 122,602 
KS 301,157 
ME 209,735 
MD 195,986 
MA 81,692 
MI 3,637,965 
MN 3,469,211 
MO 1,675,400 
MT 26,921,861 
NE 549,346 
NV 56,961,778 
NH 777,807 
NM 27,001,583 
NY 211,422 
ND 1,735,755 
OH 298,500 
OK 703,336 
OR 32,665,430 
PA 616,895 
SD 2,646,241 
TX 1,273,974 
UT 2,977,950 
VT 35,033,603 
VA 453,871 
WA 2,358,071 
WV 12,173,813 
WI 1,130,951 
WY 1,865,374 
AZ 30,043,513 
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Table C-7: RTO-ISO Territories (square miles) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 37656 45324 45324
CA 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IL 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519
IN 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826
IA 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857
KS 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759
ME 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843
MD 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 9707 
MA 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
MI 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539
MN 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627
MO 33615 33615 33615 33615 43307 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000
MT 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 24814 49628 74443 74443 74443 74443
NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NH 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 8953 
NM 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807
NY 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126
ND 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001
OH 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861
OK 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 68595 68595 68595 68595
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743
SD 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 52992 68382 68382
TX 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954
UT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VT 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 9217 
VA 11768 11768 11768 11768 0 39490 39490 39490 39490 39490 39490 39490
WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WV 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038
WI 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158
WY 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 
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Table C-8 Circuit Miles of Transmission Per state 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 
AR 4389 4450 4511 4572 4633 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697 4697 
CA 6518 6518 6518 6518 6518 6518 6981 7444 7908 8307 8833 9296 
CO 3051 3106 3161 3217 3272 3328 3427 3526 3626 3725 3824 3923 
ID 2443 2617 2757 2931 3106 3315 3440 3564 3689 3814 3855 3980 
IL 3499 3780 4005 4286 4567 4904 5236 5567 5899 6231 6341 6673 
IN 3779 3929 4050 4200 4351 4531 4848 5166 5483 5800 5906 6223 
IA 3814 3814 3814 3814 3814 3814 3879 3945 4010 4075 4097 4162 
KS 2292 2466 2606 2780 2955 2667 2791 2915 3039 3163 3204 3328 
ME 256 290 318 352 387 428 432 437 441 445 447 451 
MD 627 642 655 670 686 704 830 955 1081 1207 1249 1374 
MA 550 545 541 535 530 524 539 554 569 584 589 604 
MI 4358 4426 4481 4550 4618 4700 5100 5500 5900 6300 6433 6833 
MN 3074 3074 3074 3074 3074 3074 3296 3519 3741 3963 4037 4260 
MO 4471 4504 4530 4563 4596 4635 4679 4722 4766 4810 4824 4868 
MT 3529 3547 3562 3581 3599 3621 3621 3621 3621 3621 3621 3621 
NE 2125 2183 2229 2287 2345 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 
NV 2220 2220 2220 2220 2220 2220 2437 2655 2872 3089 3162 3379 
NH 205 248 282 324 367 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 
NM 2697 2697 2697 2697 2697 2697 2722 2746 2771 2796 2804 2829 
NY 2288 2321 2347 2380 2413 2453 2453 2453 2453 2453 2453 2453 
ND 2359 2394 2422 2457 2492 2534 2730 2927 3123 3319 3385 3581 
OH 4545 4566 4582 4603 4624 4649 5542 6435 7328 8221 8519 9412 
OK 4856 4876 4891 4911 4930 4954 5349 5745 6140 6535 6667 7062 
OR 3004 3004 3004 3004 3004 3004 3191 3377 3564 3751 3813 4000 
PA 3044 3157 3248 3362 3475 3611 3779 3948 4116 4284 4340 4509 
SD 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 
TX 14189 14726 15156 15693 16230 16874 18381 19888 21395 22902 23404 24911 
UT 1893 1954 2003 2064 2125 2198 2484 2770 3056 3342 3437 3723 
VT 117 143 163 189 214 245 250 256 261 266 268 273 
VA 3005 3005 3005 3005 3005 3005 3276 3547 3818 4089 4179 4450 
WA 2667 2716 2756 2805 2855 2914 3233 3552 3871 4190 4296 4615 
WV 1654 1738 1806 1890 1974 2075 2310 2545 2780 3015 3093 3328 
WI 2344 2413 2469 2538 2607 2690 3096 3503 3909 4315 4451 4857 
WY 2186 2280 2356 2450 2544 2657 2757 2857 2957 3057 3090 3190 
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Table C-9: Total Nameplate MWs of Baseload Generation 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 14282 14413 14963 14203 14215 14666 14666 14552 15143 15142 15142 15072
AR 9985 9997 9958 9958 9958 9958 9958 9495 9970 10690 10663 11472
CA 38485 37826 36479 36219 36308 35966 36000 35813 35625 35565 35045 34518
CO 5966 6016 6224 6228 6229 6229 6186 6164 6300 7038 6881 6753
ID 2600 2660 2681 2682 2682 2684 2677 2675 2677 2697 2697 2697
IL 33152 29870 30055 30091 30195 30192 30050 30013 30712 30497 29435 29957
IN 21788 22708 22663 22679 22647 22596 22585 21946 22560 22185 22036 21150
IA 7231 7231 7231 7228 7240 7240 8314 8242 8460 8258 8284 8246
KS 8674 8690 8653 8654 8653 8621 8621 8361 8540 8515 8547 8485
ME 2544 2637 2641 2659 2658 2658 2671 2495 2590 2589 2658 2544
MD 10037 9935 9940 9941 9941 9941 9973 10077 10077 10075 10112 9882
MA 8041 7116 6376 6415 6416 6415 6056 5956 5979 5979 5869 5970
MI 21030 21175 21204 21428 21455 21058 21110 20426 21000 20896 20778 20797
MN 8223 8498 8258 8266 8247 8191 8015 8360 8006 7999 8011 8058
MO 13704 13708 13655 13664 13663 13666 13660 13657 13657 14555 14841 14993
MT 5099 5102 5102 5108 5118 5279 5300 5265 5305 5293 5312 5334
NE 5129 5137 5104 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5850 5921 6174 6174
NV 4753 4779 4781 4760 4745 4559 4680 3286 4939 4947 4849 3224
NH 2855 2868 2868 2893 2891 2891 2845 2831 2848 2837 2837 2839
NM 5343 5388 5387 5404 5334 5334 5334 5265 5334 5326 5327 5302
NY 27121 27391 27452 27893 27455 27304 26950 26170 26128 25245 25294 24920
ND 4781 4781 4840 4878 4878 4878 4878 4878 4883 4883 4883 4881
OH 26838 26793 26653 26847 26571 26531 26336 26041 26086 25597 25674 23620
OK 12577 12714 12750 12750 12755 12565 12442 12321 12439 12270 12394 12299
OR 8894 9103 9068 9089 9127 9146 9167 9143 9202 9162 9178 9258
PA 34636 34558 34496 35034 34727 34747 34423 34561 34563 34530 33762 32935
SD 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2083
TX 62241 63455 63201 63644 62943 61287 60010 54298 53533 56711 56029 55026
UT 5250 5352 5472 5579 5660 5660 5629 5629 5630 5629 5629 5629
VT 13514 13463 13474 13474 13393 13380 13387 13355 13381 13463 13463 13617
VA 936 940 948 948 948 948 948 961 963 963 965 965 
WA 23579 23577 23611 23665 23696 23714 23809 23731 23898 24034 23951 23986
WV 15678 15725 15725 15725 15805 15797 15696 15692 15696 15696 16516 15341
WI 10057 10065 9976 9737 9772 9769 9774 10362 10380 10847 11620 11707
WY 6389 6392 6475 6476 6482 6482 6482 6577 6578 6698 7131 7131
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Table C-10: Total Nameplate MWs of Intermediate Generation 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 1786 3325 6319 10901 11635 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11939
AR 236 1550 1735 4163 4667 4909 5588 5588 5588 5588 5588 5588
CA 4930 7251 11740 12505 16114 17750 17914 17777 19553 20762 20733 21489
CO 1252 1439 1987 2776 2789 2789 3121 3246 3246 3246 3201 3401
ID 375 375 375 375 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 641 
IL 533 3658 3558 3505 3505 3505 3505 3505 3505 3420 3420 3420
IN 387 1344 1909 3134 3134 3134 3134 3072 3072 3072 3072 3072
IA 83 83 702 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1248 1248 1314 1314
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ME 1375 1375 1377 1377 1377 1377 1377 1651 1651 1651 1389 1389
MD 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
MA 1988 2225 6689 6656 6671 6645 6645 6553 6638 6655 6648 6648
MI 2890 4014 5192 5192 5221 5230 5309 5309 5139 5139 5139 5150
MN 530 581 718 718 886 1457 1579 2223 2809 2809 2809 2809
MO 1833 2098 2170 2098 2153 2153 2184 2184 2184 2199 2214 2113
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NE 0 0 46 118 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 422 
NV 1541 1726 2625 3977 3943 5151 5395 6018 6018 5956 6514 6514
NH 0 606 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506
NM 79 79 256 256 323 973 1083 1783 1783 1783 1783 1741
NY 4622 4581 4581 5914 7874 8158 7726 7697 8105 9410 9604 9604
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OH 0 600 2826 2836 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2951 2996 4414
OK 1552 3044 5514 6870 6881 7408 7423 7423 7498 7498 8031 8035
OR 2117 2572 3169 3048 3048 3048 3531 3435 3435 3441 3441 3452
PA 1474 2508 5517 9063 9062 9062 9062 9062 9062 8940 9640 9640
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 324 
TX 19462 28849 35598 37053 37263 37683 38308 38153 40103 41193 42518 42158
UT 0 0 0 140 432 707 1275 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298
VT 2553 2415 2841 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 4346 4346
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WA 956 1604 2284 2558 2589 2484 2484 3453 3453 3453 3479 3511
WV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI 315 315 368 1032 2215 2401 2401 3004 3004 3004 3004 3030
WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table C-11: Total Nameplate MWs of Peaking Generation 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 1873 2515 3817 2147 2147 2142 2131 2407 2407 2407 3136 3336
AR 394 342 342 351 342 510 916 915 916 964 963 962 
CA 11203 11241 10981 11340 11486 11654 12119 12181 12825 13125 13364 13757
CO 1851 2649 3157 3244 3244 3242 3356 3662 3937 3951 3900 4100
ID 271 271 271 271 444 444 444 617 622 623 630 639 
IL 10859 12633 13887 14049 14350 14374 14359 14201 14231 14220 14138 14191
IN 3956 4278 3715 3881 4277 4304 4311 4301 4302 4311 4298 4310
IA 2088 2205 2248 2547 2593 2602 2659 2653 2653 2586 2570 2607
KS 2261 2386 2871 2978 2988 3071 3215 3683 4024 4014 4002 3908
ME 234 244 430 430 431 431 431 245 248 248 434 437 
MD 2307 2328 3134 3153 3153 3153 3180 3181 3185 3176 3178 3203
MA 2821 4060 2611 2626 2632 2609 2575 2591 2737 2726 2705 2710
MI 5266 6775 6821 6748 6681 6689 6617 6578 6797 6793 6774 6742
MN 2383 2597 2702 2728 3137 3057 3251 3529 3809 3785 3765 3777
MO 4066 5670 5793 5927 6259 6290 6295 5904 6311 6286 6250 6385
MT 64 64 107 107 109 164 164 164 164 255 405 447 
NE 1262 1265 1429 1889 1846 1850 1777 1775 1777 1779 1779 1824
NV 1048 975 975 1075 1075 1302 1299 1897 1905 1905 1767 1770
NH 147 147 157 155 156 156 144 132 135 135 124 129 
NM 673 1009 1026 1039 1033 1026 1023 1167 1180 1176 1156 1202
NY 6941 6694 7228 7304 7312 7301 7669 7562 7597 6914 7301 7195
ND 64 81 85 87 87 87 86 86 86 86 87 63 
OH 4571 6496 7271 7280 7272 7274 7488 7491 7492 7444 7447 7497
OK 1761 1830 1392 1400 1400 1274 1347 1693 1825 1815 1815 1742
OR 3 352 262 261 267 267 219 216 222 176 178 183 
PA 4641 5383 5406 5386 5387 5382 5397 5386 5410 5414 5709 5737
SD 691 730 730 718 913 1006 1005 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102
TX 8311 6870 6875 7573 7971 7934 8258 8484 8786 9840 9858 9813
UT 220 769 769 772 769 709 616 604 653 696 706 771 
VT 135 140 140 140 140 141 136 139 139 139 139 139 
VA 5893 6037 6724 7236 7251 7247 8096 8467 8666 8662 8572 8581
WA 1230 1306 1299 1306 1329 1329 1261 1193 1268 1278 1278 1282
WV 891 1235 1224 1483 1483 1483 1224 1224 1224 1224 1226 1226
WI 4070 4153 4261 4322 4722 4727 4749 4725 4727 4732 4776 4765
WY 92 209 209 209 317 317 266 266 266 266 266 270 
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Table C-12: Total Nameplate MWs of Generation Retirement 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 27 5 
AR 0 120 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 1 71 
CA 0 907 2091 630 22 438 54 82 50 210 71 652 
CO 10 88 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 115 125 135 
ID 16 10 3 3 0 19 6 33 4 281 14 39 
IL 0 0 0 2 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IN 2 403 174 3662 222 36 121 9 121 405 1130 1246 
IA 86 0 3 5 0 46 11 8 51 662 170 914 
KS 1 1 8 21 7 34 87 4 3 24 8 212 
ME 29 468 472 32 0 2 437 0 6 13 3 16 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 230 
MA 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 21 0 0 22 
MI 1 20 4 2 22 79 4 3 112 69 150 31 
MN 2 91 53 2 15 82 279 4 269 45 39 61 
MO 1 2 87 14 3 5 0 2 2 18 47 7 
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 26 
NV 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
NM 0 0 2 8 40 10 0 0 3 13 23 26 
NY 0 0 0 0 190 11 0 128 21 25 200 1636 
ND 3 21 98 79 603 194 593 454 95 884 37 383 
OH 0 373 174 0 284 0 66 102 2 570 12 2083 
OK 0 73 0 0 0 66 11 0 0 183 0 168 
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 75 0 0 0 0 
PA 0 569 227 382 217 3 318 1 0 4 774 873 
SD 75 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TX 6 13 341 1104 557 1532 1505 684 3904 959 1228 74 
UT 0 13 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 23 1 
VT 0 138 3 0 0 0 2 3 6 12 95 514 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 
WA 51 0 0 70 52 0 44 0 7 104 188 208 
WV 3 10 117 265 0 14 64 22 41 201 100 51 
WI 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 1177 
WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 
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Table C-13: Total Nameplate 
MWs of Potential Wind 
Generation 
State MWs 
AZ 10904.1 
AR 9200.3 
CA 34110.2 
CO 387219.5 
ID 18075.6 
IL 249882.1 
IN 148227.5 
IA 570714.2 
KS 952370.9 
ME 11251.2 
MD 1482.9 
MA 1028 
MI 59042.3 
MN 489270.6 
MO 274355.1 
MT 944004.4 
NE 917998.7 
NV 7247.1 
NH 2135.4 
NM 492083.3 
NY 25781.3 
ND 770195.8 
OH 54919.7 
OK 516822.1 
OR 27100.3 
PA 3307.2 
SD 882412.4 
TX 1901529.7 
UT 13103.7 
VT 2948.7 
VA 1793.3 
WA 18478.5 
WV 1883.2 
WI 103757.1 
WY 552072.6 
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Table C-14: PPA Price for Wind Generation ($/MWhr) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
AR $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
CA $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
CO $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
ID $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
IL $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
IN $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
IA $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
KS $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
ME $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MD $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MI $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
MN $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
MO $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
MT $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NE $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NV $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
NH $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
NM $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NY $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
ND $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
OH $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
OK $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
OR $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
PA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
SD $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
TX $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
UT $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
VT $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
VA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $76.37 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
WA $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
WV $75.74 $61.59 $61.59 $58.65 $58.65 $57.38 $68.34 $69.86 $71.00 $87.31 $57.35 $50.47
WI $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
WY $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
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Table C-15: In-State Electricity Demand (million MWhrs) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 62274 62601 64080 66933 69391 73253 77193 76268 73433 72833 74944 75063
AR 41732 42450 43108 43672 46165 46636 47055 46135 43173 48194 47928 46860
CA 247759 235213 243221 252026 254250 262959 264235 268155 259584 258531 261942 259538
CO 44236 45937 46495 46724 48353 49734 51299 52142 51036 52918 53458 53685
ID 21096 20700 21219 21809 21853 22762 23755 23901 22754 22798 23272 23712
IL 136034 138447 136248 139254 144986 142448 146055 144620 136688 144761 142886 143540
IN 97734 101429 100468 103094 106549 105664 109420 106981 99312 105994 105818 105173
IA 39444 40898 41207 40903 42757 43337 45270 45488 43641 45445 45655 45709
KS 35847 36714 36735 37127 39024 39751 40166 39516 38243 40421 40760 40293
ME 12152 11441 11972 12368 12363 12285 11860 11674 11283 11532 11415 11561
MD 61640 68380 71259 66892 68365 63173 65391 63326 62589 65335 63600 61814
MA 52496 53708 55514 56142 57228 55850 57139 55884 54359 57123 55570 55313
MI 102409 104714 108877 106606 110445 108018 109297 105781 98121 103649 105054 104818
MN 60687 62162 63087 63340 66019 66770 68231 68792 64004 67800 68533 67989
MO 73213 75001 74240 74054 80940 82015 85533 84382 79687 86085 84255 82435
MT 11447 12831 12825 12957 13479 13815 15532 15326 14326 13423 13788 13863
NE 24723 25661 25857 25876 26976 27276 28248 28811 28452 29849 29676 30828
NV 28167 29204 30132 31312 32501 34586 35643 35192 34284 33773 33916 35180
NH 10316 10383 10973 10973 11245 11094 11236 10977 10698 10890 10869 10870
NM 18727 19207 19330 19846 20639 21435 22267 22038 21647 22428 23042 23179
NY 144181 147440 144045 145082 150148 142238 148178 144053 140034 144624 144047 143163
ND 9810 10219 10461 10516 10840 11245 11906 12416 12649 12956 13737 14717
OH 155798 153407 152189 154221 160176 153429 161771 159389 146300 154145 154746 152457
OK 49667 49485 50428 50942 53707 54905 55193 56279 54537 57846 59847 59341
OR 45885 45255 45195 45636 46419 48069 48697 49187 47567 46026 47171 46689
PA 135272 139820 140369 143501 148273 146150 151573 150401 143747 148964 148757 144710
SD 8627 8937 9080 9214 9811 10056 10603 10974 11010 11356 11680 11734
TX 318044 320846 322686 320615 334258 342724 343829 347059 345296 358458 376065 365104
UT 23217 23267 23860 24512 25000 26366 27785 28192 27587 28044 28859 29723
VT 5585 5629 5352 5664 5883 5795 5864 5741 5497 5595 5550 5511 
VI 96453 100619 101510 105424 108850 106721 111570 110106 108462 113806 110228 107795
WA 78495 75404 78134 79982 83425 85033 85742 87333 90165 90380 93725 92336
WV 27669 28463 28297 28919 30152 32312 34184 34221 30271 32032 31239 30817
WY 65218 66999 67241 67976 70336 69821 71301 70122 66286 68752 68612 68820
WY 12950 12874 13254 13540 14138 14947 15536 16690 16562 17113 17418 16971
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Table C-16: Exports (positive) and Imports (negative) of electricity (million MWhrs) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
AZ 27637 31531 30316 37631 32088 31140 36148 43191 38538 38918 33181 35842 34436
AR 5460 5162 7293 8256 1630 5533 7541 8916 14285 12806 13380 18146 13816
CA -49163 -51003 -50432 -57246 -53957 -46160 -53387 -60171 -54808 -54405 -61137 -60019 -56973
CO 2640 -337 122 1145 1264 964 2608 1300 -470 -2197 -2025 -1128 -475 
ID -11749 -10913 -10796 -10946 -11028 -9376 -12271 -11930 -9654 -10773 -6703 -8213 -8251
IL 43215 49607 52807 52704 49134 49979 54206 54855 57176 56591 56614 54025 61334
IN 24836 24179 24420 24676 23823 24826 21218 22529 17358 19187 16313 9523 6931
IA 1215 1630 909 2345 1399 2146 4519 7599 8219 12064 10717 10966 10386
KS 8902 10474 9833 9656 6839 5773 9956 7114 8434 7503 4600 4132 8954
ME 7413 11094 7000 6731 6481 4531 4269 5421 5067 5487 4559 2868 2238
MD -12578 -20101 -19015 -14839 -15703 -14216 -15193 -15965 -18814 -21728 -21782 -24004 -26429
MA -14018 -11680 -7129 -8642 -9713 -10252 -10063 -13379 -15392 -14318 -17515 -19115 -20717
MI 9437 13175 2470 11881 11175 4539 10013 9209 3082 7902 4116 3348 2500
MN -12164 -9384 -8036 -10976 -13000 -13532 -13753 -14029 -11512 -14130 -15413 -15795 -16127
MO 6332 6161 12985 13579 9888 9671 5620 6647 8667 6228 10621 9369 9817
MT 12785 12643 13444 13832 14460 14429 13399 14311 12387 16368 16341 13942 13581
NE 5762 5957 4599 6133 4489 4394 4195 3563 5550 6781 6419 3389 7175
NV 5709 2885 3063 6355 7713 -2726 -2973 -102 3421 1373 -1980 -7 1366
NH 4759 5570 10624 12903 13225 10970 12041 11900 9466 11306 9197 8394 8791
NM 14885 11455 13406 13094 14497 15831 13718 14972 18027 13824 15139 13457 12859
NY -266 -7848 -6402 -7117 -3261 27 -2299 -3731 -6883 -7662 -6567 -7395 -8064
ND 20522 21087 20861 19420 21093 19636 19318 20319 21547 21784 21343 21408 19639
OH -13536 -6338 -5551 -5875 -3200 2005 -6615 -5977 -10210 -10547 -19160 -22711 -12095
OK 5582 9698 10199 9788 14901 15710 17626 20050 20530 14405 14759 18556 14490
OR -833 1844 3771 5745 2906 5272 6381 9531 9124 9101 12524 14244 12841
PA 61305 64503 65981 71158 69818 72662 74515 71950 75749 80788 78558 78710 81740
SD -1226 -1215 -1136 -1704 -3290 -2924 -4466 -3891 -2813 -1306 319 300 -1684
TX 54536 64783 56514 69684 62411 57859 61663 57729 51872 53237 59412 64709 65980
UT 12637 13341 14164 13700 13165 14897 17588 18387 15956 14205 11977 9680 12489
VT -104 -173 676 -194 -166 1289 -40 1079 1785 1025 1226 1059 1358
VA -22348 -25613 -26201 -26524 -29907 -33651 -33209 -37427 -38380 -40840 -43557 -37056 -32849
WA 4554 27361 21961 22183 18541 23170 21248 23495 14305 13093 21538 24499 20332
WV 54168 66299 66415 60831 63474 61504 59749 56902 40512 48757 47761 42596 44536
WI -6455 -8568 -7119 -7531 -8511 -8181 -7910 -6642 -6327 -4438 -5323 -5077 -3180
WY 31827 30910 30373 31268 31429 30453 30097 29810 29467 31006 30220 32618 35331
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Table C-17: Electricity Price (cents per kWhr) 
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AZ 6.01 5.57 5.53 5.64 6.25 6.93 6.92 7.57 7.54 7.25 7.38 7.57 
AR 7.18 7.13 7.24 7.37 7.69 8.12 8.42 8.99 9.42 9.53 9.58 9.67 
CA 11.16 12.14 11.76 11.32 11.57 12.71 12.73 12.42 13.14 12.94 12.99 13.44 
CO 6.01 6 6.76 6.94 7.63 7.61 7.77 8.56 8.29 9.12 9.35 9.36 
ID 4.92 5.57 5.25 4.97 5.11 4.94 5.05 5.68 6.49 6.54 6.43 6.89 
IL 6.88 6.89 6.84 6.78 6.91 7.03 8.45 9.22 9.15 9.1 8.96 8.39 
IN 5.3 5.34 5.37 5.58 5.88 6.46 6.5 7.09 7.62 7.67 8 8.29 
IA 6.12 5.98 6.09 6.38 6.65 6.97 6.8 6.88 7.36 7.63 7.54 7.67 
KS 6.18 6.25 6.3 6.33 6.5 6.83 6.79 7.39 7.96 8.3 8.82 9.28 
ME 10.56 10.36 9.83 9.69 10.63 11.8 14.59 13.79 13.11 12.83 12.57 11.81 
MD 6.57 6.16 6.43 7.15 8.09 9.91 11.47 12.98 13.08 12.67 11.92 11.27 
MA 11.56 10.04 10.55 10.76 12.16 15.43 15.15 16.23 15.44 14.24 14.1 13.78 
MI 6.96 7.07 6.84 6.94 7.21 8.11 8.51 8.91 9.39 9.86 10.37 10.94 
MN 5.94 5.77 5.99 6.23 6.59 6.95 7.41 7.78 8.14 8.39 8.64 8.84 
MO 5.97 6.01 5.98 6.03 6.06 6.23 6.49 6.81 7.32 7.71 8.23 8.42 
MT 6.51 5.7 6.14 6.41 6.72 6.91 7.13 7.72 7.58 7.84 8.24 8.25 
NE 5.35 5.5 5.59 5.67 5.82 6.04 6.25 6.56 7.2 7.49 7.85 8.31 
NV 7.77 8.36 8.24 8.48 8.97 9.54 9.88 9.83 10.24 9.61 8.84 8.83 
NH 10.94 10.59 10.83 11.38 12.53 13.86 13.98 14.64 15.1 14.83 14.74 14.2 
NM 7.15 6.71 6.98 7.09 7.49 7.36 7.42 8.3 8.08 8.36 8.7 8.78 
NY 11.51 11.11 12.42 12.52 13.89 15.21 15.19 16.38 15.4 16.34 15.82 15.08 
ND 5.5 5.47 5.49 5.72 5.94 6.23 6.44 6.72 6.68 7.14 7.55 7.85 
OH 6.61 6.75 6.73 6.89 7.06 7.7 7.9 8.39 9.02 9.13 9.01 9.11 
OK 6.02 5.5 6.27 6.44 6.76 7.25 7.23 7.72 6.92 7.52 7.72 7.5 
OR 5.45 6.31 6.18 6.2 6.34 6.53 7.02 7.24 7.47 7.56 8.04 8.21 
PA 8.01 8.06 8.02 8 8.26 8.67 9.07 9.33 9.61 10.3 10.43 9.9 
SD 6.35 6.25 6.35 6.45 6.6 6.7 6.89 7.15 7.4 7.84 8.06 8.49 
TX 7.33 6.61 7.44 7.89 9.06 10.29 10.1 10.91 9.85 9.32 8.94 8.52 
UT 5.21 5.38 5.4 5.67 5.91 5.96 6.38 6.47 6.75 6.92 7.1 7.8 
VT 6.18 6.21 6.26 6.42 6.62 6.84 7.11 7.98 8.93 8.68 8.83 9.06 
VA 10.86 10.87 10.98 11.03 10.95 11.37 12.04 12.33 12.76 13.24 13.8 14.22 
WA 5.37 5.87 5.86 5.78 5.86 6.16 6.36 6.54 6.58 6.65 6.77 6.94 
WV 5.07 5.11 5.13 5.13 5.15 5.04 5.34 5.61 6.66 7.44 7.88 8.13 
WI 6.07 6.27 6.64 6.87 7.47 8.11 8.47 9 9.37 9.77 10.2 10.27 
WY 4.46 4.68 4.77 4.98 5.16 5.27 5.3 5.68 6.09 6.2 6.58 7.2 
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APPENDIX E  
 
Lead-Lag Analysis Plots 
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Correlation of Deployment and RPS Requirements 
 
Deployment (black) vs RPS Requirements in GWhrs (red)
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Correlation of Deployment and Transmission 
 
Deployment (red) vs Transmission (black) 
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Correlation of Deployment and Intermediate Generation 
 
Deployment (black) vs Intermediate Generation (red) 
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Correlation of Deployment and Retirement of Facilities 
 
Deployment (black) vs Retirement of Generation (red) 
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Correlation of Deployment and Demand
 
Deployment (black) vs Demand (red) 
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Correlation of Deployment and Import-Export 
 
Deployment (black) vs Import-Export (red) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Scatterplots of Dependent Variables vs Independent Variables 
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Deployment vs IVs by State (States of AZ to MA) 
Deployment vs PTC by State 
 Deployment vs RPS 
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Deployment vs Federal Lands 
 Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory
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Deployment vs Transmission 
 Deployment vs Baseload Generation 
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Deployment vs Intermediate Generation
 Deployment vs Peaking Generation 
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Deployment vs Wind Resource 
 Deployment vs Retired Generation 
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Deployment vs PPA Price 
 Deployment vs Demand 
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Deployment vs Import-Export 
 Deployment vs Electricity Price 
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Deployment vs IVs by State (States of MI to OK) 
Deployment vs PTC 
 Deployment vs RPS 
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Deployment vs Federal Lands 
 Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory 
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Deployment vs Transmission 
 Deployment vs Baseload Generation 
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Deployment vs Intermediate Generation 
 Deployment vs Peaking Generation 
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Deployment vs Wind Resource 
 Deployment vs Retired Generation 
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Deployment vs PPA Price 
 Deployment vs Demand 
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Deployment vs Import-Export 
 Deployment vs Electricity Price 
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Deployment vs IVs (OR to WY) 
Deployment vs PTC 
 Deployment vs RPS 
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Deployment vs Federal Lands 
 Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory 
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Deployment vs Transmission 
 
Deployment vs Baseload Generation 
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Deployment vs Intermediate Generation 
 Deployment vs Peaking Generation 
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Deployment vs Wind Resource 
  
Deployment vs Retired Generation 
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Deployment vs PPA Price 
 Deployment vs Demand 
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Deployment vs Import-Export 
  
Deployment vs Electricity Price 
 
